Search results

Der vorliegende Band befasst sich zentral mit dem Problem der Anwendung der Transzendentalphilosophie auf die praktische Philosophie. Zu Ehren von Marco Ivaldo haben sich einige der führenden Fichte-Interpreten zusammengetan, um das Thema diachronisch zu behandeln. Angefangen bei Kant bis hin zur zeitgenössischen Philosophie werden einige der philosophischen Hauptpositionen (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Husserl, Deleuze und viele weitere) auf ihre Verträglichkeit mit dem transzendentalphilosophischen Ansatz in praktischer Hinsicht geprüft.****************The present volume deals with the problem of the application of transcendental philosophy to practical philosophy. In honour of Marco Ivaldo, some of the leading experts on Fichte have teamed up to treat the subject diachronically. From Kant to contemporary philosophy, some of the main philosophical positions (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Husserl, Deleuze, and many others) are examined in view of their compatibility with the transcendental-philosophical approach in a practical way.

Die Forschungen Gianna Gigliottis zeigen, wie Kant – der Philosoph der Erfahrung in all ihren Formen, der Theoretiker des Wissens und der Ethik als Wissen – der Wegbereiter grundlegender Strömungen der Philosophie des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts sein konnte und wie seine Texte noch heute einen fruchtbaren Anreiz für die historiographische Forschung bilden. In der Erforschung der wichtigsten Themen des Neokantismus und der Phänomenologie zeigt sich, dass die Konzepte des Apriori und des Transzendentalen entscheidende Herausforderungen für das Denken Cohens, Natorps, Rickerts, Husserls und Cassirers darstellten. Überdies verdeutlichen die Studien über die Entstehung und Entwicklung des Neokantismus und der Phänomenologie die entscheidende Bedeutung der Werke Kants für das zeitgenössische Denken, im Vergleich gelesen mit größter historischer und philologischer Sorgfalt.

»Sein Gesicht war eigentlich sehr ebenmäßig geschnitten. Er hatte aber zugleich etwas (…) von einem Tier, das in seinen Backen Vorräte sammelt.« (Adorno über Benjamin) In seinen Schriften unternimmt Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) eine Standortbestimmung innerhalb einer als Kräftefeld verstandenen Gegenwart. Philosophie, so könnte man mit Benjamin sagen, ist ihre Zeit in »Denkbildern« gefasst. Sein Werk lässt den Leser nicht nur durch die »Eiswüste der Abstraktion« wandern, sondern auch durch Städte, Kaufhäuser oder Passagen, neben eigenartigen Figuren wie dem Flaneur, dem Lumpensammler, dem Wartenden. Durch seine Texte richten wir den Blick gleichzeitig auf die vermeintlich hochwertigen Bildungsgüter und auf die flüchtigsten Kulturphänomene, um die implizite Gewalt, aber auch die unausgesprochenen Hoffnungen der Moderne in den Fokus zu rücken. Die vorliegende Einführung nähert sich durch eine Betrachtung dieser Orte, Bilder und Figuren dem Leben und Denken Benjamins – und dies für jedermann verständlich. Eine leichte Sprache, sowie die Kombination von Zeichnung und Text sorgen für hohe Anschaulichkeit, sodass sich auch Leser ohne akademische Vorkenntnisse an eine der wichtigsten Philosophien des 20. Jahrhunderts herantrauen dürfen

Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist nicht, die vielbekannte Kontroverse um das Politische "bei"/"ab" bzw. "nach" Heideggers \(\textit {Sein und Zeit}\) wiederaufzunehmen. Unsere Überlegungen beschränken sich vielmehr auf den weniger unternommenen Versuch, eine solche politische Dimension in der Philosophie des frühen Heidegger (1919-1923) zu entdecken und zu erörtern. Das Hauptthema der frühen Philosophie Heideggers lässt sich auf eine fundamental-phänomenologische Frage zurückführen: die Frage nach einem Denken des Ursprungs, d.h. einem Denken, das sich fähig erklärt, einen echten und adäquaten Zugang zur ursprünglichen Struktur der faktischen Lebenserfahrung zu gewinnen. Die Frage lautet nun: Wie lässt sich überhaupt die Thematik des Politischen in einer solchen phänomenologischen Dimension entdecken und artikulieren?

Il volume analizza il rapporto fra la scoperta di sentimenti e affetti a priori e la rivoluzione nel modo di pensare annunciata nella Prefazione alla seconda edizione della Critica della ragion pura. Il lavoro mostra che il passaggio dall'ipotesi alla certezza apodittica, da Niccolo Copernico a Isaac Newton tanto nella filosofia speculativa quanto nella filosofia morale e inscindibilmente connesso con la scoperta dei sentimenti a priori del rispetto, della soddisfazione di se, dell'interesse, della tensione, dell'esigenza e della tendenza, a loro volta strettamente legati a temi come il primat

In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers' authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus', Sallut's , Quintus Curtius Rufus' words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that "no one that knows Histories" – the Histories by Tacitus – "can ignore" the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza's education, to his cultural background and to Early modern's forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian's quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers' words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians' words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza's political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic. ; Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l'autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, ...

In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers' authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus', Sallut's , Quintus Curtius Rufus' words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that "no one that knows Histories" – the Histories by Tacitus – "can ignore" the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza's education, to his cultural background and to Early modern's forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian's quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers' words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians' words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza's political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic. ; Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l'autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, ...

In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers' authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus', Sallut's , Quintus Curtius Rufus' words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that "no one that knows Histories" – the Histories by Tacitus – "can ignore" the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza's education, to his cultural background and to Early modern's forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian's quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers' words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians' words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza's political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic. ; Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l'autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, ...

In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers' authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus', Sallut's , Quintus Curtius Rufus' words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that "no one that knows Histories" – the Histories by Tacitus – "can ignore" the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza's education, to his cultural background and to Early modern's forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian's quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers' words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians' words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza's political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic. ; Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l'autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, ...