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The author outlines the modern universalistic theories which assume the natural and historical unity of humankind and, using this as a starting point, predict a cosmopolitan and Eurocentric outcome of world history. Contrary to these universalistic theories, the contemporary globalist theories, the author claims, are pluralistic and multicultural and thus paradigmatically different from the panoptical theories of classic modernism. (SOI : PM: S. 100)

Due to the increasing globalization and the danger of reducing all beings to things, it is central to point out again and again that a human being is not a thing among other things, and that the appreciation and realization of their life requires nurturing and cultivating the variety of human knowledge pertinent to different spheres of the historical world of life. Thus, the relevance and the role of practical philosophy is gaining significance regarding the - to the historical Being - proper understanding and fulfilIment of human potentials in today's world. (SOI : PM: S. 25) + The author first defines the various facets of globalization in today's world and emphasizes the key changes that are stepping up and intensifying communication among peoples, nations, and cultures all over the world. However, parallel to this there are other pressing problems: from the ecological crisis, to the realization of human rights, to the anomie of life and work. All this proves that globalization is not only an economic and technical but, ultimately, practically an ethic/political issue. Along the lines of Hegel's philosophy of world history and Aristotle's practical philosophy, the author has come to view the contemporary globalization as a step forward of world civilization, i.e. as a possibility of the realization of freedom and good life. Globalization, of course, scares people with its unpredictability and the erratic development of "global society" which (in line with Beck's distinction between the First and the Second Modernism) today is represented as a society of nation-states on the one hand, and as a "global society of transnational actors" on the other

The author analyses the possibilities of a symbiosis of the democratic and the constitutional principle, the expression of the strain between the desire for popular sovereignty and the wish to establish the fundamental rules of political life as permanently as possible. Sieyes' distinction between the constituting and the constituted power can easily link the idea of popular sovereignty with the idea of constitutional state, but cannot answer the question of the constituting power's right to restrain the constituted power. Since its inception, the democratic constitutional state has been a dyadic entity i.e. a democratic and constitutional state. The dilemma is whether to respect the existing constitution and follow the procedure envisioned for amending it, or to make amendments following a revolutionary breach with the existing situation i.e. a direct manoeuvre of the constituting power. The author is in favour of separating what the constituting power may decide upon and what the constituted power may decide upon, since this maintains the balance of both types of powers in a constitutional state. (SOI : PM: S. 28)

The author critically analyses Plessner's views on the lack of a clear idea of the state in German tradition as well as the consequences of that for its development in the 20th century. The author claims that it is not so much a question of the non-existence of the idea of the state as of the non-existence of a democratic social stratum that would have prevented the authoritarian and later totalitarian developments. He also rejects the interpretation of history as meaningful, goal-oriented processes, since they presuppose a philosophical knowledge about the goals and purposes of an inimitable historical development, the assumption which today cannot be methodologically vindicated by any historian. (SOI : PM: S. 53)

Using the contemporary system theories, the author primarily points to the asymmetry of the constitutional law and the political processes it so rarely regulates. Then he goes on to analyse the historical process of separating the custom law, oral law and written law, of the court and the courtroom, the law and the constitution, the constitution and its interpretation, the constitution's interpretation and the constitutional theory, and concludes his study with a description of the difference between constitution and democracy in the postmodern categorial optics. (SOI : PM: S. 45)