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This article outlines a theory of government failure that parallels the more well-established theory of market failure. It builds on the work of the public choice school concerning the behaviour of governments under the assumption that all relevant agents pursue their selfinterest. It examines the theoretical consequences for efficiency and equity of three kinds of government activity: provision, subsidy and regulation. The conclusion is reached that all three may create inefficiency and inequity, but that the form and magnitude of the failure will differ with the type of activity; hence it is important that the three are distinguished. It is also emphasised that the extent of government failure in each case (and whether it is greater or smaller than the corresponding areas of market failure) is ultimately an empirical question, not a theoretical one.

A MODEL OF GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE IS DEVELOPED WHICH CONTRASTS THE SUPPLY BEHAVIOR OF GOVERNMENT AND PROPRIETARY ORGANIZATIONS. REFUTABLE IMPLICATIONS ARE DERIVED FROM AN EXPLICIT INFORMATION STRUCTURE IN WHICH THE PRODUCTIVITY OF MANAGEMENT MUST BE MONITORED INDIRECTLY AND DIFFERENTLY FOR THE TWO TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS. MANAGERS ARE ASSUMED TO BE WEALTH MAXIMIZERS.

Political scientists make a sharp distinction between the terms "State" and "Government." A State is a group of individuals viewed as a politically organized unit. In the eyes of the law it appears as a corporate being possessing supreme authority and issuing commands in the form of laws addressed to those over whom it claims authority. A Government is the machinery or complexus of organs through which this state-being formulates, expresses, and enforces its will.In my preceding paper I dealt wholly with the Prussian conception of the State and had nothing to say regarding Prussian conceptions of Government. In this paper I shall have little to say regarding the Prussian theory of the State and shall devote myself almost wholly to a consideration of the Prussian governmental system. Of this system, however, I shall speak of but one of its features, namely, its strong monarchical character. In result there should appear what justification there is for the demand of the United States and of the Entente Powers for a modification of the Prussian system.

This article presents a theory of the size and party composition of cabinet governments in multiparty democracies. The object of the theory is to improve our understanding of the causal linkages that exist between the choices politicians perceive and the historically determined political and social structures that give meaning to these perceptions and lead politicians repeatedly to make essentially the same choices. A typology of multiparty democracies is employed to capture the decisive political and social structures that give meaning to these perceptions. The structural attributes, in conjunction with a constellation of bargaining relationships, lead to predictable government formation outcomes.

Government grants in federal countries account for a small share of the national product of these countries. I suppose that this, and the fact that federal arrangements are relatively flexible, explains why no well-organized body of economic doctrine deals with the issues raised by the existence of these grants. In terms of general principles, I venture the opinion that the consensus among economists—though perhaps not among students of public administration—holds that these grants can be defended with ethical and distribution arguments, but that on grounds of efficiency (in the economist's sense) and resource allocation they are to be condemned. Further, I would guess that majority opinion would favour unconditional over conditional grants on the ground that the latter do not respect the sovereignty of the "consumer" or of the spender.These principles seem to have been accepted and even defended by economists like Bhargava, Buchanan, and Scott and to have received the support of Dehem and Wolfe among others. Dissenters, like Buchanan—on the question of efficiency versus ethics—have dissented only in part.

We present a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence of its present-bias resulting from the political uncertainty in a two-party political system. We show that under a two-party political system the party in office tends to be present-biased. This may lead to inefficient procrastination of socially beneficial policies that carry upfront costs but yield long-term benefits. However, procrastination is often not indefinite even as we consider an infinite-horizon game. There exist equilibria in which the policy is implemented, and in many cases carried out to completion in finite time. When the net social benefit is large, there is no procrastination problem. When the net social benefit is small, the policy can be procrastinated indefinitely, though there may co-exist some gradual implementation equilibria. When the net social benefit is intermediate in magnitude, there are all sorts of procrastination equilibria, including gradual implementation. The theory predicts that a government with a more strongly predominant party tends to procrastinate less.

Causes of interference.--Errors of interference.--The prohibition stage of the aquarian movement.--Conclusion. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Berrian Collection.

DESPITE THE GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF "RED TAPE" ON ORGANIZATIONS' BEHAVIORS AND IMPACTS, THEORY REMAINS POORLY DEVELOPED. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO DEVELOP A THEORY OF THE ORIGINS OF RED TAPE AND THEN TO APPLY THE THEORY TO THE QUESTION "WHY DO GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS HAVE MORE RED TAPE?" THE PERSPECTIVE PRESENTED ASSUMES THAT RED TAPE IS BEST VIEWED AS PATHOLOGICAL, WHEREAS THAT FORMALIZATION CONCEPTS ARE BEST VIEWED AS NEUTRAL ATTRIBUTES OF ORGANIZATIONS. THE TERM "RULE DENSITY" IS INTRODUCED TO DESCRIBE THE EXTENSIVENESS OF RULES AND REGULATIONS AS RELATED TO TOTAL ORGANIZATION RESOURCES. THE THEORY MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN RULES THAT ARE AT THEIR ORIGIN DYSFUNCTIONAL (RULE-INCEPTION RED TAPE) AND RULES THAT INITIALLY SERVED A USEFUL FUNCTION BUT TRANSFORMED INTO RED TAPE (RULE-EVOLVED RED TAPE). SPECIFIC CAUSES OF EACH TYPE RED TAPE ARE IDENTIFIED. A DISTINCTION IS MADE REGARDING THE INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL PRODUCTION AND IMPACT OF RED TAPE AND A TYPOLOGY IS DEVELOPED WHICH IS USED IN HYPOTHESES ABOUT RED TAPE. FINALLY, THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT RED TAPE IS CONSIDERED. A MODEL OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL CONTROL AND RED TAPE IS PRESENTED. THE MODEL IMPLIES THAT MOST FACTORS LEADING TO RED TAPE ARE NOT AN INHERENT FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, TWO INHERENT FACTORS OF GOVERNMENT ARE CITED, EACH OF WHICH GIVES RISE TO RED TAPE.