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This article reviews and examines the role of the public inquiry as a mechanism for investigating disasters within the United Kingdom. A number of authors have considered the growing penetration of technology into our lives, as well as economic liberalisation, societal fragmentation and the globalisation of business, as factors that have contributed to a post modern view of the world. Within this context, this article considers the efficacy of the public inquiry as a tool for learning from disaster. Is an instrument born of the late nineteenth century suited to the demands of the early twenty‐first century? Data are drawn from the football and rail industries, both of which have witnessed a sequence of large‐scale accidents investigated through the public inquiry mechanism. Drawing upon literature from the fields of socio‐legal studies and crisis management, three broad areas are critiqued: the process, underlying aims, and impartiality of the public inquiry process.

This article analyses the Cullen Report into the Piper Alpha disaster in order to research how public inquiry teams represent their efforts to make sense of events as authoritative. It is argued that inquiry reports are highly convention-governed sensemaking narratives that employ various forms of verisimilitude in order to bolster their authority. They are also monological storytelling performances that function hegemonically to impose a particular version of reality on their readers. The investigation of the means by which inquiry reports accomplish verisimilitude and hegemony are important as they may shed light on how this form of public discourse depoliticizes disaster events, legitimates social institutions, and lessens anxieties by concocting myths that emphasize our omnipotence and capacity to control.

AbstractPublic inquiries are an important phenomenon in modern British society, often used to address controversial or difficult issues of major concern to policy makers, the media and the public. Although people often comment adversely on how costly inquiries are and how long they take, inquiry methods are rarely discussed, let alone critiqued or challenged. However, from a social sciences perspective, inquiry methods, processes and outputs are often at odds with accepted standards for research methods. This paper discusses this divergence and the implications for how we should regard the inquiry as a way of knowing, or learning.

This paper examines a public inquiry into the proposed draining and exploitation of a peat bog, held to be of great significance by conservationists. Inquiries seem to offer a `naturally-occurring' instance of the public understanding of science. Of course, the conventions and procedures of legal examination dictate that scientific arguments may be treated differently in court from the way they are normally handled by the public. Still, the purpose of the inquiry is to allow lay persons to pass judgements. The paper examines the argumentational strategy of the scientists supporting the conservationists' case, and of the Queen's Counsel representing the developer. In particular, the QC is seen to use a rigid model of scientific rigour to criticize the ad hoc and sometimes tacit procedures of the scientists; although it is by no means clear that such ad hoc ery could be eliminated, he is able to suggest that their reasoning may actually be tendentious. The paper concludes by contrasting the debate in an inquiry with scientific controversies conducted in other contexts.

Prosecutors' discretionary decisions have enormous impact on individuals and communities. Often, prosecutors exercise their vast power and discretion in questionable ways. This Article argues that, to encourage prosecutors to use their power wisely and not abusively, there is a need for more informed public discussion of prosecutorial discretion, particularly with regard to prosecutors' discretionary decisions about whether to bring criminal charges and which charges to bring. But the Article also highlights two reasons why informed public discussion is difficult—first, because public and professional expectations about how prosecutors should use their power are vague; and, second, because, particularly in individual cases, it is hard to know what decision-making process the prosecutor employed and what considerations entered into the prosecutor's decision. Despite these challenges, the public can and should engage in more rigorous scrutiny of prosecutors' work. By way of example, the Article identifies a questionable practice that prosecutors have not adequately justified. Some prosecutors work with private debt collection agencies to threaten to prosecute low-income debtors whose checks bounced, demanding payment of the amounts owed plus additional fees, from which prosecutors' offices receive a cut. This practice appears abusive both because some innocent debtors are wrongly threatened with prosecution and because, for others, a threatened prosecution is disproportionately harsh. Because prosecutors have not been subject to serious, informed public questioning about potentially abusive practices such as this one, they have not publicly justified the practice. Informed public inquiry and discourse will both encourage prosecutors to use their power wisely and promote accountability when prosecutors use their power abusively.

Policy and practice in child welfare and protection has been significantly influenced by public inquiries or commissions which follow highly publicised child tragedies. Whilst there has been considerable comment on the final reports, there has been little research on the evidence gathered for such inquiries. Large amounts of testimony are collected which are increasingly available on inquiry websites. Such evidence offers new forms of readily available data about professional practice across a wide range of topics. Suggestions are made about research methods and search functions, and links to some sites provided. However, the data must be understood in the context in which it was produced.