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Social philosophy takes care of three tasks: the conceptual idea about an institution, how it functions and how it accomplish. In this sense, a challenge to social philosophy, from the point of view of critical-normative research, is to think of the social institution not only as the backbone of society, but, above all, to link it with the social-ontological argument with emancipatory approach; in other words, how a social institution how to deal with its task of promoting social goods and social rights. I intend to explain the philosophical-social requirement of the social-ontological argument in the discussion of critical-normative research taking into account that, at first, the social institution is understand itself as a medium to emancipation and, secondly, this institution stem from a detranscendental reason conception and this refer to a new way to think the social philosophy inside in the historical background of ours social communities.

Apresenta a área Ciência da Informação e seus objetos de estudo no mesmo movimento em que esses objetos de estudo são pensados na interrelação com a Educação, tornando assim a questão da autoria, do uso de periódicos educacionais e o funcionamento dos grupos de pesquisa em educação, novos objetos de pesquisa revitalizados pelo aporte discursivo e pela aproximação das áreas em questão.

The aim of the present paper is to analyze the conception of science of Popper resorting to the metaphor with the game of chess that he uses in his work The logic of scientific research. We consider that by means of this metaphor it is possible to perceive that its conception of science is not reduced to the logical criterion of falsifiability as many of its critics let us envisage, nor even to define methodological rules to guide the practice of science. But the philosopher himself in establishing such analogy makes it clear the existence os rules is what science has in common with the game of chess. In our view, these rules, as well as the scientific criterion, are not sufficient to define the scientific practice, since it involves other elements such as: values, objectives, scientific community and context in which the research is carried out. Popper assumes these elements in his metaphor, but does not make them explicit. It is only in later works such as Conjectures and Refutations and The Open Society and Its Enemies that they are clearly defined. We, therefore, intend to bring to light those elements involved in the game of science in Popper in order to give greater clarity to his conception of what science is.

Eric Weil's modern society is characterized among other things by its conception of science. Both based on the principle of effective calculation, the understanding of its functioning and its limitations go together. Thus, analyzing modern society contemplates a discussion of the instance that functions as its self-consciousness: the conception of science that is its own, the social sciences, whose model is the science of nature. Modern science and society are understood within the scope of the Weil's category of condition. Here there is no appeal to an unconditioned principle. Therefore, the question of sense can not be made. However, it is not a question of renouncing the achievements of modern science. In Weil's view, however, it must be recognized that the question of sense can be properly made. This is because it must be put through philosophy. Our objective in the present paper is to discuss the relationship between modern society, modern science and sense. This is because if there is a science of an efficacius society there is also a science of sense: this is philosophy.