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The author has tried to prove that interethnic relations in democracy cannot be handled solely by means of legal, economic, & institutional means; political culture, ie, civic democratic political culture, can have a significant role. The analysis shows that there is room for the build-up of a transnational democratic citizenry, free from all ascriptive criteria & identities such as religion, ethnicity, etc. It also reveals how classic liberalism neglects various identities (ethnic, national, etc) while communitarian liberalism overlooks the excluding force of various identities. It has also demonstrated that there are several concepts of civic identities (liberal, communitarian, & social/group) & that each of these concepts can exert profound influence on the relationship between citizens & their political community. Finally, the relation between patriotism & interethnic relations in democracy are reviewed. Patriotism, in the circumstances of growing social pluralization, & despite a plethora of political integrations, can play a prominent role in bridging the political & cultural atomizations & conflicts in society. It can undertake this role only if constituted in the civic & not the crude (fixed) ethnic sense -- though the national defines the limits & the meaning of this constitution -- provided it evolves into loyalty to one's homeland & goes hand in hand with the development of democracy & human rights. In short, the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that it is necessary to expand democratic political culture that might aid in resolving intricate & sensitive relations among various ethnic & cultural communities. Patriotism can assume a decisive role in this. It lays down the limits & legitimacy of each meaningful political discourse & each genuine political subject. Adapted from the source document.

Much academic writing about socialism & post-socialism in Eastern Europe is grounded on assumptions that socialism was "immoral," "imposed," "oppressive," etc., & was experienced as such by people subjected to socialist governments (c.f. Yurchak, 2003). The memories of Soviet times recorded in three village communities in present-day Lithuania constitute a paradox to such conceptualizations of socialism. Furthermore, memories comprise a contradiction to the rhetoric of the revolutions of 1989-1991 founded in the strong criticism of socialism. People in the village communities studied invoke the past as a space & time of security, social welfare, prosperity, a sensible way of life, as well as a moral & just order. Conversely, the present is narrated in terms of decline & regression. The memories are comments on the post-socialist changes & personal experiences of post-socialism. Dialectically, the past & the present are reproduced in all narratives. These narratives constitute subjectivities of the villagers significant in understanding some recent processes such as nostalgia of socialism & resentment towards the present. These processes increasingly define the post-1989 history of Eastern European countries (Minkenberg, 2002; Ramet, 1999). The rise of radical & populist politics in Eastern Europe gives reason to think that communication between politicians & people is carried out in a language incompletely understood in post-socialist studies. The inquiry into memories of Soviet times is a way to approach articulated subjectivities & social histories which may or have become embodied in recent political discourse. 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

Democratic consolidation of postauthoritarian & posttotalitarian societies is looked into at the levels of (1) basic political institutions; (2) chief proponents of representative democracy (political parties & interest associations); (3) behavior of powerful informal political actors (army, church, entrepreneurs, etc); & (4) civic culture. Democracy is stable only after it has been consolidated on all four levels. This "maximalist concept" of democratic consolidation excludes the explanation of a breakdown of democratic systems by voluntaristic & nonconceptualized descriptions of "deconsolidation.". 1 Table, 1 Figure, 123 References. Adapted from the source document.

Partisan activity has been the main and the most important mode of institutionalized political participation (in addition to electoral participation) in the modern democracy. Even though mass party membership is a distinct feature of modern political system (although not necessarily democratic), since 1960-ies the decline of party membership is observed in many democratic countries. Lithuania is a typical example of post-communist region, where party membership is regarded as a specific elitist activity rather than an ordinary practice of political involvement. In the article, the attitudes of Lithuanians towards party membership are analyzed to answer the question if and why people are not keen to join political parties. Public attitudes are explored using the data of a representative public opinion survey carried out in 2005 and qualitative data of in-depth interviews with ordinary people collected in 2008. Using a mixed method research strategy, the article analyses the image of political parties in Lithuania, determines the potential of party membership and investigates the dominant reasons of avoiding partisan activity. In the first part of the article, the theories explaining partisan activity are presented. In addition to Civic voluntarism model and General incentives theory used by Paul Whiteley and Patrick Seyd to explain partisan activity, the broader theories explaining changes of political culture and transformation of party models are discussed. Moreover, the theoretical arguments for the exceptionalism of post-communist societies are presented. In the second part of the article, the analysis of the qualitative data is presented. The exploration of public attitudes reveals that partisan activity can be perceived in several different ways: as a specific occupation, as a civic self-expression, as belonging to power elite, as a privilege, as dependence, and as partiality. These images of parties held by people are related to their attitudes towards party membership. The reasons provided by the people of not joining political parties can be grouped into three groups: 1) the lack of necessary resources or personal characteristics (e.g. old age, low education, etc.); 2) critical attitudes towards political parties; 3) dislike of partisan activity because of indifference towards politics or individualism and appreciation of personal independence. In the third part, the quantitative data drawn from the public opinion survey is analysed. The data shows a surprisingly high potential of party membership in Lithuania: about 11 percent of all respondents and about 20 percent of respondents in the age group of 18-39 have an inclination to join a political party. However, 87 percent of individuals admit that they were not invited to join a political party during the last 5 years. This proves that Lithuanian political parties are not active in expanding their membership. The quantitative data approve the trends observed from the qualitative research. The two most popular reasons of not joining a party are the lack of resources or necessary characteristics (surprisingly, young age seems to be one of the most important of them) and an indifference towards politics. These two motives fit well into the Civic voluntarism model. Disappointment with politics or a negative attitude towards political parties in general, contrary to expectations, proved to be of secondary importance. The importance of individualist attitudes, i.e. the avoidance of commitment and appreciation of independence, unfortunately, could not be evaluated due to the lack of data. Summing up, the analysis of Lithuanian case suggests that low party membership in post-communist countries might be explained by low demand rather than low supply. In other words, we should look for the explanation of low enrolment in the process of recruitment of party members rather than in the attitudes of people. The research do not provide any evidence for a popular theory of "communist legacy" claiming that a "bad" image of parties inherited from communist regime accounts for the low party membership in post-communist societies. On the contrary, the data demonstrate rather positive attitudes towards partisan activity among Lithuanian population. Adapted from the source document.

2003 EU accession referenda results in the 8 East Central European countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, & Latvia) have been analyzed examining regional dimension of their results. Two criteria, active euro-optimism (percentage of YES voters out of all the electorate in particular region), & active euro-skepticism (percentage of NO voters out of all the electorate in the region), have been used. Comparison with two other variables, economic (GDP per capita in the region) & ethnic (percentage of ethnic group other than title one, if remarkable) has been made; Pearson correlations have been calculated. Though there is common agreement on suppositional influence of regional factors (possibly, North-South, East-West, urban-rural, richer-poorer regional cleavages, exceptional case of the capital city, influence of densely inhabited ethnic groups etc.) in previous euro-integration referenda, there were no consistent analyses on it. Examining of 8 East Central European countries has showed both varieties from country to country as well as a number of general trends. In Slovenia, region of its capital city, Ljubljana, is more euro-optimistic compared with eastern Pomurska region (Maribor & Ptuj). Though regional economic irregularities not enough significant, as well as the number of examples too small for generalization, one can suppose West-East cleavage connected with the economic factor here. In Hungary, though voters' turnout was exceptionally low, both factor of higher euro-optimism in the capital city, Budapest, was evident, as well as strong relation between economic factor & voting behavior. However, Hungary has its own specifics: higher economic development of the region increases both active euro-optimism & active euro-skepticism, too. This, in turn, cannot exclude that factor of "passive euro-skepticism" is important here. In Lithuania, strong relations between size of ethnic minorities in the region & both active euro-optimism (negative) & active euro-skepticism (positive) were evident. More complications were, to evaluate influence of the economic factor: present statistics of GDP per capita in apskritys are far not enough to support supposition that voting results in particular Lithuania's territories are related with their economic development, too. In Slovakia, quite strong influence can be found of the size of Hungarian ethnic minority, but the opposite compared to Lithuania: increasing number of ethnic Hungarians do increase active euro-optimism & decrease active euro-skepticism. This is in good accordance with widely known believe of Hungarian ethnic group that EU membership will improve their status. Surprisingly, in Slovakia it was impossibly to evaluate the influence of another ethnic factor: though this country is widely known by the problems connected with Roma ethnic group, official statistics does not even show remarkable percentage of Roma in any region at all. Influence of economic factor, though number of examples is very small, is also present in Slovakia: the higher is GDP per capita, the higher is active euro-optimism, & at the same time the lower active euro-skepticism. In Poland, clear pattern of lower active euro-optimism was shown for its eastern regions, Podlaskie, Lubelskie, & Podkarpackie; they are economically poorest, at the same time, & characterized by specific political culture (bigger number of orthodox, smaller agricultural incomes, dependence on small trans-border trade, etc.). In the Czech Republic, regional economic pattern is also present: increase in regional GDP per capita also increases the active euro-optimism. Capital city, Prague, has exceptional position: it is most economically developed, & most euro-optimistic, too. For Estonia, complicated picture of inter-related influence of both ethnic & economic factors is typical. On one hand, there are no clear correlations between economic & voting variables. On the other, eastern Ida-Virumaa region, densely populated by ethnic Russians & the least economically developed, is described at the same time as mostly active euro-optimistic, & less euro-skeptical. The most reliable explanation would be, economic underdevelopment & ethnicity, complicated by stronger trans-border relations of individuals living near Russian border, may reinforce uncertainty in euro-integration perspective. For Latvia, the ethnic factor is very much evident: Pearson correlation between regional percentage of Russian population & active euro-skepticism is 0.906; reversely, it is connected with active euro-optimism. Eastern regions of Daugavpils & Rezekne affected also by economic underdevelopment were the most euro-skeptical among all 8 East European countries & became only regions where bigger part of inhabitants were actively opposed EU integration than supported. Thus, a number of cleavages can be generalized for majority of the acceding countries examined. "Center-periphery" cleavage is more or less evident for all countries except of Lithuania & Latvia: better socio-economic development seems to be overcomplicated by ethnic factors in two the latter. In Slovenia, Poland, and, especially, the Baltic States, the East-West cleavage is important. This can be explained by specifics of eastern regions: economic underdevelopment, personal & business ties beyond border, especially among Russian ethnic group in the East of the Baltic States, can lead to rational individual arguments against integration into European Union. With reversed relation, ethnic factor is typical for Hungarian ethnic group in Slovakia: support for euro-integration is predominant within it. The universal factor influencing electoral behavior in referenda is economic one, especially remarkable for Visegrad countries & Slovenia. Adapted from the source document.

The development of communicational potential of public spaces as European civil society's structure's sine qua non played an important role in the self stimulation of individualism and democratization. Transmutation of catacombic "kitchen culture" of post soviet societies into the spaces of public discourse – cafés, clubs, etc., confronts the limits of historical mentality. Rudimental character of dialogue culture, primitive and selfish perception of individualism, alienation and distrust in Modernity innovations and challenges reflect the peculiarities and possible alternatives of communicational horizon. Proliferation of similar intentions in more general contexts makes the problem of rebirth of metaphysic subject important again. In turn, communicational discourse differences of cafés and teahouses in palingenetic post soviet Modernity changes implicate distinctive and characteristic of traditional Lithuanian mentality oriental "residual" communication inclusions. The latter are treated as eventual fl uctual stimuli (productive coincidence) encouraging qualitative changes in sociocultural system.

The development of communicational potential of public spaces as European civil society's structure's sine qua non played an important role in the self stimulation of individualism and democratization. Transmutation of catacombic "kitchen culture" of post soviet societies into the spaces of public discourse – cafés, clubs, etc., confronts the limits of historical mentality. Rudimental character of dialogue culture, primitive and selfish perception of individualism, alienation and distrust in Modernity innovations and challenges reflect the peculiarities and possible alternatives of communicational horizon. Proliferation of similar intentions in more general contexts makes the problem of rebirth of metaphysic subject important again. In turn, communicational discourse differences of cafés and teahouses in palingenetic post soviet Modernity changes implicate distinctive and characteristic of traditional Lithuanian mentality oriental "residual" communication inclusions. The latter are treated as eventual fl uctual stimuli (productive coincidence) encouraging qualitative changes in sociocultural system.

The development of communicational potential of public spaces as European civil society's structure's sine qua non played an important role in the self stimulation of individualism and democratization. Transmutation of catacombic "kitchen culture" of post soviet societies into the spaces of public discourse – cafés, clubs, etc., confronts the limits of historical mentality. Rudimental character of dialogue culture, primitive and selfish perception of individualism, alienation and distrust in Modernity innovations and challenges reflect the peculiarities and possible alternatives of communicational horizon. Proliferation of similar intentions in more general contexts makes the problem of rebirth of metaphysic subject important again. In turn, communicational discourse differences of cafés and teahouses in palingenetic post soviet Modernity changes implicate distinctive and characteristic of traditional Lithuanian mentality oriental "residual" communication inclusions. The latter are treated as eventual fl uctual stimuli (productive coincidence) encouraging qualitative changes in sociocultural system.

The development of communicational potential of public spaces as European civil society's structure's sine qua non played an important role in the self stimulation of individualism and democratization. Transmutation of catacombic "kitchen culture" of post soviet societies into the spaces of public discourse – cafés, clubs, etc., confronts the limits of historical mentality. Rudimental character of dialogue culture, primitive and selfish perception of individualism, alienation and distrust in Modernity innovations and challenges reflect the peculiarities and possible alternatives of communicational horizon. Proliferation of similar intentions in more general contexts makes the problem of rebirth of metaphysic subject important again. In turn, communicational discourse differences of cafés and teahouses in palingenetic post soviet Modernity changes implicate distinctive and characteristic of traditional Lithuanian mentality oriental "residual" communication inclusions. The latter are treated as eventual fl uctual stimuli (productive coincidence) encouraging qualitative changes in sociocultural system.

European cultural dimensions. This implies: developing a Europe of knowledge, strengthening of stable, peaceful and democratic societies; enhancing mobility in employment and study; implementing the Bologna Magna Charta Universitatum 1988. In short the Declaration focuses on the promotion of co-operation and international competitiveness of European higher education. There are expectations of national reforms: the changes in two-tier degree structures, shorter first degrees, bridges between university and non-university sectors and external evaluation. At the institutional level, the reforms should also be considered to shape the curriculum development and evaluations (mare professionally relevant, more international and mare multidisciplinary). The article focuses on the universities role to facilitate study and labour mobility. Identifying labour needs calls for a constant update of the curriculum. The question is whether universities should move to professional training instead of providing an academic education. The article is dealing with the difficulties of the implementation of Bologna Declaration: a tension between academic education and professional training, between equality and opportunity, between internationalization and globalisation and etc. Mass higher education and life-long learning cannot be uniform across individuals, communities and countries. Reality is different in many universities, but the changes are needed in many universities too.

European cultural dimensions. This implies: developing a Europe of knowledge, strengthening of stable, peaceful and democratic societies; enhancing mobility in employment and study; implementing the Bologna Magna Charta Universitatum 1988. In short the Declaration focuses on the promotion of co-operation and international competitiveness of European higher education. There are expectations of national reforms: the changes in two-tier degree structures, shorter first degrees, bridges between university and non-university sectors and external evaluation. At the institutional level, the reforms should also be considered to shape the curriculum development and evaluations (mare professionally relevant, more international and mare multidisciplinary). The article focuses on the universities role to facilitate study and labour mobility. Identifying labour needs calls for a constant update of the curriculum. The question is whether universities should move to professional training instead of providing an academic education. The article is dealing with the difficulties of the implementation of Bologna Declaration: a tension between academic education and professional training, between equality and opportunity, between internationalization and globalisation and etc. Mass higher education and life-long learning cannot be uniform across individuals, communities and countries. Reality is different in many universities, but the changes are needed in many universities too.