Search results

Formerly the diffusion & circulation of ideologies had a kind of spontaneity, not systematic, but sporadic. But today this diffusion takes place by a very conscious process controlled by professional news organs, parties, & special interest groups. At the same time, pol'al ideology cannot be separated from ideologies of a diff type (econ, religious, moral). We are approaching a total ideology which is taking hold on a large scale of all aspects of the life of the individual. Now in spite of their rational foundations, modern ideologies have an emotional determination & are charged with affectivity. They are tending more & more to draw nearer to religions. It is a tragic paradox to see liberalism & democracy, which were founded on the idea of tolerance, assume as absolute & inflexible a character as other monolithic ideologies. Finally, today all ideologies are oriented toward concrete institutions with the result that a pol'al theory which does not have an active pol'al program has lost its raison d'etre. Perhaps this explains the sterility of contemporary pol'al philosophy. Tr from IPSA. Adapted from the source document.

Der Begriff "Leistung" ist in Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft omnipräsent. Doch auf die Frage, was Leistung ist, folgt in der Regel Schweigen. Lars Distelhorst geht in seinem Essay dieser Leerstelle auf den Grund und vermag so eine tiefgehende Kritik an der "Leistungsgesellschaft" zu üben. Er zeigt: Jede Rede von Leistung mündet in einen unauflösbaren Widerspruch. Was hinter dem Leistungsbegriff liegt, ist nicht weniger als die Leere einer Gesellschaft, deren Zentrum in der Akkumulationsbewegung des Kapitals zu suchen ist, während sie die letzten Karten der Ideologie spielt.

Polish Minister of Education Roman Giertych, a member of the archconservative League of Polish Families, comes from an extremely politically active family. As a young man, he founded the nationalist movement "All-Polish Youth" (Mlodziez Wszechpolska). Roman's father, Maciej Giertych, represents the League in the European Parliament, who, in his published works, speaks out for traditional family values & against Germany's alleged striving for hegemony in Europe. Jedrzej Giertych, Roman's grandfather, made a name for himself as a nationalist publicist. In its political creed, the family Giertych invokes the national-democratic politician roman Dmowski & the Catholic historiosoph Feliks Koneczny. Among the constants in the Giertychs' ideological worldview are a close connection between the Polish nation & Catholicism, a defensive position towards Europe as well as conspiracy theories in which the Germans, homosexuals &, interchangeable, the Jews or Free masons appear as the enemy. Adapted from the source document.

Historically, prophecies about the coming of a post-ideological age have always been proved to be wrong. However, if the expression "ideology" is relieved from its inflationary ambiguity and derived from its specific historical context, the indications of an "end of ideology" and the end of "grand narratives" are almost undeniable. Not much remained from the classical ideologies of the 18th and 19th century and this is equally true for the once powerful mass integration parties that served as their agents and propagators. Against the backdrop of ideological decline in most western societies, however, ideological polarization in the U.S. is particularly striking. But what is the reason for this? The example of the U.S. shows that processes of modernization and individualization do not necessarily lead to the erosion of ideological movements. On the contrary, a revival of ideologies in European societies is not to be ruled out. Adapted from the source document.

The ideological factor plays a decisive role in the formation & operation of pol'al systems. To study it, we must adopt modern US &, to a large degree French, theories which reject the purely 'Institutional' approach now favored in Germany. In fact, the pol'al ideology inherent in each pol'al system creates of itself compatible institutions, & the functioning of these institutions is determined by the dominating ideology. Before one can speak of ideology, a certain number of conditions must be present (its formulation should be comprehensible to the large mass of people, it should seek to influence this mass rather than an elite, it should be oriented toward the satisfaction of the desires or human needs which the average man experiences as soc values). Just as pol'al theory may involuntarily become ideology, so may a simple defense of a specific material interest also take on ideological characteristics. It is now possible to draw up a catalog of the principal types of pol'al ideologies: absolutism, constitutionalism, individualism (including liberal capitalism, anarchism, & humanism), soc collectivism (including State capitalism as well as 'Welfare State'), nationalism & finally, aristocracy. Under institutions should be classed not only constitutional organs, but `pressure groups' as well. With this as a base, a true ontology of the forms of gov can be undertaken. (Translated by Z. Dana from IPSA).

The relations between family & state are to be characterized as contradictory: In an ideological way, the symbolic system family, envisaged as a "natural" way of living, serves as a central legitimating figure for the (nation) state. But as a real form of social life, family is constituted & stabilized by state activities. Conservative ideologies of the patriarchal family use to be (re-)activated during times of crisis, while (male) men worry about their dominant positions. The crisis of Fordism led to its revitalization accordingly. Against this background, a seemingly "unholy" alliance was formed between (neo)liberalism & (neo)conservatism in the field of family policy. Unholy because the (neo)liberal cult of the individual represents the sheer antithesis to the (neo)conservative transfiguration of the family as a solid community. This paper intends to show why this connection is not as absurd as it seems. 38 References. Adapted from the source document.

The relations between family & state are to be characterized as contradictory: In an ideological way, the symbolic system family, envisaged as a "natural" way of living, serves as a central legitimating figure for the (nation) state. But as a real form of social life, family is constituted & stabilized by state activities. Conservative ideologies of the patriarchal family use to be (re-)activated during times of crisis, while (male) men worry about their dominant positions. The crisis of Fordism led to its revitalization accordingly. Against this background, a seemingly "unholy" alliance was formed between (neo)liberalism & (neo)conservatism in the field of family policy. Unholy because the (neo)liberal cult of the individual represents the sheer antithesis to the (neo)conservative transfiguration of the family as a solid community. This paper intends to show why this connection is not as absurd as it seems. 38 References. Adapted from the source document.

This contribution is concerned with public & party-based euroscepticism in Poland after EU-accession. The main question is whether the European elections in June 2004 meant a "eurosceptical backlash" from a Polish view or not. As the analysis clearly shows, this election can be termed second order. As follows from that, there is not a direct relationship between public & party-based euroscepticism. By drawing on two different models to analyse party position on Europe the article shows that most of the eurosceptical positions of Polish party can be explained by party competition & only to a minor degree by ideology. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

Call for Abstracts for a Theme Issue of the Nordic Journal of Cultural Policy. Deadline: December 15, 2023

Der Begriff »Leistung« ist in Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft omnipräsent. Doch auf die Frage, was Leistung ist, folgt in der Regel Schweigen. Lars Distelhorst geht in seinem Essay dieser Leerstelle auf den Grund und vermag so eine tiefgehende Kritik an der »Leistungsgesellschaft« zu üben. Er zeigt: Jede Rede von Leistung mündet in einen unauflösbaren Widerspruch. Was hinter dem Leistungsbegriff liegt, ist nicht weniger als die Leere einer Gesellschaft, deren Zentrum in der Akkumulationsbewegung des Kapitals zu suchen ist, während sie die letzten Karten der Ideologie spielt.

Die Frage nach der Überlebensfähigkeit der Demokratischen Volksrepublik Korea (DVRK)1 ist wiederholt gestellt worden. Ihr Kollaps wurde nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion, dem Tod des langjährigen Führers Kim Il Sung 1994 und ebenfalls in der Zeit der schweren Hungersnot Mitte der 1990er-Jahre heraufbeschworen. Wie der Untergang der osteuropäischen sozialistischen Systeme historisch gezeigt hat, stellt eine ausreichende Legitimation2 einen Schlüssel für die Aufrechterhaltung eines Regimes dar, das vor allem in wirtschaftlichen Notlagen wie auch bei politischen Schlüsselereignissen in Gefahr gerät. Der Begriff Legitimation ist dabei freilich ein breit gefächerter. Man kann dennoch übereinstimmend davon ausgehen, dass das Regime zum einen eine materielle, leistungsbezogene Dimension erfüllen, zum anderen aber auch in normativer Hinsicht der Bevölkerung eine als überlegen angesehene Weltanschauung im weitesten Sinne liefern muss (vgl. unter vielen Merkel 1999: 63-67 und 125-127).