Search results

A power point presentation of the post approval oberservations of the national budget FY2017-18 discussing revenue, develpoment expenditures, and budget deficit.

A power point presentation of CPD analyses of the National Budget for FY2017-18.

A power point presentation of CPD analyses of the National Budget for FY2017-18.

International audience ; This paper discusses the monetary and exchange policies followed by Latin American countries during the financial crises that have appeared each decade since the beginning of the 1980s. We examine the implications of a phenomenon defined by Reinhart as "this time is different". In particular, we report errors in the diagnosis of the structural causes of past financial crises, and the damages caused by the choice of fixed exchange rates. The article also looks at the problems facing the countries today: the resource curse, the dilemma between currency appreciation and financial bubbles, inflation targeting policy. We suggest that governments have learned from past crises, by further anchoring their financial policies to the reality of their economies: the exchange rate regime is no longer the guiding element of inflation policy, loans in local currency have increased due to the rise in domestic bond markets, monetary policies have remained accommodative during the 2008 financial crisis, and central banks have used swap agreements to meet their needs of international currencies. ; Cet article propose une réflexion des politiques monétaires et de change suivies par les pays d'Amérique latine lors des crises financières, qui sont apparues au cours de chaque décennie, depuis le début des années 1980. Il expose ce qu'a impliqué le syndrome que Reinhart expose par « cette fois-ci, les choses sont différentes ». Sont développées notamment les erreurs de diagnostic sur les causes structurelles des crises, les dommages causés par la volonté de maintenir un taux de change fixe par rapport au dollar au moment fort des crises. L'article se penche également sur les problématiques auxquelles les pays font actuellement face : la malédiction des ressources, le dilemme entre appréciation monétaire et bulles financières, les enjeux du ciblage d'inflation. Nous suggérons que les gouvernements ont appris des crises passées, en ancrant davantage les politiques financières sur la réalité de leurs économies : le régime de change n'est plus l'élément guidant la politique de lutte contre l'inflation, les prêts en monnaie locale ont augmenté grâce à l'essor des marchés obligataires domestiques, la politique monétaire est demeurée accommodante au cours de la crise financière de 2008, des accords de swaps entre banques centrales sont conclus pour répondre aux besoins de devises internationales.

The present report is the first reading of the State of Bangladesh Economy in FY2016, prepared under the flagship programme of the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) titled Independent Review of Bangladesh's Development (IRBD). The purpose of this report is to present an assessment of the performance of key sectors of the Bangladesh economy and to track trends in major macroeconomic variables during the first half of FY2016. The review examines quality of macroeconomic management and underlying strengths and weaknesses of the economy, at the halfway mark of the ongoing fiscal year. The report considers latest available data and information from domestic and international sources, as well as insights gleaned from key informants. First, this report revisits macroeconomic trends in FY2015 so as to establish the benchmarks to assess the performance in FY2016 in Section II. Second, the report reviews the performance of key macroeconomic correlates during the early months of the current fiscal year. In Section III, a review of the public finance management in FY2016 has been carried out. Section IV deals with inflation and banking sector, while performance of external sector is examined in Section V. In Sections VI and VII detailed analyses of two key sectors of the economy, viz. power and energy and manufacturing sectors, from the perspectives of economic growth and private investment have been presented. Finally, the report ends with some concluding remarks.

Significant foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to maritime Southeast Asia (and more recently Vietnam) have been the key factor behind the economic development and in the integration into the global economy of the countries located in that region. Southeast Asia's prospects as a destination for foreign direct investment are bright, and over the last decade, FDI stock per capita in the region has increased five-fold from USD$500 in 2000 to nearly USD$ 2,500 in 2013.1 In this same period, regional real GDP per capita grew only 1.6 times to reach USD$ 2,255 in 2013.2 Using the latest UNCTAD statistics on bilateral foreign direct investment flows into nine Southeast Asian economies, this Perspective will look at what FDI flows tell us about two of the major strategic concerns of Southeast Asian states and of ASEAN: 1. The significance of the relationship for each Southeast Asian state and the region as a whole, between economic development, global economic integration and dependence on (or autonomy from) major extra-regional powers. The growing trade dependence of Southeast Asian economies on China and China's growing influence in Southeast Asia are the current focus of this foundational regional concern. 2. Further strengthening of integration among Southeast Asian economies and through this reducing the development gap between them. This regional economic virtuous circle is seen to be particularly important for supporting ASEAN unity and centrality.

Although emerging economies as a group performed well during the global recession, weathering the recession better than advanced economies, there were sharp differences among them and across regions. The emerging economies of Asia had the most favorable outcomes, surviving the ravages of the global financial crisis with relatively modest declines in growth rates in most cases. China and India maintained strong growth during the crisis and played an important role in facilitating global economic recovery. In this informative volume, the second in a series on emerging markets, editors Masahiro Kawai and Eswar Prasad and the contributors analyze the major domestic macroeconomic and financial policy issues that could limit the growth potential of Asian emerging markets, such as rising inflation and surging capital inflows, with the accompanying risks of asset and credit market bubbles and of rapid currency appreciation. The book examines strategies to promote financial stability, including reforms for financial market development and macroprudential supervision and regulation.

While Shadow Board members still considered current monetary settings as appropriate for the upcoming May meeting, attention turns to a tightening in monetary policy over the coming year. In the near term, members pointed to some uncertainty over how sustainable the recovery will be particularly in light of continued border restrictions. Hence members saw a cautious approach as justified for the upcoming meeting.

Development Research News is a quarterly publication of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). It highlights the findings and recommendations of PIDS research projects and important policy issues discussed during PIDS seminars. PIDS is a nonstock, nonprofit government research institution engaged in long-term, policy oriented research.

There are growing calls amongst Shadow Board members for the Reserve Bank to tighten monetary policy given the pick-up in inflation pressures in the New Zealand economy. Many on the Shadow Board now see a tightening in monetary policy at the upcoming July meeting as appropriate. Beyond that, an overwhelming majority thinks monetary policy should be tightened within the coming year.

This paper explores modules and articles on cooperation concerning the digital economy that are applicable for Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries under certain circumstances. It investigates the progress of and obstacles to ASEAN's digital connectivity, as well as features of existing Digital Economic Agreements and digital economy related articles in other agreements. We propose the use of a differentiated strategy and steps to promote integration for ASEAN countries covered in this research.

Asia has experienced massive economic growth, characterized by rapid urbanization and industrialization, changing demographics, and increasing consumption and demand for resources. This has contributed to significant environmental degradation. The challenge faced by governments in the region is in identifying and implementing innovative and dynamic policy approaches that are effective at improving environmental quality while sustaining development gains. This report reviews past and ongoing applications of marketbased instruments (MBIs) to address air quality, water, and waste management in Asia and provides recommendations for the use of MBIs for more efficient and effective environmental management.

A. Introduction A wide body of literature describes the relationship between innovation and the success of the organization. The evidence that innovative organizations are more successful is overwhelming [Bain 1956, Porter1983]. It is therefore not surprising that innovation is seen as one of the most important processes in the organization. The importance originates not only from the organization's ability to develop products with unique features and therewith improve its competitive position but also from the organization's ability to respond to changes in the environment, threatening its existing competitive position. Although the former, proactive implementation of innovation is often the organization's intention and the more glorious implication of innovation, the latter, reactive implementation represents more widely the context of innovation in organizations. There is also overwhelming evidence that many organizations have problems with innovation. In order to obtain a better understanding of these problems it is important to study the innovation process and its characteristics. The innovation process is not necessarily similar in every organization and depends on the type of activities that the organizations pursue. This study focuses on the innovation processes in Technology Intensive Organizations (TIOs) and more in particular TIOs active in High Tech industries like the semiconductor and material sciences industry. In these TIOs, technology development plays an important role in the innovation process because technology provides the functionality of the product or process. However, the technology development processes is often not considered as a part of the innovation process. In general there is more emphasis is on the New Product Development (NPD) process and the technology development process captured under the 'fuzzy front-end' of the NPD process. However, some contributions in literature indeed emphasize that the Technology Development process is not only important, but also hard to manage and quite different from the NPD process. This study supports this notion about the technology development process and intends to contribute to a better understanding of the technology development process, its role in the innovation process and how it is managed. B. Problem definition The technology development process is not well described in literature which is particular as technology becomes more and more important for new products. The tendency is that products not only comprise of more technologies, but also the manufacturing processes become more reliant on multiple technologies. It is expected that this increasing complexity and integration of product- and process technologies will continue. This implies having access to technology becomes more important. This access can be realized by licensing, technology acquisitions or by in-house developments. As a result of the higher level of integration of technologies in products, it becomes more difficult for organisation to own all the required product and process technologies. While licensing and trading technologies provides more external access, one can argue that owning and developing the core technologies of the products or processes remains crucial to maintain a strong competitive position. Therefore, the development of technologies will be important for Technology Intensive Organisations, now and in the future. Cooper argues that technology development processes are very important for the prosperity of the organisation and that that these processes are in general 'mishandled' by applying NPD-methods to it [Cooper 2006]. Cooper proposes to apply an adapted 'Stage-Gate' process to the Technology Development process, where the process is broken down in a flow where important decision points are represented by gates and the activities prior to these gates are defined as stages. This approach is not disputed but there are two issues that are not well addressed. Firstly, during the development activities that Cooper identifies as stages, many decisions are made that 'do not make it to the gate'. It is recognized that the technology developments process requires gates, especially at a management level in order to decide on resources supporting the process. Just because technology development is in general a costly and long lasting process, it requires a lot of management support to progress. However, at the operational level technology developers make all kind of decisions in order to make progress during the 'stages' of the process. These decisions have definitely impact on the outcome of the process and are therefore at least equally important to consider. The 'Stage-Gate' approach assumes that progress is made in the 'Stages', but how it is made is not discussed nor defined. Secondly, the 'stage-gate' process does not take into account the notion that technology development is subject to a certain path dependency. This notion is based on several contributions in several bodies of literature; scientific discovery [Kuhn 1972], [Klahr & Simon 1999] economics [Nelson & Winter 1981], Organizational change [Van de Ven & Poole 1995] and cognition [Garud & Rappa 1999]. An important aspect is how the organization is operating while following a path or may be even more interesting: What happens if an organization realizes that following the current path is not sufficient enough to meet the organisational goals that have been set? These different modes; following the path versus breaking with the path can be identified with the difference between evolutionary/equilibrium versus revolutionary/punctuated technology developments. This distinction is not taken into account in the 'stage-gate' approach, while the impact on the organisation can be very different. These two omitted issues will be particularly addressed in this thesis. C. Research questions The first research question is related to the technology development process and its relationship to product development and scientific discovery: What are the characteristics of the technology development process in general and in comparison to the product development process and the scientific discovery process? Technology developments that follow a certain path, progress in equilibrium, require only evolutionary changes, and have limited impact on the organization. However, technology developments that require a change of path are considered to be much more radical to the organization. There are at least five aspects that need to be understood about a path change. Firstly, it is important to understand how the organization resists against a path change. Secondly, how is a path change initiated? And thirdly, how is the organization adapting to this path change. These three aspects are addressed in the second research question: What are the processes and drivers at several levels in the organization, prior, during and after a technology path change? The fourth aspect is finding the alternative path: . How are alternative technology-paths identified, evaluated and selected? The fifth aspect is related to the required changes that are necessary to reach the alternative technology path: What are effective management techniques to manage decisions related to technology path change and the associated organizational changes? D. The Technology Development process The frame work presented in Chapter 2 comprises the following four sub-processes of the technology development process: knowledge processes, change processes, problem solving processes and organisational processes Knowledge processes: Technology can be seen as the embodiment of knowledge, indifferent whether it is scientific, explicit or tacit knowledge. Just theoretical knowledge is not enough to obtain a technology; it requires practical knowledge or 'know how' to create a 'construct' that embodies the theoretical principles. Also it is assumed that for technology development in an organizational context, knowledge is generated [Nonaka 1994], disseminated [Berends 2003] and integrated [Grant 1996]. Furthermore, technological knowledge is generated by problem solving cycles, alike scientific knowledge [Popper 1970]. This generation process is considered to be an individual process [Popper 1970, Polanyi 1962, Nonaka 1994]. Change processes: Technology developments tend to change according to punctuated equilibrium process [Pettigrew 1985, Gersick 1991]. Very similar to scientific developments evolutionary technology development tends to follow a certain predefined trajectory or paths, while revolutionary or radical technology developments are characterised by path breaking activities [Kuhn 1970, 1977]. The notion that technology development is following an existing path can be identified with an equilibrium state where the organisational changes are small and gradual. The punctuated periods where radical technology development takes place, resulting in breaking the existing path, may result in much more radical organisational changes. The skills, knowledge and capabilities the organisation developed to operate along the existing path become less relevant or even meaningless and in order to operate along a new path, new skills, knowledge and capabilities are required that can be radically different from the previously developed ones. Problem solving processes: Knowledge generation in context of new technology development is ultimately a process that takes place in the human mind, and is related to human problem solving. This individual knowledge generation process should be placed in the context of ongoing group processes and of the characteristics of the organization. The goal state in the problem solving cycles is very similar to the teleological change process as described by Van de Ven and is expected to play an important role in steering the problem solving cycles [Ven 1995]. The problem cycle is part of a broader decision making process. This process is related to the problem definition, goal state definition, the search strategy, and test strategies. These decisions are made on the basis of existing information and a stream of new information originating from the problem solving cycles. Organizational processes: The justification to view technology development as a distinct organizational process can be based on a few contributions in literature. Cooper pointed out that technology development processes are different from other development processes and deliver new knowledge, new technology, or a new technical capability. The process comprises fundamental research projects, science projects, basic research, and often technology platform projects. [Cooper 2006]. Cooper sees Technology development projects as a kind of meta-projects leading to multiple commercial projects and new product platforms. This suggests that technology development processes can be seen a distinct organisational process. Another way to look at the technology development process is to consider so-called technological options that are initiated be the Generation of Technological Option (GTO) stage, characterized by a divergent process where numerous options are created. This stage is followed by a convergent process, the Selection of Technological Option (STO) stage where various options are benchmarked and selected for further developments. In this stage the number of options is reduced. This stage is followed by a Integration of Technological Option (ITO) stage where various options are combined in order to test the combined functionality. And finally the Deployment of Technology Option stage represents the integration of a technological option into a product. The stages are forming the TO-model that is described in more detail in Chapter 3. E. Collective Frame of Reference Based on the case study research reported in Chapter 4 and 6, several patterns have been observed that appeared to be decisive on the outcome of the technology development process. These patterns are related to a phenomenon that has been identified as Collective Frame of Reference, which can be described as: Collective Frame of Reference (CFR) is a set of beliefs that is shared within a group and/or an organization. This belief is not necessarily justified (like knowledge), and can be based on shared intuition, experiences, cultures and perceptions. The CFR can proliferate through groups and across organizational boundaries. In summary the following was observed: - Coherent, coordinated activities and incoherent, uncoordinated activities coincide with the presence and absence the Collective Frame of Reference of the group. - The presence of a strong collective frame of reference keeps the group focused on its activities and allows for coordinated problem solving routines with a CFR based goal state. - The absence of the CFR initiates incoherent and uncoordinated activities; this results in uncoordinated problem solving routines were the goal state is set based on individual beliefs. - Proliferation of the CFR is based on influencing individual beliefs, and takes place internally, within the group, laterally towards functional interdependent groups and vertically, either top-down, or bottom-up. The CFR is seldom completely shared and not all individuals in an organizational structure fully conform to the CFR. From a management perspective this can be seen as an undesired situation; first order management techniques rely on a hierarchic structure where policies flow down, which are adopted smoothly. It is argued, that a not fully adopted CFR helps in situations where radical changes need to be made. The CFRs develop under the influence of interactions between management level and operational level and under the influence of internal and external factors. The internal factors include the following. - Competences: The know-how to conduct certain processes. - Technologies: The technological building blocks available to the firm, basically forming the technology paradigm. - Past Experiences: An organization carries the burden of historic failures and successes. In case of failures it imposes a certain fear factor to the CFR. - Past Strategies: Choices, made in the past, impose path dependency on technology development. These internal factors constitute in a paradigm that is related to the CFR. It is not only about the technological paradigms, but also about the routines, knowledge and skill sets that are present within an organization that constitute the paradigm of the organization. Successes and failures contributed to these paradigms and this is a burden that comes with the maturity of the organization. The external factors contributing to the development of a CFR include the following. - Market developments: The market developments obviously influence the CFR. - DESTEP factors: The Demographic, Ecological, Social-Cultural, Technological, Economic and Political factors influence CFR development. - Competitive developments: Competition can be considered as very significant in the development of CFRs with respect to prospective technologies. - External technological factors: The upcoming and downfall of technologies that are directly or indirectly related to the technology base of the organization will definitely influence the CFR of the firm. These factors are more about perceptions, rather than objective facts. Finally, four psychological and social factors are suggested that constitute to the CFR. - Values: The values of a group or individual impact on the CFR even as actors are unaware of the influence of this factor on their acting. - Individual Beliefs: The individual beliefs impact on the CFR, and tend to be more volatile than values. - Self Esteem: The self esteem is a perceptual view on the value that an individual or group has for its environment. - Risk perception: The perception of risks impacts the collective frame of reference and can be associated with entrepreneurial attitudes of a group or individual. These factors determine not only the coherency of the groups and the confidence levels contributing to the CFR, but also the course of action in the absence of a CFR. F. Management implications The management implications regarding the Collective Frame of Reference are summarized in the following management actions: Gathering and providing objective information: Managing the flow of information is considered a very important factor to influence the CFR. Providing a flow of objective information and providing the means to process this data in an efficient fashion will help for the 'good' and for the 'bad'. On the one hand, if the objective information is interpreted by the individuals in such a way that the CFR is reinforced this can be considered as 'good'; the organization is doing well, while following the existing paradigm and the members of the organization have the impression that this is sustainable. On the other hand if the objective information weakens the CFR, it can be expected that this is for good reasons; the members of the organization have the impression that following the existing paradigm is not sustainable and that change is required. Connect to the external networks: Connection to external networks provides useful information about the technological capabilities of the organization. Monitoring trends in technology allows the organization to anticipate better on 'sudden' external changes. These networks comprise scientific networks, supplier networks, user networks and other networks like for example economical think-tanks that can provide information about trends in future needs. Management of an organization can influence the CFR by assuring that professionals in the organization are connected to the relevant networks. Stimulate Confidence: Many organizations are aware that celebrating success is important to stimulate the confidence level in the organization. Showing internally the success stories is important, but for the CFR it is also important that previous failures are well understood. An organization tends to interpret failures as evidence that everything outside the comfort zone of the organization is doomed. The issue is that radical technology development results in one or two successes out of ten attempts and therefore easily can be interpreted as a waste of time and money. An organization has to manage these failures in such away that new opportunities are still considered despite the build-up of evidence that technology developments can only go wrong. Allowing non-conformist behavior: This may be the most difficult factor to manage, as the traditional management techniques assume that all members of the organization follow the strategy and contribute to the goals that are set by the management. Any behavior that is not contributing or sometimes even contradictory to the strategy can be seen easily as unwanted behavior. However as this non-conformist behavior is a source of organizational change, it should not be excluded by the organization. G. Conclusions The main conclusions of this study are: - The technology development process is positioned between the scientific discovery process and the product development process - A technological option is an artefact or construct that often is based on a scientific principle and which can provide a certain product or process function. - Based on the TO model, a technological option is passing through four phases: o A generation phase where an artefact is created, and which shows a certain functionality. o A selection phase where the functionality of the artefact is competing with alternative options, o An integration phase where a specific option and its functionality is integrated with other options. o A deployment phase where the option is incorporated into a product in order to provide this product with certain functionality. - Technology, like science develops along paths, governed by a paradigm, which provides evolutionary, more or less predictable improvements, punctuated by developments leading to new paradigms. - The paradigm character of technology plays not only on a macro- and mesoscopic scale; it is also present within Technology Intensive Organizations. - Radical or paradigm shifting technology development programs are hard to manage, unpredictable and require particular measures to weather short-term vs. long-term deliberations. - Technology development can be characterized as 'evolutionary' if it progresses along a technology path. - Technology development can be characterized as 'revolutionary' or 'radical' if it requires a paradigm shift. - Both the evolutionary and revolutionary technology development in the organization is driven by the Collective Frame of Reference. - A paradigm shift starts from and results into a recurring, cyclical phase, which represents an equilibrium state of the organization. The actual shift takes place in three phases; the reorientation phase where the organization identifies new technology paradigms to consider and start acquiring knowledge of paradigms that are thought to be suitable to provide useful and relevant technology options. In the second phase the organization takes all the decisions that are required to adopt the new paradigm. And in the third phase the organization implements decisions that have been made. - The development of the CFR changes throughout the paradigm shift; in the recurring or cyclical phase the CFR drives the focus on recurring tasks that develop the current technology option. - The breaking of the technology paradigm is assumed to be sparked by an individual who develops a belief that opposes the shared belief that keeps the organization on the current technology paradigm. - Once this individual is confident to share her or his beliefs with others, this belief may or may not be accepted by others. - If the non-conforming belief holds and gains foothold at the decision makers in the organization, a wider reorientation process is initiated to obtain knowledge about alternative technology paths. - The selection of an alternative technology paradigm is in general not a single decision point, but consists of a chain of decisions on sub aspects of the transition. - Managing the flow of information is considered a very important factor to influence the CFR. - Connecting to the external networks is important, not only because it can provide objective information as discussed above, but also because it provides access to external knowledge in that is or will become important for the reorientation process. - Stimulate Confidence is important for the balance between the CFR and non-conforming behavior. - Allowing non-conformist behavior as it is a source of change in the organization.

Tässä väitöskirjassa tutkitaan, miten yhtäältä henkilökohtaiset ja toisaalta jaetut ideat sekä ajatusmaailmat vaikuttavat ulkopolitiikan tekoon. Väitöstyön viisi itsenäistä tutkimusta tarkastelevat Suomen ulkopolitiikkaa jostain ideationaalisesta näkökulmasta. Vaikka artikkelit käsittelevät Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan eri ajanjaksoja, työ on kiinnostunut erityisesti kylmän sodan loppuvuosista sekä kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alusta. Työn keskeinen teoreettinen väite on, että kattavan näkemyksen ideoiden vaikutuksesta ulkopolitiikkaan voidaan saavuttaa vain lähestymistavalla, joka yhdistää ulkopolitiikan analyysin subjektiivisiin sekä intersubjektiivisiin ideoihin keskittyvien teorioiden pääperiaatteet. Tutkimus korostaa, että integroiva menettelytapa on sovellettavissa eri ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksen analyysintasoilla. Yhdistävän lähestymistavan soveltaminen perustuu näkemykseen siitä, että yksilökeskeiset psykologiset teoriat ja sosiaalisuutta korostavat konstruktivistiset lähestymistavat täydentävät toistensa heikkouksia. Väitöstyö rakentaa argumenttinsa jatkamalla ja täydentämällä Vaughn P. Shannonin and Paul M. Kowertin kirjassaan Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance aloittamaa tutkimusohjelmaa. Ideationaalisen allianssin asemesta tutkimuksessa kuitenkin puhutaan ideationaalisesta ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksesta (Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis, IFPA). Valintaan on kaksi syytä. Ensinnäkin ideationaalinen ulkopolitiikan analyysi ottaa teoriaperinteiden väliseen dialogiin mukaan lisää teoreettisia näkökulmia sekä analyysin tasoja. Se siis toimii kattokäsitteenä ulkopolitiikan analyysin eri ideoiden merkitystä korostaville lähestymistavoille. Toinen syy valinnalle on semanttinen. Rationaalisia ja ideationaalisia teorioita ei tule nähdä täysin vastakohtaisina, ja tutkimusohjelman rakentaminen jotain käsitystä vastaan lähettää turhan vahvan viestin. Idea itsessään on käsitteenä liian epämääräinen, jotta sitä voitaisiin käyttää ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksen työkaluna. Tarkempia ja selitysvoimaisempia käsitteitä tarvitaan, jotta ideoiden maailmaa voidaan yksinkertaistaa ja tehdä ymmärrettäväksi. Väitöskirja hyödyntääkin konstruktivismin ja psykologisen ulkopolitiikan analyysin käsitteistöä. Tarkemmin sanottuna tutkimus soveltaa ideationaalisen ulkopolitiikan periaatteita neljällä eri analyysin tasolla. Samalla se tarkastelee tarkemmin neljää eri ulkopolitiikan analyysin teoriakokonaisuutta. Väitöstutkimuksen ensimmäinen teoreettinen osio selittää yksilöiden uskomusjärjestelmien merkitystä ulkopolitiikan tekemisessä ja korostaa sosiaalisen ympäristön merkitystä yksilön ajatusmaailman lähteenä. Työn toinen kumpuavaa kansallisen identiteetin mallin, jossa kollektiivisen kansallisen omakuvan perusta on yksilön identifioituminen tiettyyn kansakuntaan. Tämän lisäksi tutkimus jakaa kansallisen identiteetin kolmeen komponenttiin: maailmankuviin, poliittiseen tarkoitukseen ja statukseen. Tutkimuksen kolmas teoreettinen mielenkiinnon kohde on yleisen mielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan suhde, ja se hahmottaa kolme julkinen mielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan välistä dynamiikkaa. "Alhaalta ylös" –mallissa kansalaismielipide vaikuttaa selvästi ulkopolitiikan tekemiseen, siinä missä "ylhäältä alas" –dynamiikassa valtiojohto pyrkii muokkaamaan yleistä mielipidettä. Kolmannessa mallissa ulkopolitiikan tekeminen ja julkinen mielipide eivät ole yhteydessä johtuen kansalaisten kiinnostuksen puutteesta tai poliittisen johdon välinpitämättömyydestä. Käsiteltyään kolmea valtion sisäistä analyysitasoa tutkimus kiinnittää huomiota ideoiden rooliin valtioiden välisissä suhteissa. Se käsittelee valtioiden välistä luottamusta kolmesta eri teoreettisesta perspektiivistä, ja analysoi, miten erityisesti valtioiden välillä koettu epäluottamus voi vaikuttaa niiden keskinäisiin suhteisiin. Toisin sanoen osiossa tutkitaan, miten valtiotoimijan piirissä elätellyt ideat ilmentyvät kahden maan keskinäisessä kanssakäymisessä. Väitöstutkimus koostuu viidestä itsenäisestä tutkimusartikkelista, jotka käsittelevät Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan eri aspekteja. Laajemman, konstruktivismia ja psykologiaa integroivan, teoreettisen tavoitteen ohella artikkeleilla on omat teoreettiset päämääränsä, jotka tukevat työn kattavampaa tavoitetta. Julkaisu I tutkii Mauno Koiviston uskomusjärjestelmää ja samalla punniskelee, miten sosiaalinen ympäristö vaikuttaa yksilön uskomuksiin. Se kutsuu Koiviston ajattelumaailmaa suurvaltaempiristiseksi. Lisäksi se väittää, että kylmän sodan loppuminen ei sanottavammin muuttanut Koiviston uskomusjärjestelmää, mikä tuki jatkuvuutta myös Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittisessa linjassa. Julkaisu II taas yhdistää koulukuntakäsitteen ja valtioin sisäisessä diskurssissa kilpailevat käsitykset valtiolle sopivasta omakuvasta. Samalla se edistää alhaalta ylös kumpuavaa näkemystä kansallisesta identiteetistä. Tutkimus hahmottaa neljä Suomen kylmän sodan lopussa ja sen jälkeisen ajan alussa vaikuttanutta koulukuntaa – pienvaltiorealismin, integrationismin, euroatlantismin ja globalismin. Eurorealistiselle maailmankuvalle perustunut integrationismi oli koulukunnista selvästi vahvin. Suomen kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alkuvuosien ulkopolitiikassa oli kuitenkin elementtejä jokaisesta neljästä koulukunnasta. Julkaisu III tarkastelee yleisen mielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan suhdetta Suomen ulkopolitiikan historiassa. Se väittää, että Suomen ulkopolitiikasta on löydettävissä kolme erilaista mallia kansalaismielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan välillä. Itsenäistymisen alkuvuosina ja sotienvälisenä aikana ulkopolitiikka ja yleinen mielipide eivät juuri kommunikoineet. Tilanne muuttui kylmän sodan alettua, ja kyseistä aikakautta leimasikin valtiojohdon vahva pyrkimys muokata yleistä mielipidettä. Kylmän sodan loputtua julkinen mielipide voimaantui ja se alkoi vahvemmin vaikuttaa ulkopoliittisiin päätöksiin. Työn seuraava tutkimus, julkaisu IV, analysoi Suomen ja Ruotsin puolustusyhteistyössä ilmenevää epäluottamusta. Se toisin sanoen tarkastelee, miten Suomessa Ruotsia kohtaan tunnettu epäluottamus vaikuttaa maiden väliseen yhteistyöhön turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikassa. Tutkimuksessa on kolme teoreettista argumenttia. Ensinnäkin tutkimuksessa on syytä erottaa tiettyjen kokemuksien aiheuttamat luottamuksen menetykset (mistrust) laajemmasta epäluottamuksen tunteesta (distrust). Toiseksi on huomioitava se, että luottamus on skaalattava ilmiö. Valtioiden välistä luottamusta on mahdollista arvioida ideaalityyppisten minimaalisen (reliance) ja täyden luottamuksen välillä. Kolmanneksi tutkimuksessa olisi syytä erottaa pettymyksen ja petetyksi tulemisen tunteet. Artikkelin keskeisin empiirinen argumentti on se, että uusi kireämpi turvallisuuspoliittinen tilanne ja lisääntynyt puolustusyhteistyö Suomen ja Ruotsin välillä on saanut suomalaisen eliitin keskuudessa nousemaan muistot vuodesta 1990, jolloin Ruotsi yllättäen päätti hakea jäsenyyttä Euroopan yhteisössä. Tällä kertaa pelkona on Ruotsin yllättävä liittyminen Natoon. Suomen ja Ruotsin puolustusyhteistyön keskeinen tavoite onkin syventää maiden välistä luottamussuhdetta, ja lisääntyvä luottamus on syvenevän yhteistyön ennakkoehto. Väitöstyön viimeinen tutkimus, julkaisu V, tutkii suomettumisen eri puolia. Tutkimuksen lähestymistapa on historiallinen, mutta se sisältää elementtejä väitöstyössä käsiteltävistä analyysin tasoista. Tutkimus ymmärtää suomettumisen ennen kaikkea poliittisena kulttuurina, joka syntyi Suomen kylmän sodan ulkopoliittisen doktriinin kylkiäisenä. Kulttuuri toisin sanoen tuki Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välistä ystävyyspolitiikkaa. Vaikka Suomen kylmän sodan ulkopolitiikkaa voidaan pitää onnistuneena, suomettumisen kulttuuri sisälsi ylilyöntejä, jotka itse asiassa syövyttivät Suomen ulkopolitiikan keskeisiä tavoitteita kuten maan suvereniteetin säilymistä. Kuten todettua, tutkimus on kiinnostunut erityisesti kylmän sodan lopusta ja kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan ensimmäisistä vuosista. Tarkastelemalla ja yhdistämällä viiden yllämainitun julkaisun tuloksia tutkimus pyrkii ymmärtämään, miten kylmän sodan loppuminen muutti Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan ideationaalisia perusteita. äitöstyö toteaakin, että muutos tapahtui kolmessa suhteessa. Ensinnäkin Suomen turvallisuuspoliittisessa orientaatiossa tapahtui muutos. Pienvaltiorealismin ajasta siirryttiin integrationismin aikaan. Suomi lähti lopulta innokkaasti mukaan Euroopan integraatioon unohtamatta kuitenkaan geopoliittisen realismin pääoppeja. Suomen uusi ulkopoliittinen suuntaus perustuikin eurorealismille. Realismin säilymisellä oli konkreettisia vaikutuksia Suomen ulkopoliittiseen doktriiniin – erityisesti päätökseen jatkaa liittoutumattomuuspolitiikkaa. Toiseksi eritoten suomalaiset politiikantekijät ja eliitin edustajat kokivat Suomen länsimaisuuden vahvistuneen. Suomettumisen leima katosi, ja maa kykeni ajamaan intressejään täysivaltaisena länsimaana. Kolmanneksi suomalaisen ulkopolitiikan teon ideationaalisessa ympäristössä tapahtui tietynlainen vapautuminen. Yritykset kontrolloida yleistä mielipidettä ja ulkopoliittista keskustelua vähenivät, ja erilaiset ideat Suomen ulkopolitiikan perusteista saivat kilpailla vapaammin kuin kylmän sodan aikana. Kylmän sodan loppumisen jälkeen suomalaisessa keskustelussa on ollut aitoja vaihtoehtoja kulloinkin vallitsevalle ulkopoliittiselle linjalle, ja yritykset luoda ulkopoliittista konsensusta ovat vähentyneet. ; This doctoral dissertation seeks to demonstrate how personal and collective ideas affect foreign policy. The five original publications making up the dissertation all investigate Finnish foreign policy from various ideational aspects. Although the publications deal with different periods of Finnish foreign affairs, the dissertation places particular emphasis on the end of the Cold War and early post-Cold War years. The dissertation's main theoretical claim is that in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the significance of ideas in foreign policy, one must concentrate on both individual and intersubjective ideas and that this approach is applicable at multiple levels of analysis. In other words, the dissertation suggests that one must harness the respective strengths of cognitive psychology and constructivism, and adopt an integrative approach to the analysis of foreign policy. The rationale behind the integrative approach is the viewpoint that psychology and constructivism support each other's weaknesses. The dissertation builds its theoretical argument on a research program initiated by Vaughn P. Shannon and Paul M. Kowert in their book Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance. However, instead of an ideational alliance, the dissertation speaks of Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). There are two main reasons for this choice. First, IFPA incorporates additional theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis into the realm of ideational dialogue. Thus, it serves as an umbrella for the various ideational approaches of FPA. Secondly, the decision to use another concept is a matter of semantics. To imply that a theoretical construct is against something sends a strong signal, and it is perhaps unnecessary to see material/rational and ideational views as polar opposites. Moreover, "idea" is too broad and vague a concept to be employed as an analytical tool, since ideas are practically infinite and ubiquitous. In order to conduct a sound and theoretically solid analysis, one needs more specific concepts to simplify the world of ideas and to make it understandable. This research taps into the vocabulary of constructivism and political psychology, particularly cognitive and social psychology. More precisely, the dissertation applies the principles of IFPA to four levels of analysis, and sheds light on four different theoretical approaches. The first section of the theoretical chapter explains the importance of individual belief systems in foreign policymaking, and highlights the significance of the social environment as a source of individual beliefs. The second theoretical contribution relates to national identity. The dissertation advocates a bottom-up view of national identity, in which the basis of collective national self-images is in fact individual identifications with a nation state. Furthermore, national identity is divided into three components: worldview, political purpose and status. The third theoretical question under scrutiny is the public opinion-foreign policy nexus. The dissertation outlines three dynamics between public opinion and foreign policy. In the bottom-up model, public opinion clearly influences foreign policymaking, whereas the top-down dynamic refers to a situation whereby leaders actively try to shape public views. The third model is disconnection, which describes a condition where there is either a public disinterest toward foreign policy, or where decision-makers neglect the opinions of the public. In this context, the principles of IFPA elaborate the public opinion- foreign policy link in two central ways. Firstly, the beliefs of ordinary citizens come about in a process akin to elite opinion formation – that is, in the interplay between inherent dispositions and the social environment. Secondly, the manner in which decision-makers understand the importance of public views is partly dependent on their belief systems. After treating the three intra-state levels, the dissertation moves on to inter-state relationships. More precisely, it discusses the issue of trust from three theoretical perspectives, and points out how intra-state ideas of trustworthiness may affect inter-state interaction, namely foreign policy. In other words, the section's main purpose is to show how certain ideas can affect bilateral relations between two states. The dissertation consists of five publications, which all deal with different aspects of Finnish foreign and security policy and which to a varying degree apply the principles of IFPA. In addition to the overarching theoretical objective of promoting the synthesis of psychology and constructivism, every publication has its own theoretical objectives that serve the broader goal of ideational integration. The aim of Publication I on the belief system of Mauno Koivisto is to understand the effects of the social environment on individual beliefs. It claims that Koivisto's belief system is best described as great-power empiricist. Moreover, the article argues that the great transformation caused by the end of the Cold War did not considerably change Koivisto's belief system. Publication II links the schools of thought approach to the intra-state competition between different national identities, and promotes a bottom-up view of national identity rooted in psychology. It outlines the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought at the beginning of the post-Cold War era: small state realism, integrationism, euro-atlanticism and globalism. Integrationism, which was based on a "eurorealist" worldview, was clearly the most powerful school. Finnish early post-Cold War foreign policy nevertheless contained elements from all four schools. The focus of Publication III is on the historical nexus between public opinion and Finnish foreign policy. It claims that three different models of the public opinion- foreign policy nexus have prevailed in Finland during its independence: a disconnection in the years of early independence, the top-down model of the Cold War, and a stronger bottom-up dynamic of the post-Cold War era. In other words, in the post-Cold War era, public opinion has become a stronger force in Finnish foreign policymaking. Publication IV unpacks Finnish beliefs on the untrustworthiness of Sweden as a defense cooperation partner and is thus interested in the interstate-level manifestations of individual and collective ideas. The study lays out three main theoretical arguments. Firstly, it differentiates between distrust and mistrust. The second point the article drives home is that trust is a scalable phenomenon. Thirdly and lastly, the article suggests that a sense of disappointment and a feeling of being betrayed must be separated. Its chief empirical argument is that the Finnish experiences of misplaced trust from October 1990 and Sweden's surprise announcement of its ambition to join the European Communities have now manifested as elite-level mistrust towards Sweden as a defense cooperation partner. In order to intensify mutual defense cooperation, Helsinki and Stockholm must overcome the looming mistrust in their defense relationship. The final publication, Publication V, explores different aspects of Finlandization. The analytical approach to the phenomenon is historical, but it nevertheless contains elements from the four levels of analysis. The publication treats Finlandization first and foremost as a political culture, which was born in part to support the official foreign policy line vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One can argue that the foreign policy strategy of Finland was rather successful but that the political culture of Finlandization had excessive features. It is therefore too naïve to interpret Finlandization only as a successful foreign policy strategy, as some international commentators have done. In fact, it can be said that some of the features of the culture actually eroded the hard core, namely Finnish sovereignty, which the foreign policy strategy tried to preserve. As implied, in addition to the interests in the original publications, the dissertation has an interest in the end the Cold War and in the early post-Cold War years. More specifically, it aims at understanding what the end of the Cold War meant in terms of the ideational foundations of Finnish foreign policy. The study suggests that it signified three things in particular. First, it led to an adjustment from small-state realism to integrationism as the primary orientation of foreign policy. In other words, Finland enthusiastically adopted a pro- European integration policy, but did not forget the core tenets of geopolitical realism. Thus, the approach was based on a "eurorealist" worldview. Secondly, the end of the era vindicated Finland in terms of its Western-ness in the minds of decision-makers. To put it differently, Finland was finally released from the stigma of Finlandization, and was free to pursue its ambitions as an accepted Western nation. Thirdly, the ideational milieu of Finnish foreign policymaking became more relaxed, as the attempts to shape public opinion and control societal debate diminished and as ideas about Finland's position in the world were able to compete more freely. Ever since the end of the Cold War, there have been genuine alternatives to the existing poli attempts to impose a consensus have been less considerable.

SUMMARY: Étienne François explores the way in which the French project of creating "symbolic history" through studies of memory initiated by Pierre Nora's work can be continued in a different national context. For François, it is the question of whether history of memory can be pursued in the German case. François notes that despite Nora's insistence on the exclusivity of the French case, Germans have not less a "neurotic" attitude to their past.

At the same time, François admits that in Germany attitude to the national past memorial projects is profoundly different from the French case. Among such points of difference François notes that if in France national history is usually perceived as a long-term development rooted in the Middle Ages, in Germany looking at the past usually implies focusing on such topics as Nazism or "the second German dictatorship" in GDR. History of memory is problematic in Germany partly because most well known "places of memory" are concentration camps. It is also that in Germany perceptions of national identity are questioned to a greater extent than in France, which is a result of German history divided for the most part of the second half of the 20 th century.

Despite these profound differences, François insists that France and Germany entered the "memorial period" simultaneously about 20 years ago. The Franco-German rapprochement and the development of mass cultural tourism greatly contributed to that process. This "memorial boom" is reflected in three major developments: the growth of and greater attention to memorial events, such as the celebration of "Luther's year" in 1983; the public fascination with historical exhibitions; and the rise in popularity of historical museums. A development parallel to the growth of "memory" in Germany can be noticed in professional historical studies: in Germany, at the roots of the study of memory were Thomas Nipperdey and Reinhart Koselleck, while today the leading scholars in the field are Jan and Alaida Assman. The unification of Germany and the disappearance of the "German question" combined with dramatic improvements in the relationships between Germany and its neighbors created most favorable conditions for German memorial projects.

François touches upon the work of the conferences on "Nation and Emotion" held in Berlin in October 1993 and May 1995. At these events researchers agreed that the paradigm of "places of memory" that allows to create a symbolic history of a nation can be successfully implemented not only in France but elsewhere. The second conclusion of researchers was that it was impossible to replicate the French case in other national traditions. François notes four major principles that emerged out of the French-German cooperation in the studies of memory: the first is the preservation of a critical attitude to one's own work and resistance to temptations to legitimate the existing political situation; second, the specifics of German history required more attention to conflicts, ruptures, and breaks in the past; third, such research should be open and pluralistic with respect to chronology and geography, without limiting one's project to XIX and XX centuries or to the national level; finally, the pan-European context should be always taken into account, for varieties of national memory are often shaped by or in contact with "foreigners".

In the last paragraphs of his contribution François informs the reader about the seminar on cultural memory that he and Hagen Schulze conducted in Berlin, as well as touches upon the structure and methodology of the project of German "places of memory" study. François explains the decision to structure the project around the list of key memorial terms, such as "Reich", "Leistung", "Schuld", etc. François ends his article by pointing out the importance of German cultural memory in European context and in German national history.
Tony Judt explores the emergence of Pierre Nora's project of describing the French places of memory by locating it in the context of transformations that France was undergoing in the post-World War II period. As Judt argues, in 1956 France still reminded one the France of 1856 in terms of the social composition of its population, the structure of its economy defined by late industrialization and the importance of agriculture, and the authoritarian political regime. In the 1960s, fundamental changes in the economy led to the growth of urbanization. Rising prosperity undermined the position of the French Communist party and the departure of Charles de Gaulle combined with Mitterand's reluctance to pursue radically socialist policies left behind most divisive political distinctions between the conservative France and the left France. At the same time, the decline in importance of the French language combined with the revival of interest in regional identities and the loss of the French dominant position in world and European affairs contributed to the French perception that by 1980s their country was simultaneously undergoing several transformations: France was shrinking, breaking apart, and loosing its traditional identity. Pierre Nora's project was initiated during this period of flux and uncertainty. Thus, Nora's project was a response to the sense of loss of traditional France in public consciousness and an attempt to fixate in historical categories elements of public memory.

Judt notes the contradiction of Nora's project: designed as an attempt to fixate, explore, and repudiate various historical myths, the project itself finally turned into the celebration of the past. Judt sees several reasons for this transformation. First, Pierre Nora is an important figure on the French intellectual landscape, and he attracted best specialists to write articles in the collection. Second, there is no more consensus on the canon of the past and people disagree profoundly on what can or should be included in such a project. Taking possession of past events and places brought together accidentally underscores the break of the historical tradition. Third, despite many genius insights in the articles of the collection, it turned into a text that displays emotional attraction of researchers to the object of their study. The fact that the collection curiously omitted any references to the legacy of Napoleon Bonaparte or his nephew Louis Napoleon underscores how the project reflects French ambiguities about France's past. Judt also critically surveys Nora's claims of the specificity and exclusivity of the French historical experiences, which, allegedly, make France into a "nation of memory" like no any other nation.

Judt also analyses particular contributions to the volume, focusing on such topics as Catholicism and other religions in French memory. He notes that in the collection those studies that are dedicated to Protestants and Jews are characterized by more methodological innovation then the more traditional explorations of the role of Catholicism in French history and serve as a reminder to the editor of the collection, which avoided the memory of St. Bartholomew's Night. Judt also explores the ambiguity of perceptions of the countryside always characterized positively and of the province and the provincial always characterized negatively in the French history. Judt explores the role played in French history by memory of wars.

From Judt's point of view, Nora's project is informed by the fact that today (unlike earlier in French history) French public memory shaped by official representation differs from history as told by historians. As Judt argues, public memory without a foundation in narrative history looses coherence and turns into "places of forgetting".

According to Judt, Nora's project of describing "places of memory" was a response to the loss of the sense of eternal identity experienced by the French society at the juncture when two leading historical schools – the Annales and the (neo)Marxist historiography of the French revolution – lost their predominant position. Nora's story is about that meaning that the French ascribe to France and its identity, and those aspects of French history, such as Bonaparte's legacy of national minorities, were either omitted or pushed to the periphery of the narrative. In that sense, Nora's collection represents an example of a modern mythology and cannot be called a historical study properly, despite high quality contributions by professional historians.

Concerning the applicability of the French project to the Soviet context, Judt argues that it has little to offer to an understanding of a multinational state. In France, history is an established and respected discipline and Nora can offer an alternative approach to the past, while in post-Soviet societies the task is to return to scholarly writing of history. Finally, Nora's project is the product of the Parisian intelligentsia, self-assured and well versed in all details of French history. It has not been repeated elsewhere in Europe. It is a jeu d'esprit that can hardly be replicated elsewhere.
Marina Loskutova points out that "memory" is an imported methodology in Russia. At the same time, as most researchers of memory explain, the studies of memory are related to profound changes in Western societies in the post-war period. Correspondingly, the importation of memory studies will depend on similarity of experiences. In particular, the sense of the local landscape permeated by memorials of the past, the omnipresence of places of memory in Russia is not a given fact. Despite agricultural and peasant roots of most post-Soviet citizens, very few people will seek to uncover their village roots, and if they do, not industry of memorabilia exists for them. The study of memory in Western societies is also related to the communications revolution and to the new generation of mass-media, which brings forth the problem of the visual image as a sign of the past. It is the prevalence of visual culture, according to the author, that informs the upsurge in memory studies.

Loskutova then focuses on the contents of the concept of "memory". According to the author, it implies 1) social cadres that allow an autobio graphical memory to take shape; 2) oral memories circulating in society; 3) collective commemorations; 4) information devices, from newspaper to CD, delivering information about the past to an audience larger than professional historians' community; 5) habits of the body. As the author argues, these aspects are hardly related, and their combination within one research framework obscures rather then helps to solve the problem. At the same time, none of them is specifically related to the nation-state (with the exception of commemorations). It is traditional narrative history that provides the basis for national identity, even if we consider the explosive "memory" of ethnic minorities, which is often based on semi-professional historical accounts popularized by mass media.

Loskutova agrees with Judt's argument concerning the importance of a historical narrative taught at school; at the same time, she takes issue with him concerning the presence of such a narrative in Eastern Europe. She notes that in post-Soviet Russia there is little doubt about historians' right to talk about the past authoritatively and there is little criticism of traditional narrative historical modes.

For Loskutova, the experience of importing oral history methods into the Russian context is telling. On the one hand, the community of professional historians is skeptical about the use of oral histories interviews, pointing to the need to verify data using traditional methods anyway. Historians are also reluctant to accept the possibility that contemporary perceptions of the past should be in their sphere of competence. With respect to the Soviet past seen through oral history two drastically different positions are prevalent: "Soviet history is only possible on the basis of oral data for historians have always lied to us" and "People don't remember much and they do they won't tell". Loskutova notes that many memories of the Siege of Leningrad in World War II are told according to one scenario, which implies likely following prescribed expectations of such a memory. At the same time, research into what was told in families demonstrated significant variations in memories, thus undermining the interview method. Finally, Loskutova argues that it is possible to study "imperial memory" as informal knowledge of imperial social and political mechanisms. Nevertheless, such studies of memory cannot be an alternative to a meta-narrative of imperial history.
Igor Narskii points out that historiography knows works on functions of collective memory in imperial and Soviet Russia (Lotman, Wortman, Plaggenborg). Narskii criticizes approaches to memory in the editorial introduction as too narrow. For Narskii, memory is cultural context and includes not only images of the past but also mechanisms of their formation, circulation, manipulation, etc. Imperial memory is heterogeneous as much as the national memory. Narskii also focuses on varieties of imperial memory that support/maintain supranational unit without being totalitarian. The author refers to particular junctures in history when addressing the past becomes an important societal aspect. He also argues that the Russian scholarly community focuses on such issues as memory belatedly, when the problem has already been discussed in the West and triggers idiosyncratic reactions from Western colleagues.

For Narskii, historical memory is the field for research in the framework of new social and cultural history and it can become a key in interpreting the subjective world of people in the past. Narskii reminds that it is not just the concept itself but the hard work of adapting it to the needs of historical scholarship that matters.

По мнению Матта Мацуды , память империи следует скорее рассматривать не как коллективную (Хольбвакс), но как память "собранную" ( collected ), состоящую из отдельных фрагментов, артефактов, частей мозаики, порождающих "невольное", а не преднамеренно сконструированное значение. Мнемонические качества таких фрагментов гарантируются их разделенностью, фактом невозможности единого нарратива. Соответственно, противопоставление памяти и истории неправомерно: скорее, речь должна идти о памяти как об одном из видов истории, в котором главную роль играют не хроники развития, а моменты значения. По мнению Мацуды, проекты, подобные "Местам памяти" Пьера Нора, не являются оппозицией истории, они даже не являются "антинациональными": скорее, это – варианты национальных историй, в которых собраны различные субъекты. Такие истории выглядят странными только по сравнению с телеологическими историческими нарративами. Специфика исследований памяти состоит в том, что они делают процесс дистанцирования от прошлого предметом рефлексии. Если в 1950-60-е и затем в 1980-е гг. речь шла о распаде грандиозных территориальных империй, в начале ХХI века вопрос стоит о хроно-политической деколонизации субьектов, колонизированных телеологическими нарративами социализма или империализма.

Традиционное понимание империи состоит в представлении о территориальной замкнутости, множественности подданных и наличии центра власти. Можно, тем не менее, последовать примеру "мест памяти" и представить себе империю не как закрытую территорию власти, но как множество локальностей, каждая из которых является пространством соревнования меняющихся императивов. Исследования национализма говорят о нациях как практиках, а не как о реальных сущностях. Такой же подход должен быть применен к империи. Соответственно, в той же мере, в какой империи не суть закрытые историографические доминантные миры, память не является оппозицией истории. В терминах памяти можно говорить об империи как о наррации правил; при этом имперское пространство характеризуется неровным распространением этих правил. Подход к империи как ко множеству локальностей, определяемых и доминируемых политической, экономической или культурной властью, позволяет уйти от противопоставления "модерного" концепта памяти и "архаичного" концепта империи. Именно "архаичность" памяти об империи (Британской или Российской) позволяет глобальным империям XXI века (США) не замечать имперского характера собственного доминирования в мире.

Касаясь вопроса об "имперской памяти", Мацуда замечает, что она, скорее, является ширмой, за которой осуществляется непростое сосуществование разных народов, взаимоисключающих претензий на культурное наследие или различных культур. Освобождение от имперских уз часто ведет к реконституированию национального, причем агенты такого реконституирования предпочитают не помнить о том, что нации сыграли свою роль в создании империй. Касаясь вопроса о моделях памяти, воплощенных в обществах типа "Памяти" и "Мемориала", Мацуда отмечает, что и ностальгия как исторический принцип, и моральное банкротство попыток использования нарративов прогрессивных перемен для исправления исторических несправедливостей одинаково опасны.

В заключении Мацуда обращается к известной теме восстановления исторической справедливости, к требованиям платежей и репараций, выдвигаемым на основе памяти. По сути, вопрос стоит так: может ли память требовать репараций у истории? Вопросы исторической вины и компенсации в огромной степени зависят от факта признания, т.е. от допущения памяти. Это само по себе – вызов имперскому наследию, ведь главной задачей империи является забывание (поскольку сама империя расколота и неоднородна). Обращаясь к проблематике памяти, исследователи невольно напоминают нам об этой характеристике империи.

Old postcards and posters were used as illustrations to the roundtable.

В оформлении круглого стола использовались старые почтовые открытки и плакаты.