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Populism in Venezuela analyses the emergence, formation, reproduction and resistance to a left-wing populist project in a major world oil producer. For readers who seek to understand the historical, economical and sociological contexts that gave rise to a 38 year-old mestizo-mulato Lieutenant Colonel who stormed the presidential palace in a bloody coup d'état in 1992, subsequently returned to the same palace in 1998, but this time, as a democratically elected President, and has been in power since, this book is the right place to start. In spite of opposition attempts to oust Presi.

Populism in Venezuela analyses the emergence, formation, reproduction and resistance to a left-wing populist project in a major world oil producer. For readers who seek to understand the historical, economical and sociological contexts that gave rise to a 38 year-old mestizo-mulato Lieutenant Colonel who stormed the presidential palace in a bloody coup d'état in 1992, subsequently returned to the same palace in 1998, but this time, as a democratically elected President, and has been in power since, this book is the right place to start. In spite of opposition attempts to oust President Hugo Ch

We aim to explain petro populism - the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support. To reap the full gains of natural resource income politicians need to remain in office over time. Hence, even a purely rent-seeking incumbent who only cares about his own welfare, will want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in office. While this incentive benefits citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it also has the adverse effect of motivating benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they realize cannot be sustained over time. Our model explains how resource wealth may generate political competition that reduces the tenability of equilibrium policies.

We aim to explain petro populism - the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support. To reap the full gains of natural resource income politicians need to remain in office over time. Hence, even a purely rent-seeking incumbent who only cares about his own welfare, will want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in office. While this incentive benefits citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it also has the adverse effect of motivating benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they realize cannot be sustained over time. Our model explains how resource wealth may generate political competition that reduces the tenability of equilibrium policies. ; publishedVersion

"This updated edition of Populism in Latin America discusses new developments in populism as a political phenomenon and the emergence of new populist political figures in Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela in particular"--Provided by publisher

This article explores various conceptualizations of populism and tests their heuristic virtues against a Romanian case, the Legion of the Archangel Michael. First, after reviewing several contemporary theoretical approaches on populism, a term whose ambiguity is constantly deplored, the study tries to clarify its content by examining it in relation with other fundamental notions like democracy, representation, or people. Second, while acknowledging the relative consensus of the historiography as to the fascist nature of the Legionary Movement, the article focuses on the debate around its populist character. The disagreement in interpreting the character of the Movement is arguably due to the variable criteria that define populism, fascism and their relation.