Suchergebnisse

Respon'sible,liable to be called to account or render satisfaction: answerable: capable of discharging duty: able to pay. The old Chambers's dictionary gives a behavioristic view of responsibility: in terms of action, not thought or belief. "Lust in the heart" is not equated to lustin flagrante. It is this view I shall explore in this essay, rather than the more subjective notion ofmoralresponsibility, as in, "I feel moral responsibility (i.e.,guilt) for not doing anything to save the Tutsis [Hutus, ethnic Albanians, etc.]." My presumption is that responsibility implies capability: you cannot be held responsible for something over which you have no control (Hutus, ethnic Albanians, etc.). There is obviously uncertainty in some cases—where control is less than total, where the degree of potential control depends on our own efforts, where we cannot know if we have control until we try to exert it, etc. The relation between responsibility and degree of control is a separate topic which I shall not treat here.

LASSWELLT:h e first of our discussants is of the discipline that the rest of the social scientists examine with mixed feelings of respect and envy, namely, economics. Prof. Jan Tinbergen. TINBERGEIN p: ropose not only to give a very brief summary of my paper but to add a few remarks that are inspired by the discussions in these two and a half days. In my paper I trace how, during the last century and a half, both the aims and the means of social economic policies have changed. A number of social objectives have been added to the aims, especially care for the weak and income distribution generally, but other social objectives as well.

This commentary traces the genealogy of "theft of time," a newly discovered offence committed by employees against employers. A Foucauldian perspective is used to examine how truth claims from science, technology, and law constitute categories through which groups are sorted, classified, and censured: the processes of naming, blaming, and shaming. This commentary argues that to understand why some truth claims are heard and acted upon, while others are ignored or silenced, it is necessary to link the power/knowledge nexus to political economy, the structural dominance of capital, and the power relations thereby created and reinforced.

The dramatic clarification of segregation and diversity law -- Determining the legitimacy of laws that use racial/ethnic classifications -- Legal rationales relating to school segregation and diversity -- Empirical assessments of legal doctrine responding to school segregation and diversity -- Empirical assessments of the implementation of laws addressing school segregation and diversity -- Lessons from the law and empirical research addressing school segregation and diversity

Comments on Patricia Wald's (2003) article on social science's utility to judges. In reviewing Wald's work, surprise is registered at her lack of attention to amicus curiae briefs for synthesizing, digesting, & presenting social science data for judges. It is then argued that Wald's ideas have implications for the choices that political scientists make if her view that judicial decisions would be well served if judges were better able to use social scientific evidence were shared. The relevance of "who judges" in terms of background is discussed, arguing that what judges know derives from their legal & judicial education; specialist training for judges is looked at briefly. It is concluded that political scientists can make themselves more accessible as public intellectuals to judges & employ institutional analysis to help guide the construction of the legal system for the best possible legal decision making. 21 References. J. Zendejas