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The process of European integrations, with a growing political, economic, and security interdependence of member states is designed in such a way that, among other things, it can eventually result in developing a collective approach to defense, whose features would be a far cry from any other form of traditional alliances. The signatories of the Maastricht Agreement vowed to shape a common defense policy which would in time lead to the common defense. The common defense policy, whose structure would be built on the basis of the models and trends of the defense policies of the leading West-European countries, should evolve as an integral part of EU's common foreign and security policy. It should address all the aspects of the use of military power, and it will require an analysis of a broad spectrum of possible scenarios which may pose a threat to EU's security. EU countries have demonstrated certain shortcomings in their military capacities e.g. transport equipment and other capacities for deployment. Although in the economic field they have achieved consensus on numerous issues, it is obvious that defense issues such as nuclear weapons, professionalization of the military and the policies of defense industry are still a major bone of contention for EU members. Though EU, WEU, and NATO represent only a segment of the European security architecture, they will most probably serve as the key institutional framework for the development of a common defense policy and common defense. Further expansion of this triangular institutional framework is going to be interdependent, mutually supportive and parallel. (SOI : PM: S. 89)

In today's world, marked by an increasing interdependence, national security is becoming a component of international security, which is not a mere sum of individual national securities, but a permanent international framework of universally acceptable values. Interethnic relations today are central for a state's security, as well as for international order. There is the question whether the international system must guarantee individual and collective security of ethnic groups/minorities, regardless of the state they live in. Today, human and minority rights have become an important institutionalized international factor of security and stability and a concern of the entire international community, despite the fact that many states still claim that minority policy is their internal problem into which international community has no right to interfere. The affirmation of the rationalist approach to contemporary security implies that the responsibility for guaranteeing security lies not only on individual states and unions but also on the international system as a whole. (SOI : PM: S. 35)

Ethnic minorities and minorities-related conflicts have always been one of the most important security issues for international community. The durability of ethnic conflicts in certain regions and the difficulties in thei resolution, have resulted in the outbreak of many armed conflicts, the collapse of multi-ethnic states, the changes of borders and of demographic relations. Despite the increasing number of security challenges and needs, it is still not possible to talk about a certain uniform and universally accepted model of solving the problems among ethnic minorities. It is obvious that in the postcoldwar period this is going to be an increasingly pressing need of international community. The paper deals with most basic security problems which are caused by the unsettled relationships between ethnic minorities and majority; it also covers the policies of their resolution. By analysing the model of resolving ethnic conflicts in South Tyrol, two groups of ethnic conflicts' resolution policies are looked into: the policy of the elimination of differences and the policy of managing differences. (SOI : PM: S. 59)

The author claims that all major efforts concerning European security have always been linked with the end of a war. Thus the end of the cold war has been marked with the expansion of NATO and an attempt to create a new security. By analysing the political scope of the expansion, the military and strategic framework, the Russian reactions, and the economic significance, the author comes to the conclusion that the expansion is not conducive to the establishment of an integral system of European security. The purpose of this development by Clinton's team was primarily to outline the new European borders (the key aspect of Clinton's foreign policy) and, in the future, to create the conditions for further expansion and admittance of new members. Only in the remote future, through constant expansion and links with other European organisations, NATO could turn into the central system of European security. (SOI : PM: S. 97)

Germany's security dilemma is to fulfill the larger role in Europe and global security that is expected after reunification, while not rekindling a sense of threat particularly among neighbors to the east. Opinion surveys of Germans and Central/East Europeans reveal substantial difficulties were Germany to become more assertive. Changes in German behavior and constitutional interpretation suggest a maturation or "normalization" of German foreign policy. Thus far, th changes have emphasized traditional forms of diplomacy and alliance behavior focused on using the enlarged capacities of a reunited Germany that more direc pursue German interests. An alternative way by which to perform a larger security role are discussed, particularly in light of data regarding the mutual perceptions of Germans among neighboring peoples and leaders. (SOI : PM: S. 62)

Henry Kissinger is one of the most eminent and influential intellectuals in American foreign policy. His work and achievements may be divided into three phases of his participation in the creation of American foreign policy. In the first - scholarly - phase of his career, he criticized US foreign polic His works from that period clearly reflect his "realpolitik" outlook. Particularly important for his life and work is the second phase when he was able, as a national security adviser and later as Secretary of State for presidents Nixon and Ford, to use his remarkable intellectual capital and successfully practice realpolitik as the creator and proponent of American foreign policy. After his retirement from foreign policy administration, Kissinger did not cease to use his clout in the field of international relations and American foreign policy. He has been one of the most significant American intellectuals who have exerted an influence on American foreign policy. (SOI : SOEU: S. 133)

International pressure prevented Croatia from ending the occupation of eastern Slavonia by military means. The author claims that the policy of peaceful integration and the UNTAES mandate are rife with risks which might jeopardize the eventual Croatian control of that region. He points out a set of contentious issues related to the occupied territory: the incomplete demilitarization, dual government (parallel UNTAES and Serbian authorities), no return for the non-Serbian refugees, staying on of the Serbs from other parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. Particularly risky for Croatia are the efforts of the local Serbs to retain absolute ethnic majority as the grounds for establishing territorial autonomy which would enable the militant accolytes of Greater Serbian politics to remain in the region and push for the secession and annexation by Serbia, the efforts which would in all probability be given military support by Serbia, this time under the circumstances which would be much more unfavourable for Croatia than in 1995. The author concludes that for Croatia the only acceptable solution is the total integration of eastern Slavonia and the establishment of full Croatian sovereignty while the creation of a Serbian autonomous province in that region must on no account be permitted. (SOI: PM: S. 188)