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This article presents a systematic review of the literature of oligarchy in Indonesia, which offers a distinctive interpretation of political change in Indonesia. The article argues that this literature is significant in two important ways. First, it invites ongoing rethinking of the ways in which authoritarian regimes fall. In the mainstream literature of democratisation, the fall of authoritarian regimes is often portrayed as the triumph of pro-democratic civil society mobilisation. Whereas many Indonesianists embrace this mainstream account in explaining the fall of the Suharto regime, the oligarchy literature suggests that its fall was driven not so much by the rise of civil society forces as by tensions between Suharto and oligarchs, in which the former was abandoned by the latter. Second, the oligarchy literature also compels a reappraisal of the nature of Indonesia's new democracy. Unlike the mainstream account of democratisation, which holds an optimistic view that the country is in the 'consolidation' stage towards a liberal democracy, the oligarchy literature sees political transition in Indonesia as a journey to an illiberal type of democracy: namely, oligarchical democracy.

This article presents a systematic review of the literature of oligarchy in Indonesia, which offers a distinctive interpretation of political change in Indonesia. The article argues that this literature is significant in two important ways. First, it invites ongoing rethinking of the ways in which authoritarian regimes fall. In the mainstream literature of democratisation, the fall of authoritarian regimes is often portrayed as the triumph of pro-democratic civil society mobilisation. Whereas many Indonesianists embrace this mainstream account in explaining the fall of the Suharto regime, the oligarchy literature suggests that its fall was driven not so much by the rise of civil society forces as by tensions between Suharto and oligarchs, in which the former was abandoned by the latter. Second, the oligarchy literature also compels a reappraisal of the nature of Indonesia's new democracy. Unlike the mainstream account of democratisation, which holds an optimistic view that the country is in the 'consolidation' stage towards a liberal democracy, the oligarchy literature sees political transition in Indonesia as a journey to an illiberal type of democracy: namely, oligarchical democracy. Adapted from the source document.

Unter den Wirtschaftssystemen der südostasiatischen Länder zeichnet sich Indonesien durch einen einmaligen "bürokratischen Kapitalismus" aus. Militärs und auch Zivilisten der Suharto-Regierung üben hier nicht nur strukturellen Einfluß aus, sondern fungieren gleichzeitig als führende Unternehmerpersönlichkeiten und -gruppen. Folgender Artikel gibt einen Überblick über die Entwicklung des indonesischen Staatskapitalismus unter den unterschiedlichen wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen der letzten Jahrzehnte. Es handelt sich dabei um den Abschnitt über Indonesien aus dem Artikel "Structures of Power and the Industrialisation Process in South East Asia" von Richard Robison, erschienen im "Journal of Contemporary Asia" Vol.19, No.4,1989.

Nach dem Rücktritt Suhartos vom Präsidentenamt im Mai 1998 gab es zunächst wenig Zweifel daran, dass das politische System Indonesiens in der bestehenden Form ebenfalls ausgedient hatte. Der Ruf nach grundlegenden Reformen war mit dem Wunsch nach Demokratisierung und Zulassung neuer politischer Parteien verbunden. Schon während Suhartos Vorgänger Sukarno, dessen Regierungszeit von der indonesischen Unabhängigkeit 1945 bis in die Mitte der 1960er Jahre reichte, hatte es eine zunehmende Einschränkung und Beschneidung der Arbeit von politischen Parteien gegeben. Ein wichtiger Einschnitt war das Verbot der islamischen Masyumi-Partei, deren Vertreter von manchen Indonesiern bis heute als politische Märtyrer angesehen werden. Suharto verbot nach seinem Amtsantritt nicht nur die starke kommunistische Partei PKI, sondern führte die von ihm propagierte Vereinfachung des Parteiensystems schließlich soweit, dass neben seiner regierenden "Golkar" nur zwei andere politische Parteien zugelassen waren: die "Partai Demokrasi Indonesia" (PDI) und die "Partai Persatuan Pembangunan" (PPP). Es sollte aber in Suhartos "Neuer Ordnung" immer noch der Anschein erweckt werden, dass Indonesien eine Demokratie wäre. Der vorliegende Beitrag gibt einen kurzen Überblick über die neuen Akteure in der Parteienlandschaft und diskutiert die Grundprobleme der indonesischen Demokratie. (ICI2)

This article argues that Indonesia since reformasi remains subject to powerful tendencies for disintegrasi – both province-based "separatism" and general socio-political decay. These tendencies are greatly aggravated by the failure of democratically elected presidents and parliaments to effectively tackle endemic corruption or reform the armed forces, which continue to enjoy near-total immunity as a major practitioner, guarantor and enforcer of corrupt business practice and extortion. The article notes the activism of civil society and liberal media on the corruption issue and the commendable new array of anti-corruption institutions. But it argues that reform efforts have been virtually nullified by broad collusion of Indonesia's political, bureaucratic, military and business elites in sustaining – but also "democratising" and decentralising – the system of corruption inherited from Suharto. Change must await new social and political struggles initiated outside the parliamentary arena which itself has become a major source of KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme).

This article argues that Indonesia since reformasi remains subject to powerful tendencies for disinfigrasi -- both province-based "separatism" and general socio-political decay. These tendencies are greatly aggravated by the failure of democratically elected presidents and parliaments to effectively tackle endemic corruption or reform the armed forces, which continue to enjoy near-total immunity as a major practitioner, guarantor and enforcer of corrupt business practice and extortion. The article notes the activism of civil society and liberal media on the corruption issue and the commendable new array of anti-corruption institutions. But it argues that reform efforts have been virtually nullified by broad collusion of Indonesia's political, bureaucratic, military and business elites in sustaining -- but also "democratising" and decentralising -- the system of corruption inherited from Suharto. Change must await new social and political struggles initiated outside the parliamentary arena which itself has become a major source of KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepstisme). Adapted from the source document.