The article addresses an important and complex problem concerning the analysis of the implications of shaping a new international order for Germany's policy towards Russia. It consists of three parts: General tendencies of German research on changes in the international order, The essence of the new German policy strategy vis-à-vis Russia, Challenges for the implementation of Germany's policy towards Russia. As the leading EU country with extensive global interests, Germany – being the fourth global economy – in the 21st century benefited largely from the achievements of globalization and the international neoliberal order with the dominant role of the United States. In this context, cooperation with Russia as a strategic partner was of key importance to Germany. It was curtailed after Russia's transition to a policy of explicit aggression against Ukraine in 2014 (annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas), thus undermining the existing international order. As a consequence of imposing sanctions on Russia – by the USA, NATO countries and the EU – the Kremlin's leadership team headed by W. Putin made a shift towards deepening cooperation with China, aiming at weakening US influence and building a competitive multilateral order. Tensions and difficulties in transatlantic relations against the background of "America first" policy of the new US president D. Trump from the beginning of 2017 prompted Germany to maintain relations with Russia and China in a bilateral and multilateral dimension. ; Artykuł podejmuje ważny oraz złożony problem, związany z analizą wpływu kształtowania nowego porządku międzynarodowego dla polityki Niemiec wobec Rosji. Składa się on z trzech części: 1) ogólne tendencje niemieckich badań nad przemianami porządku międzynarodowego; 2) istota nowej strategii polityki Niemiec wobec Rosji; 3) wyzwania realizacji polityki Niemiec wobec Rosji. Jako czołowe państwo UE o rozbudowanych interesach globalnych Niemcy będące czwartą gospodarką światową korzystały w XXI w. w dużym stopniu ze zdobyczy globalizacji oraz dominującego w skali całego świata – międzynarodowego porządku neoliberalnego. W tym kontekście pierwszoplanowe znaczenie dla Niemiec miała współpraca z Rosją jako partnerem strategicznym. Uległa ona ograniczeniu po przejściu Rosji do polityki jawnej agresji przeciw Ukrainie w 2014 r. (aneksja Krymu oraz wsparcia dla Separatystów w Donbasie), podważając tym samym istniejący porządek międzynarodowy. W konsekwencji nałożenia na Rosję sankcji – przez USA, kraje NATO i UE – ekipa rządząca na Kremlu na czele z W. Putinem dokonała zwrotu w kierunku pogłębienia współpracy z Chinami, zmierzając zarazem do osłabienia wpływów USA i budowy konkurencyjnego porządku multilateralnego. Napięcia i trudności w relacjach transatlantyckich na tle polityki "America first" nowego prezydenta USA D. Trumpa od początku 2017 skłoniła Niemcy do podtrzymania relacji z Rosją oraz Chinami w wymiarze bilateralnym i wielostronnym.
The aim of this article is to analyse the international legal and political process of reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo in terms of its impact on the scope of development directions and strategies of the European Union countries as well as Russia and the USA. Particular emphasis was placed on the treatment of these issues in the light of the activities of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office. The main theses assumed for the purposes of this article are as follows: firstly, that the policy of reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo is multidimensional, including the necessity of the process of international criminal liability for the crimes committed by both states, while at the same time influencing the dilemmas of the development directions of individual European countries, but also of the European Union and the United States. In addition, the legal and political stabilization of the Balkan region, especially in the context of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and the possibility of cooperation with these states as part of intergovernmental international organizations, is strategically extremely important for the EU, the USA, as well as for Russia. The Author critically analyses issues using polemics with the standpoint presented in the doctrine of the subject as well as interpreting selected instruments of international law and Kosovo's national law. The deliberations resulted in conclusions as to the determinants in terms of the directions of the legal and political development of the EU and Russia resulting from the complicated process of reconciliation and mutual settlement of sins by Serbia and Kosovo.
In: (Wydawnictwo Ogólno Żydowskiego Zwia̧zku Robotniczego na Litwie, w Polsce i Rosyi)
Demonstracje i zbrojny opór : tłumaczenie z żydowskiego z "Arbeiterstimme" Nr. 27 -- Jak powinny być zorganizowane nasze demonstracje : tłumaczenie z żyd. z Nr. 29 "Arbeiterstimme" -- Jak mamy świętować dzień pierwszego maja ; z 30 Nr. Arbeiterstimme
Diplomacy is one of the ways of carrying out foreign policy. It is implemented during negotiations of a given country's envoys with representatives of other countries. The manner of receiving envoys (foreign diplomats) and proceeding with negotiations is specified by diplomatic etiquette. The article describes how those relationships were effectuated in the second half of the 17th century between Poland and Russia. Diplomatic missions are described from the moment of receiving indispensable documents and plenipotentiary powers, through traveling to Moscow under supervision of the pristavs (Russian pristavy), to the conclusion of mission. The description of envoys' stay in Moscow includes details of accommodation, organizing audiences, feasts, entering into treaties, adherence to rules of appropriate behaviour in the tsar's presence and keeping proper forms of address. Also, a peculiar way of carrying out lengthy negotiations by king and country's envoys and commissaries is presented.
The paper synthetically presents new trends and selected issues concerning Germany's stance vis-à-vis Russia in the second decade of the 21st century. It concentrates on an analysis of the following substantive issues:– draft of the essence of domestic political shifts in Germany and Russia in international context;– presentation of general assumptions featuring the new strategy in German policy vis-à-vis Russia;– showing principal challenges as well as selected problems of German cooperation with Russia in the period 2014-17;– underscoring new tendencies in Russia's impingement on Germany together with German judgments as to Russia's international role in the era of the Ukrainian crisis in light of opinion polls.Over the years 2003-17, as a result of internal changes in Germany, a multi-party system took on a shape that made it harder to create a coalition and a new government after the parliamentary election of September 24, 2017. In Russia, in turn, the authoritarian government system with president Vladimir Putin at the helm strengthened. President Putin, through the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas, begot to the persistent destabilization of Ukraine. The above mentioned developments were accompanied by a transition from the post-Cold War, unipolar international system, with the United States on top, towards a multipolar international system with the rising significance of China and Russia. Russia transformed into a geopolitical "competitor" of its strategic partner, Germany. On the other hand, Germany – as a leading EU and NATO state – together with France attempted to solve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It managed merely to achieve a partial armistice in Donbas within the framework of the OSCE mission (the Second Minsk Agreement from February 12, 2015). Due to the strong political and economic ties, Germany solely and temporarily suspended some forms of contact and cooperation with Russia and decided to reintroduce them in 2015. Germany engaged in hammering Western sanctions against Russia and their implementation during 2014-18. It concurrently supported Ukraine in its endeavors to achieve association with the EU in 2016. Simultaneously, Russia took advantage of its trump cards in the form of its presence in Germany ("Russian Germans", media: Sputnik and RT as well as sympathy in some political and social circles) to prop up anti-Western and populist tendencies in this country. ; The paper synthetically presents new trends and selected issues concerning Germany's stance vis-à-vis Russia in the second decade of the 21st century. It concentrates on an analysis of the following substantive issues:– draft of the essence of domestic political shifts in Germany and Russia in international context;– presentation of general assumptions featuring the new strategy in German policy vis-à-vis Russia;– showing principal challenges as well as selected problems of German cooperation with Russia in the period 2014-17;– underscoring new tendencies in Russia's impingement on Germany together with German judgments as to Russia's international role in the era of the Ukrainian crisis in light of opinion polls.Over the years 2003-17, as a result of internal changes in Germany, a multi-party system took on a shape that made it harder to create a coalition and a new government after the parliamentary election of September 24, 2017. In Russia, in turn, the authoritarian government system with president Vladimir Putin at the helm strengthened. President Putin, through the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas, begot to the persistent destabilization of Ukraine. The above mentioned developments were accompanied by a transition from the post-Cold War, unipolar international system, with the United States on top, towards a multipolar international system with the rising significance of China and Russia. Russia transformed into a geopolitical "competitor" of its strategic partner, Germany. On the other hand, Germany – as a leading EU and NATO state – together with France attempted to solve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It managed merely to achieve a partial armistice in Donbas within the framework of the OSCE mission (the Second Minsk Agreement from February 12, 2015). Due to the strong political and economic ties, Germany solely and temporarily suspended some forms of contact and cooperation with Russia and decided to reintroduce them in 2015. Germany engaged in hammering Western sanctions against Russia and their implementation during 2014-18. It concurrently supported Ukraine in its endeavors to achieve association with the EU in 2016. Simultaneously, Russia took advantage of its trump cards in the form of its presence in Germany ("Russian Germans", media: Sputnik and RT as well as sympathy in some political and social circles) to prop up anti-Western and populist tendencies in this country.
Central Europe is part of the continent with its historical and cultural identity and a unique geopolitical role (geopolitical wedge between Germany and Russia). Central Europe includes the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, which for centuries have been the subject of rivalry between Poland and Russia and the area of influence of powers neighboring this region. Depending on the results of this rivalry, the status of Ukrainian-Belarusian territories varied between the "great borderland" and the periphery of various powers, most often the Republic of Poland or the Russian Empire. However, their role was different for both countries. For the Commonwealth, they constituted a necessary resource for maintaining its subjectivity, sovereignty and, consequently, independence. However, for Russia they were a route to master Central Europe and to influence Western Europe. In the history of the Ukrainian-Belarusian lands, three alternative variants of concentration and political rivalry were possible. The first – the formation in this subregion of Central Europe of the countries with high political subjectivity, based on significant demographic, geopolitical and economic resources. The second – the occupation of the Ukrainian-Belarusian border entirely by one of the neighboring powers as a result of military actions or EU agreements, which made them a "great borderland", strengthening the potential of the country of its belonging. The third – the division of Ukrainian-Belarusian lands between state organisms with high subjectivity (the loss of the status of "great borderland" in favor of being peripheries), actually preventing internal political consolidation, but deepening the diversity of the subregion in terms of religion, religion, ethnicity, culture and language, mental, and consequently also socio-economic. In the historical process, all three scenarios were implemented, which contributed to giving the Ukrainian-Belarusian lands as a constitutive feature of the "Central European syndrome", however questioned in the international environment, primarily by Russia recognizing this area as part of its own civilization and cultural circle. ; Europa Środkowa jest częścią kontynentu z własną tożsamością historyczną i kulturową oraz unikatową rolą geopolityczną (geopolitycznego klina między Niemcami i Rosją). Do Europy Środkowej należy zaliczyć ziemie ukraińskie i białoruskie, które przez wieki były przedmiotem rywalizacji między Polską i Rosją oraz obszarem wpływów mocarstw niesąsiadujących z tym regionem. W zależności od wyników tej rywalizacji status ziem ukraińsko-białoruskich wahał się między "wielkim pograniczem" a peryferiami różnych mocarstw, najczęściej Rzeczypospolitej lub Imperium Rosyjskiego. Jednak dla obu tych państw ich rola była odmienna. Dla Rzeczypospolitej stanowiły one konieczny zasób dla utrzymania jej podmiotowości, suwerenności, a w konsekwencji – niepodległości. Natomiast dla Rosji były szlakiem do opanowania Europy Środkowej oraz oddziaływania na Europę Zachodnią.W dziejach ziem ukraińsko-białoruskich były możliwe trzy alternatywne warianty koncentracji i rywalizacji politycznej. Pierwszy – ukształtowanie w tym subregionie Europy Środkowej państw o wysokiej podmiotowości politycznej, opartej na znacznych zasobach demograficznych, geopolitycznych i gospodarczych. Drugi – zajęcie ukraińsko-białoruskiego pogranicza w całości przez jedno z sąsiednich mocarstw w wyniku działań militarnych lub układów unijnych, co czyniło z nich "wielkie pogranicze", wzmacniające potencjał państwa swojej przynależności. Trzeci – podział ziem ukraińsko-białoruskich między organizmy państwowe o wysokiej podmiotowości (utrata statusu "wielkiego pogranicza" na rzecz bycia peryferiami), faktycznie uniemożliwiający wewnętrzną konsolidację polityczną, lecz pogłębiający zróżnicowanie subregionu pod względem religijno-wyznaniowym, etnicznym, kulturowo-językowym, mentalnym, a w konsekwencji również społeczno-gospodarczym. W procesie historycznym były realizowane wszystkie trzy scenariusze, co przyczyniło się do nadania ziemiom ukraińsko-białoruskim jako cechy konstytutywnej "syndromu środkowoeuropejskiego", jednak kwestionowanego w środowisku międzynarodowym, przede wszystkim przez Rosję uznającą ten obszar za część własnego kręgu cywilizacyjno-kulturowego. ; Центральная Европа является частью континента с его исторической и культурной самобытностью и уникальной геополитической ролью (геополитический клин между Германией и Россией). Центральная Европа включает в себя украинские и белорусские земли, которые на протяжении веков были предметом соперничества между Польшей и Россией и зоной влияния держав, граничащих с этим регионом. В зависимости от результатов этого соперничества, статус украинско-белорусских территорий варьировался между «великой границей» и периферией различных держав, чаще всего Речи Посполитой или Российской империи. Однако их роль была разной для обеих стран. Для Речи Посполитой они являлись необходимым ресурсом для поддержания ее субъективности, суверенитета и, следовательно, независимости. Однако для России это был путь к овладению Центральной Европой и влиянию на Западную Европу.В истории украинско-белорусских земель были возможны три альтернативных варианта концентрации и политического соперничества. Первый – формирование в этом субрегионе Центральной Европы стран с высокой политической субъектностью, основанных на значительных демографических, геополитических и экономических ресурсах. Второй – оккупация украинско-белорусской границы целиком одной из соседних держав в результате военных действий или союзных соглашений, которые сделали их «великой границей», усиливая потенциал страны своей принадлежности. Третий – разделение украинско-белорусских земель между государственными организмами с высокой субъектностью (утрата статуса «великих пограничных территорий» в пользу периферии), фактически предотвращающее внутриполитическую консолидацию, но углубляющее разнообразие субрегиона с точки зрения религии, этнической принадлежности, культуры и языка, менталитета, а следовательно, и социально-экономической дифференциации. В историческом процессе были реализованы все три сценария, которые способствовали тому, что украинско-белорусские земли стали характерной чертой «центральноевропейского синдрома», хотя и подвергались сомнению в международной среде, в первую очередь в связи с тем, что Россия признала этот район частью своего цивилизационно-культурного круга.
