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Many misconceptions about the state of affairs in Russia have surfaced since the end of the Cold War; this article seeks to correct these errors. The first erroneous idea is that the Russian economy has collapsed. This is not true; Russians have simply fled low quality in domestic products & have embraced high quality foreign goods. Also, the idea that the market economy was too much too soon is erroneous; problems such as excessive state intervention, corruption, high tax rates, etc, actually point to the need for more reforms. In addition, privatization is not to blame for these deficits; instead, it has provided 70% of the nation's GDP. Russia collects taxes & in fact has instituted a stable flat income tax of 13%, which most people pay. Russia's infrastructure is actually improved: Russia does not need foreign investors. The health care crisis is not as extreme as some say. Russia was not lost by President Clinton. Democracy & the media are the answer to control Russia's elitist tendencies. Bibliog. R. Larsen

In this section on the Capabilities, Trends & Economics of regional military defense capabilities, the military trends & priorities of Russia are assessed. The reform & modernization of the Russian military is asserted to be slowing, as well as a reduced path aspirations for military professionalization, & the retention of conscription. Developments in modernization identify a slow pace of re-equiping for ground forces, but also updates to aerospace reconnaissance systems & successful underwater firing of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A medium-term outlook is positive for the Russian economy, and increases in and national defense spending & exports of military hardware may be slowed by changing relationships due to China & US sanctions on to of Russia's defense groups. The difficulties of estimating the real scale of Russian military spending is resolved by the application of the PPP approach to calculate Russian military expenditure in US dollars. A detailed assessment follows of Russian military capabilities that inventories troops, organizations by service & equipment, deployment, & foreign forces. Tables. J. Harwell

This chapter provides an independent & detailed assessment of Russia's military capabilities & defense economics. Military operations in Georgia have bolstered confidence in the Russian military, which was damaged by the end of the Cold War & involvement in Chechnya. There is public support of a more expanded military. Abroad, Russian's military power has been represented by its navy with deployments in the Mediterranean & Caribbean. Russia's military posturing is due in large part to increasing U.S. & NATO activities in traditionally Russian spheres creating a crisis in Russian-Western relations. Key to Russia's military posture is Central Asia & the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) whose military capacity Russian president Medvedev hopes to increase in order to counter U.S. & Western influence. This chapter also discusses in detail Russia's war with Georgia & security situations in the North Caucasus region. Statistic & details concerning Russia's defense budget & capabilities are provided. C. Goger

The chapter summarizes developments in military operations from 2009 to early 2010 in the Russian Federation. The chapter provides a summary of Russia's military performance in the South Ossetian conflict of 2008. It explains of the changes that Army General Nikolai Makarov has proposed to the structure of the armed forces, which are described as being the most radical transformation of the Russian military in the last two hundred years. The plan envisages the transformation of the current four-tiered structure of the military into a three-tiered system creating a series of brigades which should better allow for regional conflict management in zones of foreign strategic interest. Military education and career management will be centralized into ten educational centers. The officer corps will be consolidated in order to eliminate redundant positions, and salaries for officers and other personnel are expected to triple in the next ten years. Despite the economic crisis, the Russian government has confirmed its commitment to maintaining high levels of defense spending aimed at modernization. The chapter discusses the role of arms exports to Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South America as a tool of revenue generation for the armed forces. Kenny Cargill

The army's transformation to a combined-arms brigade-based structure is proceeding, albeit more slowly than the ministry initially envisaged. Personnel issues continue to bedevil the modernisation process, with poor manpower planning and poor conditions for contract servicemen and conscripts, as well as difficulties in the creation and maintenance of an effective senior NCO cadre. Modernising the equipment used by military personnel is another challenge. Efforts continue to overhaul not only command structures, but also command philosophy. Adapted from the source document.

Although Russian military reform has been obstructed by several factors including the appearance of cases of bullying amongst senior leaders, it is noted that conscription programs have been modified & that other reforms will reduce the number of Interior Ministry troops while augmenting the number of Federal Security Service personnel. Attention is then directed toward examining the air defense & space capabilities of the Russian military, alterations to Russia's cooperation with international military operations, & developments in combating insurgency in the North Caucasu's region. Moreover, information concerning Russia's defense economics, defense budget for 2006, & weapons exports is presented. In addition, detailed information documenting the Russian military's capabilities, deployment, & involvement in foreign forces is provided. Tables. J. W. Parker