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In 2017, the The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) – a set of function-based regulations applicable to Arctic and Antarctic waters, with the goal of increasing awareness and improving safety for ship operations in polar waters – entered into force. This article examines the Polar Code's contribution to the establishment of new standards and guidelines, with the problem under discussion being the extent to which the function-based regulations contribute to enhancing safety for ship operations in the Arctic, given that maritime activities in these waters are associated with great risks and uncertainties. The article gives a historical review, elucidating the background leading to the development of the Polar Code, followed by a review of the structure and key principles of the regulations. Further, ship traffic in the Arctic region and those subject to the Polar Code are examined, followed by a summary of findings and experiences from three survival exercises (SARex I, II and III), performed in northern areas around Svalbard between 2016 and 2018. The article concludes that safe ship operations depend on those subject to the regulations conducting thorough operational risk assessments that cover all potential hazards, in order to mitigate sufficiently. Further, the presence of authorities is found to be crucial, with validation of the adequacy and the dimensioning of the implemented measures being of the essence.

Hedge strategies became famous after the strange year of 2008 when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and the Norwegian stock market crashed by 55%. Countries could benefit from the hedging strategies known from the financial world during an era when the American hegemony is about to end. In a polar or bipolar world where stakes are well known hedging is unnecessary, but in a multipolar world dominated from two to ten states the importance of hedging increases. A successful foreign policy hedging strategy aims at finding a low delta by reducing and managing risk, pushing decision making into the future, keeping options open and developing insurance mechanisms. L. Pitkaniemi

This study has developed a tool for explaining why employees fail to speak up with regard to work related criticism; there is a hidden policy of silence that teaches employees to remain silent. This hidden policy is here designated as the "Curriculum Silentium" and is described in detail on the basis of empirical and theoretical data. After identifying a gap between the intentionally and experienced policy for employees freedom of speech in organizations I suggest that there are on-going unofficial, partially hidden learning processes in the organizations. The overall research question is; How does the Curriculum Silentium; the hidden policy of silence among employees, look like? I make an analytic construction of the hidden policy as if it were planned policy, using the didactic categories applicable to organizations. These didactic categories are: goals, content, teaching strategies and the motivation of employees. The empirical data was collected in three different organizations: an elementary school, a home for the elderly and a factory in the process industry, using qualitative methods such as interviews and observation. The theoretical foundation of the study is taken from existing theory within the field of work life research and educational science. The study is not a comparative study of the three organizations, but does involve a comparison of whether and how the Curriculum Silentium is expressed in three such different organizations. The challenge of examining hidden relationships in organizations was met through the development of guidelines for an analytical approach called a critical didactic relations analysis. The study concludes that a hidden policy of silence resembling that presented here exists in organizations where employees fail to voice working life related criticism.

What can account for the distinctive American style of political discourse, the independent course of US foreign policy, & the stubbornly enduring popularity of George W. Bush? The article argues that both rest on the deep structure of American thought that is on the one hand highly dualistic & on the other obsessed with the notion of purity. These produce a worldview in which the "Good" is wholly, indivisibly good, the "Bad" is wholly, indivisibly evil & "Good" is at eternal risk of corruption. This mental framework is first illustrated by means of two popular films, the 1989 Bill and Ted's Excellent Adventure & the 1964 Dr. Strangelove. Finally, the author draws on the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas to analyze the consequences of this way of thinking for US foreign policy, & argues that such a dichotomous worldview faces constant challenge from the existence of phenomena that do not easily fit it. Much of US foreign policy can accordingly be understood as varying strategies to protect American purity & to resolve ambiguous phenomena that threaten the prevailing American moral code. 20 References. Adapted from the source document.

Most studies of Asian state involvement in Arctic affairs assume that shorter sea-lanes to Europe are a major driver of interest, so this article begins by examining the prominence of shipping concerns in Arctic policy statements made by major Asian states. Using a bottom-up approach, we consider the advantages of Arctic sea routes over the Suez and Panama alternatives in light of the political, bureaucratic and economic conditions surrounding shipping and shipbuilding in China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Especially Japanese and Korean policy documents indicate soberness rather than optimism concerning Arctic sea routes, noting the remaining limitations and the need for in-depth feasibility studies. That policymakers show greater caution than analysts, links in with our second finding: in Japan and Korea, maritime-sector bureaucracies responsible for industries with Arctic experience have been closely involved in policy development, more so than in China. Thirdly, we find a clear tendency towards rising industry-level caution and restraint in all three countries, reflecting financial difficulties in several major companies as well as growing sensitivity to the economic and political risks associated with the Arctic routes. Finally, our examination of bilateral and multilateral Chinese, Japanese and Korean diplomatic activity concerning Arctic shipping exhibits a lower profile than indicated by earlier studies.

This article question what are the causes of inaccuracies in opinion polls, and what is the political impact of opinion polls and their inherent risk of inaccuracies. Examples are provided of opinion polls that failed to predict the outcome of the 2008 Democratic primary elections. The author considers the strong US traditions of polling and ties to the academic community, and examines special issues present in American politics and the nomination process for the 2008 election to explain low polling accuracy. Statistical and methodological premises of opinion polls are discussed. It is suggested that the issue of race had an impact on respondents' willingness to answer truthfully questions about their candidate of choice in primary election opinion polls. A discussion of media presentation of polling results is included and it is argued that media organizations are increasingly ordering exclusive polls as opposed to reporting aggregate results from multiple polls conducted by independent sources. The bandwagon theory of the effect polling influencing results is discussed. The article refers to the American Association for Public Opinion Research special panel to shed light on pre-election polling. It is concluded that opinion polls will continue to have an important role in election reporting. References. E. Sundby

This comparative article reveals how the general focus of Canadian and Russian threat perceptions in the Arctic have shifted from a Cold War fixation on hard defence to accommodate soft security issues over the last three decades. Both countries now pay greater attention to threats and challenges stemming from climate change, security, and safety risks associated with resource development and increasingly accessible sea routes. Although concern about military conflict arising from Arctic disputes continues to frame some media discussions in both countries, most strategic analysts and academics have moved away from this line of argument. Instead, military functions now include assertion of Canadian and Russian sovereignty over their respective internal waters, as well as protection of resources in their exclusive economic zones and on and in extended continental shelves; protection of economic interests in the North, including mineral and bio-resources; prevention of potential terrorist attacks against critical industrial and state infrastructure; and dual-use functions, such as search and rescue operations, surveillance of air and maritime spaces, support to safe navigation, and mitigation of natural and human-made catastrophes.
The authors argue that analysts should parse two forms of military modernization in the Arctic: one of capability development related to the global strategic balance, where the Arctic serves as a bastion or a thoroughfare; and a second intended to address emerging non-traditional security challenges. They contend that these modernization programs do not inherently upset the Arctic military balance and need not provoke a regional arms race.

The Arctic is saturated with nuclear facilities bringing both benefits for regional economic and social development and risks of nuclear and radiological accidents and concerns about radioactive wastes. There is every reason to expect the Arctic will remain a nuclearized region during the foreseeable future. This makes it important to direct attention to issues of nuclear safety and security in the region. We identify several clusters of these issues in the Arctic, including the challenges of potential nuclear accidents, the handling of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the cleanup of radiological contaminants, and concerns about nuclear security. An analysis of international conventions and voluntary codes of conduct shows that they are applicable to Arctic nuclear safety and security, but only in general terms. This suggests a need for an Arctic-specific agreement on nuclear and radiological safety, emergency preparedness and response, and cleanup of radiological contaminants. The outbreak of military hostilities in Ukraine in February 2022 has disrupted normal procedures for addressing issues of common concern in the Arctic. But the need for co-operation regarding matters like nuclear safety and security will not go away. Assuming it is possible to devise "necessary modalities" for restarting the work of the Arctic Council following the acute phase of the Ukraine crisis, an Arctic-specific agreement on nuclear safety and security could be developed under the auspices of the Arctic Council, which already has taken an interest in nuclear safety through the activities of its Working Group on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response. Once such an agreement is in place, it will become important to consider the infrastructure needed to ensure that its provisions are implemented effectively.