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The development of a strict methodology of observation & analysis in soc sci has always met with resistance. In the current debate on this topic in the US, 2 positions can be distinguished. There are the 'theorists,' who find their inspiration in the work of recent philosophers such as H. Marcuse & J.-P. Sartre; they rate the formation of a pol'al theory as a 1st priority. Then there are the 'behaviorists,' whose first care is for sci'fic method. This contrast is reviewed on the basis of the document, "Political Science at Berkeley, An Invitation to a Discussion," which was published anonymously by a group of students. The criticism of these students can be summarized under the headings 'commitment' & 'relevance.' As far as commitment is concerned, the critics reproach the behaviorists for not taking stands in important contemporary moral issues, & for identifying with the status quo. It is argued here that what leads to acceptance of & identification with the existing pol'al order is not behaviorist methodology as such, but rather the mood of the behaviorists. As far as 'relevance' is concerned, the critics are impatient with the futile detail analysis & data collecting of the behaviorists. The behaviorists' use of a strict methodology of explanation by generalization leads to a reduction of the scope of analysis. Then only the 'easy' aspects ('easy' to quantify, 'easy' to collect, etc) are analyzed, & discontinuous developments are neglected. The argument presented here is that the lack of a dynamic theory of the pol'al process is an impediment indeed for pol'al sci, but that, again, behaviorism as such cannot be accused of being 'conservative' or 'conformistic': the refutation of race theories, for example, was rather a radical undertaking. It is concluded that for the time being it is not necessary to lay other bounds on pol'al sci than those that follow from the claims of rational debate & intellectual honesty. HA.

Majority rule has various applications. In parliamentary theory, it intervenes at the level of relations between assembly & gov, & again, in elections. We find it in democratic theory where the majority of the people must approve decisions of the constitutional organs. Finally, it is employed in the decisionmaking process of the assemblies, & it is this aspect which forms the object of the present study. Since antiquity the majority principle has been generally observed in the decisions of deliberating bodies; but it was not until the 16th cent that it triumphed in England & France. In Switzerland up to the 16th cent majority rule was in effect, disappeared for a while, & then reappeared after the transition from confederation to federation. In Holland, majority rule was applied with certain restrictions from the 16th cent on. Poland had the 'liberum veto' up to the beginning of the 19th cent. From a theoretical viewpoint, the jurists of the Middle Ages based their justification of majority rule on an old Roman adage, & Canon Law has also made an important contribution to this doctrine. The authors of the 18th cent elaborated a legal theory based on rational fictions & on the doctrine of the Social Contract in particular. Among the moderns, 3 principal schools can be distinguished: those who, with Duguit, give a utilitarian basis to the principle, those who see in it a sublimated power, particularly sociol'ts, & finally the theoreticians who accept the principle for ethical reasons. The problem has increased in importance with the existence of international org's where at present, the majority principle is applied only exceptionally. (Translated by Z. Dana from IPSA).