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U prošlome smo se dvobroju Šumarskoga lista, obilježavajući 250. obljetnicu hrvatskoga šumarstva, osvrnuli na tekstove iz prvih godina njegovog tiskanja, povlačeći paralelu s današnjicom. Zbog uvida u povijesni slijed šumarske struke i interesantnost, pa i aktualnost tekstova, u ovome se dvobroju osvrćemo na tri teksta iz 1880. i 1881. god. vezana uz naslov. Prvi tekst odnosi se na "Naredbu c. k. ministarstva za poljodjelstvo od 13. veljače 1875, B 129/A. M., R.-G.-Bl. Br. 9, koja se odnosi na ispit za tehničko službovanje u državnoj šumskoj upravi" (po toj su Naredbi državni ispit polagali državni službenici u resornim ministarstvima u Pešti i Beču, da bi bili osposobljeni za rad u državnoj službi). Drugi tekst odnosi se na "Dopis od 3. studena 1880. Br. 24509, kojim poziva Visoka kralj. Zemaljska vlada ravnateljstvo Kralj. šumarskoga i gospodarskog učilišta u Križevcih, da sastavi posebno povjerenstvo koje bi imalo čim prije izraditi osnovu za preustrojstvo vladine naredbe od 10. siečnja god. 1850. tičuće se šumarskih državnih ispita u obće". Tako je Osnovu nove naredbe o polaganju državnog ispita za samostalnu šumarsku upravu u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji, sačinilo povjerenstvo u sastavu: F. Ž. Kesterčanek, Dragutin Hlava i Vladimir Kiseljak, a ona se kao i naredba iz 1875. ponajprije temelji na spomenutoj Naredbi od 16. siječnja iz 1850. god. I iskustvima susjednih zemalja. Ispit se održava svake godine u svibnju. Kandidat mora imati završen odgovarajući studij šumarstva, s dobrim ocjenama iz glavnih predmeta i najmanje trogodišnju praksu. Ispit je pismeni i usmeni, a provjerava se znanje iz predmeta: a) Šumogojstvo, b) Zaštita šuma i šumsko redarstvo, c) Šumska tehnologija i uporaba, d) Geodezija, e) Ustanovljivanje šumskih obhodnja, gospodarskih osnova . . . , f) Šumarska taksacija……s osobitim obzirom na proračunanje vriednosti šuma, šumarsko-financijsko gospodarenje…, g) Šumarsko graditeljstvo (šumski putovi i prometila kao i po šumarstvo važne gradjevine……h) Državno šumarsko upravoslovlje (šumski zakon, naredbe), i sl.), i) Odnošaj privatnog prava prema šumarstvu i lovstvu, j) Temeljna načela neposrednog oporezovanja, k) Obća načela lovstva, l) Obći pregled ratarstva". Nakon 8-satnog pismenog, drugi dan je dvosatni javni usmeni ispit za svakog kandidata, a potom nakon nekoliko dana slijedi konačni "u obližnjoj kojoj šumariji ili šumi". Kandidat se nakon ispita "može proglasiti "odlično" ili pako samo "jednostavno osposobljenim", a nesposobnim pronadjeni kandidat može ispit ponoviti u roku , što mu ga ispitno povjerenstvo (od tri člana) ustanovi". U Naredbi iz 1875. posebno smo uočili dio paragrafa u kojemu se kaže: "Ispitni povjerenik, koji je s kojim kandidatom u rodu ili u tastbinstvu, ne smije kod izpita istoga kandidata prisutan biti", a interesantno je napomenuti da se za prijavu ispita, uz diplomu i potvrdu o radnom stažu u struci, traže i stručne primjedbe i zabilješke koje je kandidat vodio tijekom radnoga staža. U ova dva teksta cilj nam je bio prikazati već tadašnju potrebu, propis, način polaganja i obujam materije za polaganje državnog ispita, a u trećemu (vežući ga usputno za današnje političko kadroviranje), nalazimo odgovor na pitanje naslovljeno u članku:"Usposobljuje li položeni drž. šumarski ispit za samostalno vodjenje službe i za najviše šumarske službe?" Ako ga sami sebi postavimo, odgovor bi bio "da", no ako stavimo ruku na srce i budemo iskreni "pa ćemo morati priznati, da je ipak velika razlika biti šumarskim upraviteljem ili ravnajućim visokim činovnikom. Tko vidi, što se dan na dan zbiva, naći će, da ima vrlo mnogo šumara, koji su pod nadzorom vrstnoga i svjesnoga nadčinovnika ne samo najbolji upravni činovnici, već kadkad upravo odlično postupaju u poslovanju; nu ako se oni odmaknu od svoje svere ili im se obzirom na dosadanje poslovanje predaje vrhovna uprava, pokazuju ovi inače toli vješti činovnici toliku nespretnost i počimaju obično tako naopako gospodariti, te se mora i proti volji pomisliti, da su potpuno nevješti. Ne ima svatko sposobnosti, da ono bude, što hoće, i uz najbolju volju može se dogoditi, da komu njegove vlastite naravne sposobnosti reknu: dovde i ne dalje. Ne treba tumačenja, da uslied ovakovih pogriešaka trpi ponajprije šuma". U daljnjem tekstu sugerira se umjerenost, spoznaja vlastitih sposobnosti i napredovanje pojedinca kroz praksu, korak po korak "do one časti, kojoj može po svojih sposobnostih najbolje zadovoljavati". Glede stanja nakon položenog državnog ispita i cijeloživotnog obrazovanja, kritički se osvrće na "izpitane šumare. Većina njih, osvjedočena, da je "svoju svrhu postigla", ne radi ništa, knjige bacila na stranu, na slavohlepnost je zaboravila, svi su postali prosti i dobroćudni građani, koji u miru sade svoj kupus, i samo nuzgredno obavljaju svoju službu kao šumari, što već davno i nisu. Drugi su opet nemirne glave, puni ideja, od kojih se pako ni jedna ne obistinjuje, jer kakove imadu hire, tako im se mijenjaju i osnove; . progutaju sve knjige, ali malo od toga čestita zapamte, .njihov je rad kadkad izvrstan, nu nikad trajan. i rietko kad komu koristi. Baš od ovih polaze naši, toli slabo "cienjeni veleumi!" Treći dio napokon, i to najmanji, jest cviet šumogojaca. Ugled njihova zvanja, koje su odabrali, im je prvo. Oni ne ostaju na stepenu časti, koju su postigli položivši državni ispit, već znajući, da sad tek počima pravi študij njihove struke, i da se u životu ništa ne uči, da se vremenom opet zaboravi, pomnožuju svoje znanje i izobrazuju se kao muževi, svjestni si svoje svrhe. No, i među tom elitom šumarske struke nisu svi jednaki, i oni imaju svaki svoj limit, pa "gdjekoji obnašaju časti, koje im ne pripadaju, niti bi ih postigli da se je gledalo njihovo znanje." Želeći dobro šumarskoj struci, "kad napokon neće biti kod naše struke prepoznanih veleuma, već gdje će svaki pripadnik šumarske struke sam si stvoriti službu, dokle već sižu njegove sposobnosti. To vrieme bit će zora sjajnoj budućnosti šumoznanstva!" Uredništvo ; In the last double issue of Forestry Journal, which was dedicated to the 250th anniversary of Croatian forestry, we reviewed the texts from the first years of its printing and drew a parallel with the present. In order to gain an insight into the historical sequence of the forestry profession and the interesting and contemporary nature of the texts, this double issue will focus on three texts from 1880 and 1881 dealing with the subject title. The first text refers to the "Instruction of the Ministry of Agriculture of February 13, 1875, B 129/A. M., R.-G.-Bl.No.9, dealing with the exam for technical service in the state forestry administration (according to this Instruction, state exams were taken by civil servants in the competent ministries in Budapest and Vienna, which qualified them for work in the public service). The second text refers to the "Letter of November 3, 1880, No. 24509, in which the High Royal Government invites the Administration of the Royal Forestry and Agriculture College in Križevci to form a special commission for the purpose of drawing up a basis for the reformation of the governmental instruction of January 10, 1850, relating to forestry state exams in general". The Basis of the new instruction for state exams for independent forestry administration in Croatia and Slavonia was drawn up by a commission consisting of F. Ž. Kesterčanek, Dragutin Hlava and Vladimir Kiseljak. Like the instruction of 1875, the new instruction was also primarily based on the already mentioned Instruction of January 16, 1850, as well as on the experience from neighbouring countries. The exam was held in May every year. A candidate had to have completed a study of forestry and received good grades in the main subjects, and had to have at least three years of working experience. The exam was in written and oral form, and the subjects included: a) Silviculture, B) Forest protection and forest service, c) Forest technology and use, d) Geodesy, e) Establishment of forest control, Management plans, ., f) Forest inventory . with particular reference to the calculation of forest value, forest-financial management ., g) Forest civil engineering (forest roads and vehicles, as well as forest structures ., h) State forest legislation (forest laws, instructions), and similar), i) Relationship between private rights on forestry and hunting, j) Basic principles of direct taxation, k) General principles of hunting management, and l) General review of farming". The 8-hour written part of the exam was followed by a two-hour public oral exam for each candidate. Several days later the final exam was taken in a "nearby forest office or a forest". After the exam, the candidate might receive the following grades: "excellent" or "just competent", while those found incompetent could retake the exam on a date set by a three- member examining board". The Instruction of 1875 contains a part of the paragraph stating the following: "An examiner who is a candidate´s blood relative or a relative-in-law must not be present at the exam of the said candidate". It is interesting to note that in order to take the exam, the candidates had to submit not only their diploma and a document confirming their work in the profession, but also professional comments and notes they kept in the course of work.These two texts show that the method of taking state exams and the amount of the matter examined were regulated very early. The third text (related to the present politically-based appointments) gives an answer to the question raised in the article:"Does passing the state forestry exam qualify a candidate for an independent running of the highest forestry service?" If we answer the question ourselves, the answer is "yes", but if we are honest, "we must admit that there is a great difference between being a forest manager and a managing high servant. Those who are aware of what is happening day by day will find that there are very many foresters who, supervised by a competent and conscientious superior servant, become not only the best managing servants but also the best workers; however, if removed from their sphere or if appointed to run the highest administration, those otherwise competent servants display such ineptitude and begin to manage in such an inappropriate manner that one cannot help but conclude that they are utterly incompetent. Not everybody is capable of being what he wants to be; try as hard as one might, one´s own natural abilities tell you: you can get no further than this. Needless to say, it is the forest that suffers most in the aftermath of such errors". The text goes on to recommend moderation, an awareness of one´s own abilities and individual advancement through practical work, step by step, "up to that honourable position which can be best fulfilled by one´s abilities". As for the status after passing the state exam and lifelong learning, the text critically reviews "foresters that have passed the state exam. The majority of them, satisfied with the fact that "they have achieved their purpose", do nothing, throw away the books, forget ambition and turn into simple and well-meaning citizens who plant their cabbage in peace and only carry out their service as foresters in passing. Others, on the other hand, are restless and full of ideas, of which none are realized; their whims are followed by their changing priorities; . they avidly read all the books but remember hardly anything, . their work is sometimes excellent but never of long lasting . and is rarely useful for anybody. This is where the majority of our, so badly "appreciated geniuses" originate. The third part, the smallest one, is the crown of forest managers. The reputation of the profession which they have chosen is their utmost priority. They do not bask in the glory of passing the state exam, but, knowing that this is where the true study begins and that the things learned at one time are usually forgotten later on, broaden their knowledge and educate themselves as men with a purpose firmly in mind". Yet, there are differences even among this elite of the forestry profession. Each of them has their own limit, so "some are in honourable positions that do not rightfully belong to them, nor would they achieve them if their knowledge was the foremost criterion." Our profession will advance and benefit "when we finally do away with the geniuses of the profession, and when every member of the forestry profession creates the service himself according to their abilities. This moment will mark the dawn of a splendid future of the forestry science!" Editorial Board

Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.