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This study examines Russia's policies towards and within the Councilof the Baltic Sea States in the aftermath of the Ukrainian and other internationalcrises. More specifically, this paper analyses Russia's interest in andexpectations from the CBSS, as well as Moscow's institutional behaviour in theCouncil. The CBSS is viewed by Russia as both a centrepiece and cornerstoneof the regional governance system. Moscow also sees the CBSS as an importanttool for overcoming the politico-diplomatic isolation where Russia founditself with the start of the Ukrainian crisis. With the help of the CBSS, it retainsits ability to influence socioeconomic, political, environmental, and humanitariandevelopments in the Baltic Sea region. Russia supported the Council'sthree long-term priority areas: a regional identity, a sustainable and prosperousregion, and a safe and secure region. Russia favoured further the Council'sinstitutionalization and strengthening of its role in the regional governancesystem. Despite the fact that Russia's relations with other CBSS member-statesremain tense and that Moscow does not always manage to use the Councilto promote its interests in the region, the CBSS is still seen by Russia as animportant platform for regional cooperation.

The aim of this short paper is to show that the relations between Ukraine and Russia are extremely complex as they are built on a shared history, religion, language, and culture and they should not, therefore, be gauged by Western standards. Evaluating the current situation from a broader perspective, the fact that Ukraine plays a significant role in Russia's foreign policy needs to be emphasized. Ukraine is considered the key post-Soviet state, a significant "near abroad" country, whose position, potential, and geopolitical location are vital for the balance of power in both Eastern Europe and Europe in general. The research project aims at a synthetic examination of the current Russia-Ukraine war from the point of view of Ukraine striving for full independence, memory, and identity. Will the war of the brotherly nations wreck Russia's long-term policy towards Ukraine? Will the conflict ruin Russia's plans of post-Soviet space reintegration, whose pivot is set on Ukraine? Will the war stimulate Ukraine to deal with the issue of its identity, post-Soviet legacy, and collective memory?

The article explores Turkey's ambitions to assume a proactive role as a mediator in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Positioned as a middle power striving to enhance its global standing, Turkey has dedicated itself to striking a delicate balance between Russia and Ukraine in its foreign policy. This is exemplified by Ankara's engagement in an ambiguous cooperative rivalry with Russia while strengthening its partnership with Ukraine, including military cooperation in the Black Sea Region. Given these circumstances, Turkey sees itself as naturally inclined to act as a facilitator in brokering a ceasefire and bringing about peace between the two conflicting parties. Some successes have already been achieved, with the grain initiative being a primary example thereof.

The article deals with the problem of Russia's aspirations to revise the geopolitical system created in Soviet times using Crimea as an example. It shows the activities of both local political circles and the central authorities of the Russian SFSR, and later the Russian Federation, aimed at revising the existing borders and integrating the Crimean peninsula into Russia. The article covers the years from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the 1997 agreement between Russia and Ukraine.

Both Russian authorities and Russian society have a sense of harm associated with the position of Russia in the world. They do not agree with the dominant role of the West. To a large extent it is associated with a sense of Russian pride. The consequence of this situation is the growing confrontation between the Russian Federation and the West. Currently, the theatre of confrontation is i.a. the conflict in the east of Ukraine and the war in Syria. The intensification of military tension is also observed, the confirmation of which is the violation of the airspace of NATO members. The author of this article undertook research effort associated with the determination of the fields of confrontation between Russia and the West.

The specific use of the "energy weapon" in the hybrid war is being analyzed. The author highlights the historical retrospective use of the "energy weapon" in general and against Ukraine in particular. Now the energy component of hybrid war is the second in importance and power after the information component. The main political task of the gas conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, which was inspired by the Kremlin, was to demonstrate the inability of Ukraine as a transit partner and to damage the reputation of our country as a reliable transit, geoeconomic and geopolitical partner of the European Union. During the gas conflict Russia tried to position itself as an influential geopolitical player to preserve Ukraine in its sphere of political influence. By blackmail and promises to keep "special conditions" in the price formation Kremlin sought to protect its geopolitical interests in Ukraine. Upon solving the gas conflict, Moscow has tried to block the implementation of the provisions of the Charter on Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the United States on modernization. The "gas weapon" was used for the first time during the winter of 2005–2006. The first gas war demonstrated the vulnerability of Ukraine and European consumers, and demonstrated how effective and promising may be the further use of energy weapons.Gas weapons are used on several different fronts. First, Russia claims Ukraine is not trustworthy as a transit country for gas as it will act firstly to protect its own interests. In other words, Gazprom offers Europe a choice – or they, European consumers and voters, suffer or Ukraine does. Second, Russian specialists are ready at the first opportunity to accuse Ukraine of unsanctioned gas use, thereby justifying a reduction in supply to Europe. Third, Gazprom intends to prevent establishing reserve gas supplies in Ukraine. Fourth, Russia views Ukrainian gas debts as a source of financial income particularly necessary today.The purpose of the use of gas weapons is the implementation of a direct impact on the economy of the state, in this case – causing economic losses of Ukraine, with long lasting effects.

The specific use of the "energy weapon" in the hybrid war is being analyzed. The author highlights the historical retrospective use of the "energy weapon" in general and against Ukraine in particular. Now the energy component of hybrid war is the second in importance and power after the information component. The main political task of the gas conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, which was inspired by the Kremlin, was to demonstrate the inability of Ukraine as a transit partner and to damage the reputation of our country as a reliable transit, geoeconomic and geopolitical partner of the European Union. During the gas conflict Russia tried to position itself as an influential geopolitical player to preserve Ukraine in its sphere of political influence. By blackmail and promises to keep "special conditions" in the price formation Kremlin sought to protect its geopolitical interests in Ukraine. Upon solving the gas conflict, Moscow has tried to block the implementation of the provisions of the Charter on Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the United States on modernization. The "gas weapon" was used for the first time during the winter of 2005–2006. The first gas war demonstrated the vulnerability of Ukraine and European consumers, and demonstrated how effective and promising may be the further use of energy weapons.Gas weapons are used on several different fronts. First, Russia claims Ukraine is not trustworthy as a transit country for gas as it will act firstly to protect its own interests. In other words, Gazprom offers Europe a choice – or they, European consumers and voters, suffer or Ukraine does. Second, Russian specialists are ready at the first opportunity to accuse Ukraine of unsanctioned gas use, thereby justifying a reduction in supply to Europe. Third, Gazprom intends to prevent establishing reserve gas supplies in Ukraine. Fourth, Russia views Ukrainian gas debts as a source of financial income particularly necessary today.The purpose of the use of gas weapons is the implementation of a direct impact on the economy of the state, in this case – causing economic losses of Ukraine, with long lasting effects.

The article discusses the relationship between the occurrence of international conflicts and the desire of states to implement their own geopolitical interests. The key factor in the emergence of conflicts is the concept of an inter-civilization clash by Samuel Huntington, where the role of states in the formation of the international system is the trigger for decision-making. The author states that in modern conditions Russia defends its interests, which should not be perceived by other actors of international relations as a threat, but as competition.

This concise paper explores the intricate relationship between thedynamics of the European Union and Russia's interests in Europe, emphasizingthe advantages perceived by Russia in a weakened EU. The paper is comprisedof three sections: firstly, it examines the collapse of the Soviet Unionand its impact on newly independent states, establishing the geopoliticallandscape. The subsequent section traces Russia's foreign policy leading tothe 2022 conflict with Ukraine, with a focus on Ukraine's pivotal role as a geopoliticalflashpoint. The final section explores the dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine war, specifically addressing the European Union's role in security.The paper concludes by addressing the 2022 escalation, marked by Russia'sfull-scale invasion of Ukraine, highlighting the imperative of understandingUkraine's status as a geopolitical flashpoint. Overall, the paper contributes toa nuanced comprehension of the evolving geopolitical landscape, its implicationsfor regional stability, and international relations.

"Niniejsza monografia naukowa jest pierwszą w literaturze polskiej, która przedstawia kompleksową analizę podjętego tematu, tym samym poszerza naszą wiedzę o współczesnej polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej i jej obecności na płaszczyźnie bilateralnej i multilateralnej w Azji Południowo-Wschodniej. Zawiera także informacje o próbach rosyjskich polityków w zakresie realizacji Projektu Wielkiego Partnerstwa Euroazjatyckiego. Temat pracy nie doczekał się w polskiej literaturze naukowej kompleksowej analizy. Zwrot Federacji Rosyjskiej ku Azji, w tym Azji Południowo-Wschodniej, podyktowany był i jest względami polityki zagranicznej, tzw. wektorem wschodnim, szczególnie od czasu aneksji Krymu. Ponadto ASEAN odgrywa istotną rolę w umacnianiu poczucia podmiotowości Federacji Rosyjskiej i równowagi na międzynarodowej arenie azjatyckiej, szczególnie wobec partnera chińskiego. Temat jest jak najbardziej aktualny, ponieważ analizowana polityka zagraniczna Federacji Rosyjskiej wobec Azji Południowo-Wschodniej najprawdopodobniej będzie intensywnie ewoluowała w kolejnych latach, szczególnie w kontekście pogarszających się relacji Rosji z szeroko pojmowanym Zachodem."--