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The dominant scholarly approach to the analysis of nationalization of foreign extractive industries in Third World countries employs game theory or bargaining models. A commonly used framework in bargaining theory is the so-called "bilateral monopoly model," which posits the existence of two "non-colluding" parties—that is, the foreign investor and a government—each of whom has singular, noncontradictory objectives. The relationship is described in terms of a "balance of power" between the host country and the foreign investor based on the problem of joint-maximization. Each party has what the other needs to maximize their mutual benefits. The foreign investor has capital, organizational resources, expertise, international access to export markets, and marketing ability while the host government has control of natural resources such as ore and crude oil as well as the labor force, and control over taxation, the trade and foreign exchange regime, and other law and regulation.

This article examines two plausible rival explanations of regime change. The first explanation, a structuralist argument, holds that regimes change because they are not constructed properly. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that the coherence in authority relations (that is, consistently democratic or consistently autocratic features) of a polity is a necessary condition for the lengthy persistence of that polity. The second explanation, a functionalist argument, holds that regimes change because they do not perform properly. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that the cumulation of performance crises (that is, any combination of high mass illegitimacy, high mass strife, and low decisional efficacy) of a polity is a sufficient condition for its quick demise. These two rival explanations of regime change are not mutually exclusive. Hence, we attempt a synthesis of the structuralist and functionalist arguments by suggesting two further hypotheses: that the coherence in authority relations and noncumulation of performance crises in a polity are necessary and sufficient conditions for the lengthy persistence of that polity; and, that the incoherence in authority relations and cumulation of performance crises in a polity are necessary and sufficient conditions for the quick demise of that polity. Evidence gathered from 25 polities provides striking confirmation of all four hypotheses.

Two theories explain changes in the international regimes for major economic sectors. A theory of hegemonic stability explains sectoral change as a consequence of ebbing hegemony; a theory of surplus capacity attributes regime shifts to a serious global problem with excess production capacity in the sector. The history of the world automobile industry shows that surplus capacity offers the better prediction and explanation for the timing of regime changes. However, a synthesis of the two theories is even more satisfactory. Hegemonic decline is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change. Surplus capacity, in the absence of a hegemon, creates the conditions necessary for change.

Regimes can be analyzed both as 'outcomes to be explained' and as mediating social institutions that affect international transactions. In the case of postwar trade, the changing outcomes can be predicted simply and with rough accuracy by a hegemonic model. Yet that model cannot explain the continuing reduction of tariffs, the development of new nontariff codes, and the persistence of crucial norms, rules, and institutions. These durable features of modern trade suggest that the logic of regime maintenance is distinct from that of regime initiation. Nor can the hegemonic model account for the regime's highly uneven weakening. The most prominent trade barriers are in mature, basic industries; the least prominent are in industries with differentiated products and extensive research and development expenditures. One explanation (which usefully complements a hegemonic model) is that sectors differ systematically in their capacity to adapt competitively to imports, and hence in their need to preserve their position by trade barriers. Despite the regime's uneven weakening, trade volumes have continued their secular growth. In sectors where the regime remains strong, it has stimulated two-way trade in similar products (intraindustry trade). Where the regime is weaker, new nontariff barriers diminish hypothetical trade growth but rarely aim at a permanent rollback in market shares or trade volume.

As competition between newly industrializing and advanced industrialized countries has increased, trade protection has become a key issue. In textile and apparel trade, international regimes to regulate trade intervention have existed since the early 1960s. The 1981 renewal of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement poses two puzzles. First, why did countries choose to continue to manage conflict through an international regime rather than through some other arrangement? Second, why did the regime become weaker and more protectionist than in the past? An international structure approach suggests that regimes are wanted to prevent arrangements in larger systems from being undermined, to control the behavior of other countries, and to reduce information costs. Variation in regime strength can be explained by asymmetry in the distribution of capabilities in various systems. The nature of the regime is influenced by changes in international competition and by nesting. A domestic structure approach, on the other hand, focuses on the relationships between state and societal groups (the Commission and member states in the case of the EEC). The relative strength of groups affects national policies and the development and characteristics of regimes. A "processtracing" examination of international textile negotiations, emphasizing the response of decision makers to structural constraints and incentives, allows us to ascertain the relative influence of international and domestic structures on the negotiations and outcomes.

The dynamics of international regimes are treated as social institutions. How and why do regimes arise from the interactions of individual actors over time? Three developmental sequences are identified, and the resultant regimes are described as spontaneous orders, negotiated orders, and imposed orders. How do regimes change once they have become established in specific social settings? Three major types of pressure for regime change arise from internal contradictions, shifts in underlying power structures, and exogenous forces. The next task in studying the dynamics of international regimes is to seek a more sophisticated understanding of the factors determining the incidence of these developmental sequences and pressures for change.

Auswirkungen der Liberalisierung des Wechselkurses