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President Clinton. We don't have prepared statements, but we will each make a very brief statement and then we'll take a couple of questions.

This article reflects on the prospect for an ASEAN peacekeeping force and regional security cooperation. I argue that progress on 'soft' security issues stands to facilitate a slow deepening of 'hard' security cooperation at the ASEAN level. Governments of ASEAN member states are still reluctant to develop a regional mechanism for conflict resolution, which they perceive to be a challenge to the norms of non-interference and state sovereignty. Yet, these norms are subject to dynamic shifts in the security environment that regional governments now have to manage. The establishment of mechanisms to address politically less controversial non-traditional security issues such as environmental challenges stands to further develop and consolidate military-to-military ties and deepen political trust among member states. An ASEAN standby force for emergency response and disaster relief has become a politically acceptable initiative and could set the stage for the development of an ASEAN peacekeeping force.

Since Bozizé led the CAR from March 15, 2003, to March 24, 2013, there has been resistance from some of the rebel forces. The rebellion continues because of the economic and political weaknesses in the CAR government. One of them comes from an opposition coalition known as Séléka who staged a rebellion in 2013 with the aim of overthrowing the Bozizé regime. After the fall of Bozizé, CAR's condition has worsened because Séléka rebels have committed gross human rights violations in the CAR. This is where the conflict develops from the conflict that was originally just a conflict of government-opposition, then widened and turned to religious conflicts. As a result, questions arise about the efforts and involvement of third parties in conflict resolution within the CAR and the social impacts of the conflict. This article attempts to answer questions which focuses on the involvement of third parties as peacekeepers in conflict areas. In this case, the authors use qualitative research methods in the form of literature studies such as books, journals, and scientific articles in supporting the final explanation. The result of this paper shows that the failure of Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as a peacekeeping force in the conflict in CAR in 2013-2015 is caused by human rights violation in the form of sexual exploitation. This has had a social impact on the lives of communities, especially women and children, suffer from physical and mental trauma resulting from conflict and become victims of human rights violations committed by MINUSCA.

The 1974 Cypriot War divided the island of Cyprus into two parts with a narrow demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the opposing Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces. The volatility and violence in this zone, called the 'Green Line', necessitated a constant UN peacekeeping presence that was achieved mainly with manned observation posts (OPs). About 150 of these posts were established by 1975 to maintain stability and prevent flare-ups, including any lethal exchanges between the two sides. By the early 1990s, many of the countries contributing peacekeepers to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) had become tired of the stalemate and the lack of progress in negotiations (peacemaking), so they withdrew their troops from the force. This necessitated a reduction in the number of constantly manned OPs from 51 in 1992 to 21 in mid-1993. Further downsizing of UNFICYP by the UN Security Council in 2004 gave rise to a new approach to monitor the DMZ and produce actionable intelligence. Cameras were installed in hot-spots in the Nicosia DMZ and more responsive patrols were introduced as part of the new 'concentration with mobility' concept. This was the first time a UN peace operation used unattended cameras to monitor a demilitarized zone. This article examines the UN's difficulties and successes using the remote cameras, especially during important incidents. Other technologies that aided UNFICYP are also reviewed for lessons that might assist an under-equipped United Nations in its watchkeeping function. Adapted from the source document.

"In diesem Beitrag wird die Möglichkeit einer ASEAN-Friedenstruppe und einer regionalen Sicherheitskooperation betrachtet. Ich argumentiere, dass Fortschritte bei 'weichen' Sicherheitsfragen eine stetige Vertiefung der 'harten' Sicherheitszusammenarbeit auf ASEAN-Ebene ermöglichen. Noch zögern die Regierungen der ASEAN-Staaten, einen regionalen Konfliktlösungsmechanismus zu entwickeln, da sie diesen als Infragestellung der Normen der Nichteinmischung und der staatlichen Souveränität sehen. Diese Normen hängen jedoch von dynamischen Veränderungen in der Sicherheitsumgebung ab, mit welchen die Regierungen konfrontiert sind. Die Einrichtung von Mechanismen um politisch weniger umstrittene, nicht-traditionelle Sicherheitsthemen anzugehen, wie z.B. Umweltherausforderungen, ist ein erster Schritt dahin, militärische Kooperationen weiter zu entwickeln, zu festigen sowie das politische Vertrauen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten zu vertiefen. Eine ASEAN-Abruftruppe für Notfall- und Katastrophenhilfe ist bereits eine politisch akzeptable Initiative geworden. Dies könnte den Weg für die Entwicklung einer ASEAN-Friedenstruppe festlegen." (Autorenreferat)

The 'debate' section of the Review aims at contributing to the reflection on current ethical, legal, or practical controversies around humanitarian issues.In this issue of the Review, we invited two experts in international humanitarian law (IHL) and multinational peace operations –Professor Eric DavidandProfessor Ola Engdahl– to debate on the way in which the involvement of a multinational force may affect the classification of a situation. This question is particularly relevant to establishing whether the situation amounts to an armed conflict or not and, if so, whether the conflict is international or non-international in nature. This in turn will determine the rights and obligations of each party, especially in a context in which multinational forces are increasingly likely to participate in the hostilities.