"This book offers a thorough overview, analysis and discussion of the liability regimes which apply to financial supervisors and resolution authorities at EU level, at the level of selected individual EU Member States and in major jurisdictions worldwide. It offers a unique and thorough access to a topic that is of great practical and theoretical importance. The book also contains a thorough comparative law evaluation"--
900 In bank resolution, swift and effective cooperation of different actors is of essence, particularly in cross-border cases. While the same can be said about cross-border insolvency management generally, the European framework for the recovery and resolution of failing banks and, in particular, the centralisation of resolution powers within the Single Resolution Mechanism stand out as particularly complex – and, at the same time, remains to some extent untested to the present date. Against this backdrop, the present article explores the statutory framework for cooperation between the Single Resolution Board, the European Central Bank in its capacity as supervisory authority within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, National Resolution Authorities and Third Country authorities. It concludes that, while the legal and institutional arrangements governing inter-agency cooperation are generally sound, operationalisation in actual cases might still be exposed to unexpected disruptions, especially in cases where political interests are at stake.
Artículo de revista ; The European authority in the field of banking resolution is the Single Resolution Board (SRB), in collaboration with the national resolution authorities. The resolution of a bank involves its restructuring by this Board, through a series of instruments aimed at ensuring the continuity of the institution's critical functions and financial stability in one or several Member States. This article describes the basic characteristics of the Single Banking Resolution Mechanism. Aspects relating to its mission, governance and organisation are first set out. A description that follows of the substantive elements of a resolution plan, namely public interest, critical functions, resolution strategies and instruments, the analysis of a bank's resolvability and the identification of obstacles to resolution. The author also explains the setting of a minimum level of eligible liabilities (MREL) and describes the functioning of the Single Resolution Fund. Lastly, a summary is given of the SRB's activity since it was established in 2015, and the ongoing legislative reforms under the European resolution framework are set out.
We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
I examine the effect of the policing capacity of traditional authorities (TAs) on communal conflict. TAs of ethnic groups use distinct customary laws and dispute-resolution mechanisms. Their coexistence with national norms and those of other TAs results in parallel legal systems. I argue that this generates uncertainties about norms and vertical and horizontal jurisdictional conflict, which increases the risk of communal conflict. However, this effect can be dampened by state-level rules on norm collisions, which lead to a system of co-production and less violence. To investigate these claims, I use global georeferenced expert survey data on customary policing of TAs and data measuring their constitutional regulation. I show that customary policing can have an adverse effect on communal peace. More subgroups of the larger ethnic group with policing institutions increase the risk of conflict. State-level regulation moderates these relationships. Additional evidence suggests that policing increases communal conflict through vertical jurisdictional conflict but otherwise achieves its intended purpose of providing security.
This article presents a critical analysis of the principles behind the scope and forms of cooperation between EU Member States and third-country resolution authorities in the context of the 2014 Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. The article also explores the future responsibilities of the prospective Single Resolution Authority regarding relations between the euro area and third-country resolution authorities ; Este artículo realiza un análisis crítico de los principios que inspiran el alcance y las formas de cooperación entre las autoridades responsables de la restructuración y resolución de entidades de crédito de los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea con sus homólogos de terceros países, en el marco de la Directiva de Restructuración y Resolución de Entidades de Crédito de 2014. Además, este artículo explora las competencias de la futura Autoridad Europea de Resolución en el ámbito de la cooperación con terceros países
