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In a famous article from 1959, David Easton claimed that political anthropology has nothing to tell a political scientist, since it does not treat the state as a separate sphere. To make such a claim, Easton had to assume stability in the distribution of functions between the Westphalian state & the co-existing society, similarity between European Westphalian states, & likeness between the European state & all other states in the world. Fifty years later it seems to be clear why Easton was mistaken, & why state comparisons that do not problematize the historical & sociological conditions of every single state formation have failed. If one wants to understand the state in the age of globalization, the point of departure must be to ask how the relationship between state & society continuously changes, not if it does. As Easton points out, this is exactly what political anthropology mainly has focused on. The article gives an overview of how this has been done, from Lewis Henry Morgan to James C. Scott. It calls on political scientists to study the state empirically to a higher degree, as an endogenous part of the analysis or a dependent variable, rather than treating it as either a given starting point, an exogenous part of the analysis, or an independent variable. 44 References. Adapted from the source document.

The liberal state, it has been argued, must be neutral between different conceptions of the good. Honoring individual autonomy & embodying ideals such as fairness & impartiality, the doctrine of state neutrality is intuitively appealing. Working as a restraint for state actions it is however problematic. In this paper, a possible solution to this predicament is outlined. Drawing on the distinction between liberty & what gives worth to liberty, it is argued that we must never accept non-neutral restrictions of liberty itself, but may pursue non-neutral policies affecting the distribution of what gives worth to liberty & may impose taxes funding non-neutral state actions, although such taxation inevitable limits the worth of our liberty. It is suggested that we, by adopting such a policy of limited state perfectionism, can recognize the right to individual autonomy without having to restrain the state from doing the good it can. References. Adapted from the source document.