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The present work is based on a fundamental theme within the set of Nietzsche's thought: the theme of Destiny. If Fate is seen as something previously decided in relation to the most diverse situations, then Nietzsche's philosophy runs into an aporia, that of having to face the problem of determinism, which touches one of the greatest obstacles of culture: morality. In the moral sphere, everything is ordered and determined. In this sense, the development of this research is oriented towards a deepening of the philosophical implications related to Destiny. Faced with becoming the particular organization of impulses, Destiny loses the sense of predetermination and ready and finished decision on different situations. To what extent does talking about Destiny, within the scope of Nietzschean thought, imply openness to plenitude, beyond all forms of determinism?

This article proposes to show how the Agambenian archaeology takes place through a double movement that, at one and the same time, displays tradition from an exceptional paradigm. It is possible to think here of a play on words, since the word paradigm is usually used as a synonym for model and, in this sense, the exception is what models that which tradition has transmitted and, equally, repressed. However, with his characteristic gesture, Agamben takes the word paradigm back to its etymological sense, as "that which is shown alongside", and gives it a strategic meaning in his archaeology. Like the example, the paradigm displays the functioning and belonging of something without belonging to that which is displayed, showing itself alongside, subtracting its belonging to a rule. What it displays is the exceptional structure of tradition, also referring the word exception to its etymological sense, "caught outside". This sense, which defines the exception as such, is used to characterise the way in which tradition operated by presupposing an origin. This presupposition of an originary dimension, prior to all supposition, destined as an underlying foundation, the sub iectum, that is, the problem of the subject.

This article aims to bring together the thoughts of Theodor Adorno and Maurice Blanchot around the problem of humanism. The "jewish question", as we can still call it along with Marx, is the central issue of this conversation. Starting from Blanchot's intuition regarding the indestructibility of man and the role of judaism in revealing an exorbitant relation between men in the presence of Autrui, the article follows examining the seemingly opposite role of judaism in Adorno's and Horkheimer's dialectic of enlightenment. In this path, two topics stand out: the critique of hegelian dialectics, but also the rehabilitation of dialectics as an antidote to the regression of enlightenment; and the humanistic potencial retained in the concept of mimesis, especially in Adorno's work, concept which also allows the resignification of judaism inside the dialectic of enlightenment.

Deleuzian criticisms of representational thinking converge on the understanding of thought as a recognitive process. To recognize is to think. Among all the problems concerning such a model of thought, there is a fundamental obstacle to recognition: it does not recognize what does not fit into its previously established premises and which delimit the linearity of correct thinking. Thus, as Deleuze warns us, the difference has never been thought for itself. In such a notion, the difference is just an opposition to the equal. In one of his dialogues with the philosophical tradition, the French thinker found a punctual gap in the thinking of the Greek philosopher Aristotle where difference is brought up. A moment when the difference emerged and was almost considered by itself, and which was called "the happy Greek moment" by Deleuze. It is about Aristotelian thought of difference, that Greek moment and the conceptual criticism that Deleuze conducts to compose his theory that the article will deal with.

This paper presents philosophical conditions for the foundation of a specifically Husserlian aesthetic. Therefore, will be at first considered philosophical equivalences of two modalities of conscious experience: phenomenological and aesthetic. Thereafter, we highlight some of the concepts that guide Husserlian phenomenology as perception, intuitive experience, imagination and image consciousness. We present a conceptual approach of phenomenological experience as an experience of immediate awareness that has in perception the privileged path to access data originating from intentional objects. Aesthetics experience as a specific type of perception and loss, becomes a modality of phenomenological experience, insofar as it integrates, in itself, the same subject and object in a relationship properly intentional experience, functioning as a perfect paradigm of phenomenological perception opposed to naturalized experience model. Both aesthetics and phenomenology make it possible to centralize conscious experience in relation to world-consciousness, much more than the objective characterization of the world or any purely psychological facts. In both philosophical fields, imagination has a prominent status.

In this work we review a set of readings of Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817) - late text of Hegel's work, in which he presents his philosophical system in a completed and finished manner -: La respiración del ser from Germán Prósperi, "Hegel's Linguistic Thought in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Between Kant and the Metacritics" from J. Surber y Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics from Paul de Man. We propose to emphasize in three aspects analyzed by Hegel in the section on the "Subjective Spirit": memory, imagination and remembrance. We will also make reference to Science of Logic (1812) in which Hegel develops the importance of dialects for philosophy. Our aim is to relate the three aspects mentioned above with Hegel's theorizations of language and nomination, in order to stress that these conceptualizations implies within his philosophical system.

This article aims to analyze in Sartre's philosophy the notion of personalization. Inserted in the framework of existential psychoanalysis, this notion elucidates about the original choice and the existential project. Since his first works, Sartre has presented an impersonal transcendental conscience, so that freedom as nadification is independent of psychic life. We want to demonstrate that from the development of existential psychoanalysis freedom is not separated from the notion of personalization, but presupposes it due to the finitude condition of freedom. In this case, although it presupposes an impersonal transcendental field, freedom can only be apprehended concretely through personalization. This presupposes a necessary relationship between ontology and existential psychoanalysis in the elucidation of freedom, history, and the man.

This article aims to present the relevance of the narrative resource in the representation and in the constitution of the selfness. To achieve this goal, a comparative strategy was chosen between an anti-narrative and narrative positions with regard to the powers of narration in apprehending and composing the domain of identifications. In a first moment, a reconstruction of Jean-Paul Sartre's positions on narration will be carried out, based on the phenomenological ontology of Being and nothingness, as well as the considerations about narrative and identity found in the novel Nausea and in the text of War diaries: notebooks from a phony war. The next moment will explore narrative arguments in Alasdair MacIntyre's After virtue, Charles Taylor's The sources of the self, and especially Paul Ricoeur's in Time and narrative and Self as another. Finally, in the most strictly comparative moment, it is intended to show certain difficulties of the anti-narrative position, as well as the fruitfulness of the narrative position, with regard to the different way of managing the demand for meaning in the anti-narrative rejection of identity and the acceptance of the challenge of permanent elaboration of the meaning of the narrative position.

Causality refers to the connection between two events in which one causes the other. This connection must be necessary and permanent, in other words, the first event causes the second always and irrevocably. Doubts about the validity of the causal principle are recurrent in philosophy, and David Hume's enquiries seem to have the best critique on the subject. Nonetheless, causality is seen as essential and inevitable in the formulation of countless scientific laws. However, since the critiques of 20th century epistemology, these laws have been considered contingent or revisable. Our question is: how to make the contingency of scientific laws compatible with the need for Kantian causality? To this purpose, we will do the following: 1) we will analyse the link between time and the cause and effect relationship to access Kant's understanding of causality; 2) we will show how the difference and dependency relationship between Kantian causality and causal physical laws occur; 3) we will finally meet with the Kantian sense of the necessity and revisability of physical laws.

Due to the importance of the theory of values, elaborated by Max Scheler, this article aims to describe the essence and originality of the moral foundation, showing the absolute nature inherent to it, to erect an ethics of absolute moral values. This done, we will find, in fact, axiological foundations capable of showing the principles that permeate and make the basis of people's ethical and moral life full of value and meaning, within the responsive and responsible causality of their actions and decisions that emanate from this human capacity and, that is latent in its essence.

I argue that two historicities have predominated in the relation between philosophical and historical discourses in the 20th century. One is the historicity of historians, engendered by the birth of the humanities. The other is a philosophical historicity in which the humanist myth persists, especially within the debate opposing structure and difference. This second historicity represents an elimination of the first, as it elaborates many more demands of historicity inherent to the structural model.

The discussion about the concept of enlightenment runs through the conception of Immanuel Kant, who thematized it as an exit from the individual from his condition of intellectual minority and guardianship of those who prevent the exercise of thinking for himself, impelling the achievement of autonomy that requires freedom and to make public use of reason. Such problematization about the difficulties interposed to the process of enlightenment can be related to the problem of estrangement in Marx, making the necessary considerations in relation to the historical and social context of both philosophers. In this way, through philosophical investigation, it is possible to establish correlations of complementarities, differences and counterpoints between the different conceptions of Kant and Marx. Thus, we realize that the search for enlightenment depends on overcoming the material determinations of the set of alienations produced by the capitalist mode of production, aiming at the achievement of human emancipation understood as effective autonomous freedom.

Logos is a central Greek term for the construction of the sophistic movement. Gorgias de Leontinos, one of the main representatives of the first generation of this movement, proposed to reflect, in Elogio de Helena, about the discourse as a great and sober master, able to produce persuasion in Helena and denouncing this persuasive power at the same time. In the first part of this study, we intend to situate logos as a producer of experiences in its listener, which is important in understanding the persuasive power. In the second part, the fabrication of experiences, different from persuasion, is identified with a fictitious reality produced due to voluntary deception. Because this experience of deception is voluntary, the reason for the sovereignty of logos is for Gorgias, in which speech, in addition to persuading, can serve as a possible instrument for the fabrication of learning, whose artistic experience his own text exemplifies.

The aim of this paper is to connect the COVID-19 pandemic with philosophical elements taken from Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Three main points will be covered: the philosopher and the isolation; the nomenclature on the idea of social isolation; and the way in which the socio-political organization of a certain community is essential in order to obtain success or face failure in situations classified as catastrophic.

For many, Nietzsche is not considered a philosopher, but a poet. Between diverse factors that contribute to deny the status philosophicus to German philosopher resides, on the one hand, in the aspect of its content and, on the other hand, in its formal aspect. As regards content is difficult perceive some purposeful aspect in his thought, a constructive thesis, on the contrary, it is a deconstructive thought, demolisher, hammering philosophize. As regards form, the style of Nietzschean's writing is characterized by aphorism instead of continuous speech, each aphorism harbor a group of metaphors that stand out as puzzles to be deciphered. Our proposal, in this article, is shown that in spite of content and form, through which, the Nietzschean's thought shown itself, there is a philosophy that happens by the overcoming of rational and moral conception for stablish a genealogy of a thought.