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Em 2013, após o golpe liderado pelo Séléka, que são grupos rebeldes muçulmanos, as milícias cristãs, também conhecidas como anti-Balaka, decidiram retaliar. Esta disputa violenta deteriorou as condições já pobres na República Centro-Africana (RCA). Embora a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) tenha estabelecido uma missão multidimensional de manutenção da paz na RCA, a MINUSCA não foi eficaz para conter o conflito e evitar uma crise humanitária. Assim, este artigo examina um novo conceito para a estruturação de forças de manutenção da paz na África, particularmente na República Centro-Africana, que é o estabelecimento de uma força africana permanente de manutenção da paz. Após uma pesquisa bibliográfica e uma entrevista com um observador militar brasileiro, que trabalhou na RCA, foi possível verificar que os contingentes militares nacionais que integram a MINUSCA enfrentam graves problemas, como baixo nível de treinamento de tropas, salários atrasados, parcialidade e até mesmo a violação dos direitos humanos da população civil, minando a credibilidade da ONU no país. A fim de melhorar a eficácia da força militar na RCA, uma força africana permanente de manutenção da paz, como um ramo da União Africana (UA) e sob o controle da MINUSCA, parece ter mais chances de ter sucesso, já que esta tropa seria mais imparcial, melhor remunerado e especificamente treinado para as operações de paz.

This study explores the issue of interpreters' positionality as outsiders to the forces' personnel and insiders to the local communities. Twenty local interpreters who worked in the different peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the Bosnian War, and seven members of the forces' personnel were surveyed on their personal and professional background, their experiences with working conditions and training as well as the particularities and challenges of PKOs. The results indicate that the status, motivations, hiring procedures, and working conditions of the interpreters changed under the different PKOs, and that this had an impact on the positionality of the interpreter. The findings suggest that specific training programs are needed to better train interpreters to work in PKOs, and that consideration should be given to the issue of how to better train peacekeeping forces to work with interpreters.

Since the failures of the United Nations of the early 1990s, the protection of civilians has evolved as a new norm for United Nations peacekeeping operations. However, a 2014 United Nations report found that while peacekeeping mandates often include the use of force to protect civilians, this has routinely been avoided by member states. What can account for this gap between the apparently solid normative foundations of the protection of civilians and the wide variation in implementation? This article approaches the question by highlighting normative ambiguity as a fundamental feature of international norms. Thereby, we consider implementation as a political, dynamic process where the diverging understandings that member states hold with regard to the protection of civilians norm manifest and emerge. We visualize this process in combining a critical-constructivist approach to norms with practice theories. Focusing on the practices of member states' military advisers at the United Nations headquarters in New York, and their positions on how the protection of civilians should be implemented on the ground, we draw attention to their agency in norm implementation at an international site. Military advisers provide links between national ministries and contingents in the field, while also competing for being recognized as competent performers of appropriate implementation practices. Drawing on an interpretivist analysis of data generated through an online survey, a half-day workshop and interviews with selected delegations, the article adds to the understanding of norms in international relations while also providing empirical insights into peacekeeping effectiveness.

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are increasingly contracted to provide security in international peacekeeping missions. Yet, we know very little about the practical implications of this development. How do PMSCs reinforce and shape security management within UN peacekeeping operations, and what are the consequences for UN missions and their host populations? To answer these questions, we explore the operational, representative and regulatory security practices in the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). Our findings show how seemingly uncontroversial, even benign security practices can have unintended negative consequences. Specifically, we observe that the participation of security firms in MONUSCO's security management contributes to three developments: the differentiation of security between staff and locals, the hardening of MONUSCO's security posture, and the perpetuation of insecurity through the emergence of a local security economy. Contracted security is thus involved in reproducing forms of security that are in some ways diametrically opposed to the aims of the mission to protect civilians and facilitate a sustainable peace.

What makes a UN member state contribute more peacekeepers to be deployed in hostile environments and place their troops at risk? A significant amount of scholarly research explores the need for, and effectiveness of, UN peacekeeping in conflict zones around the world. Few studies examine the factors that determine the size of peacekeeping contributions, and these studies do not focus on the role of neoliberal institutions. This study examines the relationship between the degree of linkages in neoliberal institutions and the size of peacekeeping contributions. I argue that the degree of linkages in neoliberal international institutions creates structural conditions that facilitate the information gathering process on the preferences and needs of UN member states and incentivize these states to contribute more peacekeeping troops. In my analysis of UN peacekeeping troop contributions data for all countries between 1990 and 2015, I find that the degree of neoliberal institutional linkages is the most consistent predictor of a UN member state's size of peacekeeping contributions.

Although China's active participation in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations as a personnel contributor has drawn people's attention, very few have examined under what conditions China sent its personnel in general. This article analyzes 18 cases of China's participation/nonparticipation during 2003–2017, using such data as UN resolutions, data on trade and security, and other states' involvement. It reveals that the consideration of economic interests is a better predictor for China's behavior than China's concerns over its reputation, the insecurity of places, or mission characteristics. However, in contrast to popular speculations, economic interests are more about the importance of host states as export markets rather than as exporters of resource-related materials. The study also finds that sovereignty issues still wield power over China's decisions, showing that despite its increasing lenient voting patterns on mission resolutions, its participation behavior tends to remain conservative. (J Cont China/GIGA)

Does UN peacekeeping reduce the number of people forcibly displaced by violence? While previous research has found that the presence and size of peacekeeping deployments can reduce violence, little is known about how peacekeepers affect other aspects of civilian protection. Using original data on sub-national events of forced displacement and the location and size of UN troop deployments this study systematically evaluates the criticized efforts of UNMISS in South Sudan, while simultaneously testing hypotheses on peacekeepers and forced displacement. It is hypothesized that increasing numbers of troops affect the flight equation among civilians through the promise of and actual deterrence of violence. These deterrence-based hypotheses are also discussed in relation to the South Sudan context, creating scope conditions for their possible application in this case. The statistical analysis provides, however, no robust evidence for peacekeepers reducing the occurrence or levels of forced displacement, and only weak evidence of displaced congregating in larger numbers around peacekeeping locations. The paper ends by arguing that the theoretical argument provided may still be valid, but that an effect was not feasible to identify in South Sudan where the peacekeeping mission – despite its comparatively large numbers – lacks credible deterrent capacity.

Research on host-country effects of peacekeeping deployments has highlighted destabilizing consequences for contributing states, suggesting that deployments can increase the willingness and ability of soldiers to mutiny or attempt coups. Yet others expect that peacekeeping contributions may bring a variety of benefits, including improved civilian control of the armed forces. We reconcile these conflicting assessments in two ways. First, we identify important differences across peacekeeping organizations. Missions undertaken by the United Nations (UN) are generally better funded and equipped, invoke selection criteria that should produce fewer grievances than missions operated by regional organizations, and may be more risk averse. The benefits or hazards of peacekeeping can thus vary substantially, leading to different consequences for organizations. Second, the pros and cons of peacekeeping can incentivize mutinies and coups differently. When grievances are present, financial incentives of peacekeeping may prompt soldiers to prefer mutiny over coups to avoid being disqualified from future participation. We assess these expectations for African states' participation in UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2011. We find no evidence that UN peacekeeping deployments increase mutiny risk, while non-UN deployments have a positive effect on the occurrence of mutiny. These findings remain robust across a large number of model specifications.

After a decade of remarkable growth in the early 2000s, UN peacekeeping has entered a period of sharp contraction. This trend has been especially severe for civilian peacekeepers, who play vital though often neglected roles in UN operations: the number of civilian peacekeeper positions has shrunk by 37% since 2010. This article draws on 164 research interviews and the vast Business literature on downsizing to explore the effects of this contraction of the UN's remaining civilian peacekeepers and the missions that employ them. To conceptualize this impact, the article begins by outlining the contributions a range of civilians – international and national staff, UN Volunteers and contractors – make to UN peacekeeping. Mobilizing insights from Business scholars, it then argues that difficult downsizing processes, high employee commitment, and workforce stratification place UN missions at high risk of 'downsizing survivor syndrome': sustained organizational productivity losses due to decreased individual performance and team coherence. The article then confirms empirically that the nature of UN peacekeeping downsizing, job insecurity, and competition among personnel categories pose profound risks to civilian peacekeeper performance and therefore challenge effective mandate implementation. It also highlights that decreased inter-mission mobility due to the contraction of UN peacekeeping overall exacerbates this effect.