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The New Zealand Election Study (NZES) is designed to assess the consequences of adopting the mixed member proportional electoral system on the health of New Zealand's democracy, & to contribute to the assessment of Maori representation in the political system. Over the last 10 years, the NZES has generated a huge data bank along with substantial analysis & published interpretation. By directly comparing the attitudes & priorities of political elites with those of ordinary voters, the NZES provides data crucial to understanding the nature of democracy in New Zealand. At present, NZES is focusing on New Zealanders' evaluations of their political system; the effectiveness & perceived legitimacy of the electoral system; options for change; the operation of public institutions & political parties; & how all these relate to public perceptions, political participation, evaluations of the political system, & long-term social & economic well-being. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 15 References. A. Funderburg

One of the most important concerns in democratic political systems is the translation of citizens' votes into seats in representative bodies. Drawing on the literature involving the cube law, the article examines the votes-seats relationship for elections to the lower houses of U.S. state legislatures over the period 1976-1984. The model permitted an examination of the concepts of electoral bias and representation (majoritarianism). The analysis indicated that some degree of bias exists in the states, and they tend more toward a proportional votes-seats relationship than has generally been found for Congress and comparative legislative bodies.

Considers the degree to which various democratic models further the goals of efficiency & representativeness in the context of Eastern European democratization, providing a critical analysis of Arend Lijphart's (eg, 1994) thesis that consensus democracy is superior to majoritarian democracy. It is argued that efficiency in the sense of action capacity on the part of both government & governed is as important a criterion for the constitutional design of a democracy as is efficiency in the sense of socioeconomic performance, an assertion that adheres to Joseph A. Schumpeter's (1962) theory of democracy. Lijphart is criticized for privileging the socioeconomic definition of efficiency, the manner in which he contrasts efficiency & representativeness, & neglecting the importance of national context in selecting/evaluating a democratic model. Against Lijphart, it is concluded that a consensual model using a strictly proportional electoral system is undesirable for relatively homogeneous, nonpolarized democratizing countries (eg, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland), because it favors fragmentation & inhibits governmental action capacity.

In the wake of the closest presidential election in history, and in an age of unprecedented partisan parity in the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, and state governments, few would fault the Ameri-can political system for its lack of competition. And at a time when judges have become embroiled in politics to an unprecedented degree, even to the point of deciding a presidential election and drawing districts for dozens of legislatures, few would urge courts to reread the Constitutions o as to enlarge judges' role to that of trustbusters of perceived political cartels. And when the most prominent "independent" officials overseeing American politics in the last few years have been Kenneth Starr, Katherine Harris, the Florida Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court, few retain their faith in the notion of nonpartisan supervision of elections. Samuel Issacharoff is one of the few. His thoughtful and provocative article' urges courts to read the Constitution to enforce a prophylactic rule that would have the effect of declaring all current districting schemes unconstitutional because they were drawn by self-interested decisionmakers. Two distinct benefits would flow from this jurisprudential move, according to Issacharoff. First, nonpartisan redistricting would lead to increased intradistrict electoral competition, which in turn would lead to greater responsiveness and accountability in government. Second, by adopting a prophylactic rule that deems all purposeful redistricting suspect, the Court would put an end to the racialization of political redistricting fights resulting from partisan actors' seeking judicial redress through the limited tools of the uncertain Shaw doctrine2 and the Voting Rights Act.3 I disagree fundamentally, but I hope respectfully, with almost every aspect of Issacharoff's argument. First, I disagree with his definition and his assessment of the problem he wishes to solve. By focusing on incumbent reelection rates and margins of victory, Issacharoff ignores evidence both of intense competition for control of legislatures and of remarkable levels of legislative turnover. Second, to the extent incumbents have unfair and growing advantages over challengers, redistricting is not to blame. We know this because statewide elections unaffected by redistricting, such as elections for governor and U.S. Senate, have shown parallel growth in rates of incumbent reelection. Third, the creation of safe seats, the principal target of Issacharoff's ire, is neither inherently undesirable nor easily avoidable. Although intradistrict partisan competition may suffer from bipartisan gerrymanders, representation may be the beneficiary. There is no a priori reason to prefer a districting system that produces many competitive races over one that produces proportional representation. In fact, given that competitive districts may lead both to greater power for the ideologically centrist, median voter and to almost half of the voters' being un-happy with their representative, there is good reason to consider safe districts preferable from the standpoint of democratic theory. More-over, states have legitimate interests in sending a congressional delegation to Washington that has the greatest possible seniority and in keeping experienced legislators in state government. Fourth, redistricting by politically insulated commissions, the alternative that Issacharoff would have the courts force upon state governments, is both undesirable in theory and difficult to create in fact. If our experience with in-dependent counsels or with those overseeing the 2000 election debacle did not dispel the myth of nonpartisan oversight of politics, an analysis of current redistricting commissions and the Federal Election Commission should. Indeed, the whole enterprise of expanding or reconceptualizing judicial authority in the political sphere to include a role as trustbuster of political cartels is fraught with problems. If anything, recent experience argues in favor of a judicial retreat from the political thicket.

Die Vertretung von Frauen in gesetzgebenden Körperschaften in Westeuropa ist durch starke Unterschiede gekennzeichnet. Daher wird untersucht, warum Frauen in bestimmten politischen Systemen größere Aufstiegschancen als in anderen haben. Für die Untersuchung werden Daten über den Einfluß institutioneller, kultureller und sozioökonomischer Faktoren herangezogen. Der länderübergreifende Vergleich zeigt, daß das Wahlsystem der wesentliche Faktor für die Repräsentation von Frauen in den Parlamenten ist: im Gegensatz zum Mehrheitswahlrecht begünstigt das Verhältniswahlrecht die Frauen. (AuD-Hng)

The New Zealand Political Change Project was established in 1994 to promote collaborative academic research into the systemic consequences of the introduction of New Zealand's new electoral system, the mixed member proportional system (MMP). The project focuses on the impact in four distinct areas: (1) parliament, members of parliament, electoral law & procedure, & constitutional conventions & practices; (2) the executive branch, the public service, & government formation, durability, & termination; (3) policy outcomes; & (4) political parties & electoral behavior. The project has revealed that MMP has had important implications in a number of areas, including the diversity & character of parliamentary representation, the influence of smaller parties in the policy process, & the cohesion of parliamentary parties. However, the change has had limited impact in such important areas as the role & influence of the public service, the control of the political executive over the budgetary process, policy continuity, & overall governmental effectiveness. 12 References. A. Funderburg

"In this concise volume, Timothy Sisk defines power sharing as practices and institutions that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups. He identifies the principal approaches to power sharing, including autonomy, federations, and proportional electoral systems." "In addition, he highlights the problems with various power-sharing approaches and practices that have been raised by scholars and practitioners alike, and the instances where power-sharing experiments have succeeded and where they have failed. Finally, he offers some guidance to policymakers as they ponder power-sharing arrangements."--BOOK JACKET

Electoral change creates important and competing incentives for political parties, parliamentary elites and candidates to transform their campaign techniques in order to maximize votes under the new realities - a process constrained by continued reliance on familiar techniques. In this article I examine two significant moments of electoral change in New Zealand from partisan stability to dealignment in the late 1980s, and from an SMP/plurality system to Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation in 1996 - as a way of exploring inertia and change in the transformation of campaigns at the constituency level. Drawing on findings from in-depth interviews conducted with individuals responsible for the parties' campaigns in the 1987 and 1996 New Zealand general elections, I explore the extent to which political campaign elites, parliamentarians and candidates responded to incentives to adopt a fundamentally new election campaign logic - in these two cases, dictated by the new tactical centrality of marginal seats and geographically defined constituencies in the modern first-past-the-post (FPP) campaign, and then by the ascendancy in their place of the party list vote, issue constituencies and nationwide campaigns under MMP.

Mixed electoral systems seek to combine elements from different voting methods so as to maximise the numbers of individually accountable constituency MPs, while achieving more proportional outcomes in terms of parties' representation. This paper looks in detail at two kinds of mixed systems: variants of the Additional Member System; and AV Plus (or SV Plus). We examine how they would have operated in British conditions during the 1990s—how ballot papers would be structured, how voters respond to them and what electoral outcomes would have resulted. Both approaches offer good prospects for achieving a consensus amongst electoral reformers on an alternative to first-past-the-post elections. We also show how the Jenkins Commission's proposals can be located within the broader development of 'British AMS' by the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. In addition, we quantify the main impacts of the policy choices which the Commission made in designing the proposed system to be submitted to a referendum. The British case will be a key one for the wider debate in political science about the endogenisation of voting system changes within party systems.

Free-ranging koalas (Phascolarctos cinereus) were monitored by means of radio-relocation in the area of Blair Athol Coal Mine and surrounding properties. Daytime tree use, home range and diet of these koalas was determined in spring and autumn, as was the leaf moisture composition of potential fodder species. Koalas used on average 93 (male koalas) and 56 (female koalas) trees during the period of observation, occupying home ranges of 135 and 101 ha respectively. Mean sightings per tree were 1.19 for both males and females and home-range sizes were not significantly different between sexes or seasons. Koalas were observed returning to previously used daytime roosting trees infrequently (<12%). Although koalas were observed roosting in trees of the species that they ate, proportional species representation in the diet of these koalas during spring and autumn did not accurately reflect concurrent observations of their daytime tree-roosting behaviour. Koalas were observed to utilise non-fodder species for daytime roosting, and patterns of daytime tree use and diet selection varied between individuals inhabiting adjacent communities within the site. Leaf moisture of tree species represented in koala diets was greater in autumn than spring.

Essays -- Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy -- Public Choice: An Introduction -- Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct? -- Constitutional Political Economy -- Corruption -- Dictatorship -- Environmental Politics -- Experimental Public Choice -- Gordon Tullock at Four Score Years: An Evaluation -- Interest Group Behavior and Influence -- International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade -- James M. Buchanan -- Milton Friedman, 1912: Harbinger of the Public Choice Revolution -- Monetary Policy and Central Bank Behavior -- The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics -- Public Choice from the Perspective of the History of Thought -- Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of Law -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Philosophy -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Sociology -- Public Finance -- Regulation and Antitrust -- Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson -- Shadow Economy -- Social Choice, Contracts and Logrolling -- Spatial Theory -- Trade Liberalization and Globalization -- William H. Riker -- Concepts -- Academia -- Al-Qaeda -- Alternative Voting Methods -- Altruism -- The Anatomy of Political Representation -- Approval Voting -- Arbitration and Bargaining -- Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- An 'Austrian' Perspective on Public Choice -- Autocracy -- Autocratic Succession -- Bicameralism -- Blackmail -- Black's Single-Peakedness Condition -- Budgetary Processes -- Budget Deficits -- Bureaucratic Discretion -- Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance -- Campaign Finance 1 -- Campaign Finance 2 -- Central Banks -- Chicago Political Economy -- The Clayton Act -- Coalitions and Power Indices -- Coalitions and Social Choice -- Coase Theorem and Political Markets -- Coercion -- Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation -- Committee Assignments -- Committee Jurisdictions and PAC Contributions -- Committees in Legislatures -- Commons and Anticommons -- Constitution -- Constitutional Frameworks and Economic Progress -- The Constitution of the European Union -- Constitutional Political Economy -- The Contemporary Political Economy Approach to Bureaucracy -- Contractarianism -- Corruption 1 -- Corruption 2 -- Cost and Choice -- The Cost Disease of the Personal Services -- Customary Law -- The Demand-Revealing Process -- Deregulation of Postal Service -- Dictators and Social Contracts -- Direct Democracy -- Discrimination -- Dynamic Inconsistency -- Economic Freedom and its Measurement -- Economic Freedom and Political Freedom -- Economic Regulation -- The Economic Theory of Clubs -- Economists Versus the Public on Economic Policy -- Education and the State -- Efficiency of Democracy -- Efficiency of Democracy? -- The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis -- Elected Versus Appointed Regulators -- Election Models -- Electoral College -- Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation -- The Elusive Median Voter -- Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle -- Endogenous Morality -- Enron -- Environmental Politics and Economic Development -- The Euro -- European Political Integration -- Evolution of Institutions -- The Evolution of Law -- Experimental Economics and Public Choice -- Experimental Public Choice -- Expressive Voting and Redistribution -- Fair Division -- Fame and Politics -- Federal Reserve System -- Forecasting Presidential Elections in the United States -- Game Theory -- Game Theory in Public Choice -- Generality and the Efficiency of Government Decision Making -- Group Roles in Evolution and Cognition -- Growth of Local Government in the United States -- The Growth of Public Expenditure -- The Growth of the Relative Size of Government -- Heresthetics and the Evolution of the Us Constitution -- Homo Economicus -- Human Evolution and Political Behavior -- Ideology -- The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics -- Initiative and Referendum -- Institutions of Trade Protection -- Interest Groups 1 -- Interest Groups 2 -- International Game of Power -- International Organization -- Internet Voting -- Is Russia a Market Economy? -- Is Voting Rational? -- The Italian Public Finance Contribution to Public Choice -- The Judiciary -- The Law and Economics Movement -- Legal Precedents and Judicial Discretion -- Legal Rules and Standards -- Legislative Politics -- Legislators -- Leviathan Models of Government -- Logic of Collective Action -- The Logic of Liberty -- Logrolling 1 -- Logrolling 2 -- Meddlesome Preferences and Rent Extraction: The Tobacco Shakedown -- The Median in Politics -- The Median Voter Model -- Medieval Church -- Mercantilism -- Monetary Politics -- The New Deal -- Nonprofit Organizations -- The Origins of Social Choice Theory -- The Paradox of Rebellion -- Parchment Versus Guns -- Political and Cultural Nationalism -- Political Business Cycles -- Political Economics and Public Choice -- The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments -- The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform -- Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation -- Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters -- Principal-Agent Relationships in the Theory of Bureaucracy -- Prohibition -- Public Choice and Socialism -- Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust -- Public Choice in Italy -- Public Enterprise -- Public Finance and the Median Voter Model -- Public Finance in Democratic Process -- Public Goods -- Public Schools -- Public Utility Regulation -- Rational Choice Approaches to Economic and Political History -- Rational Ignorance -- Rational Irrationality -- Reciprocity -- Redistributive Politics 1 -- Redistributive Politics 2 -- Regulating Government -- Regulatory Takings -- Rent Dissipation -- Rent Extraction -- Rent Seeking -- Rent Seeking and Political Institutions -- Rent-Seeking Games -- Rent Seeking in Development -- The Rule of Law -- Rules Versus Standards -- Self-Interest -- Selfish Gene -- September 11, 2001 -- Single-Peaked Preferences and Median Voter Theorems -- The Social Cost of Rent Seeking -- Sortition -- Standard Oil and Microsoft: Antitrust Lessons -- State-Sponsored Murder as a Rent-Seeking Activity -- Structure-Induced Equilibrium -- Supply of Public Goods -- The Supreme Court -- Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price -- Term Limits 1 -- Term Limits 2 -- Terrorism -- The Theory and Measurement of Economic Freedom -- Totalitarianism -- Trade Protectionism -- Transitional Economies -- Transitions from Autocracy to Democracy -- Triangulation -- Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public Sector -- The Value of Voting Rights -- Votes for Women -- Voting Equipment, Minorities and the Poor -- Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections -- Voting Paradoxes in List Systems of Proportional Representation -- The War on Drugs -- Welfare Economics and Public Choice -- Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State -- Why Government Succeeds.