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The article examines the concepts of authoritarianism and democracy in Turkey through an analysis of academic freedom. From its foundation, Turkish democracy has suffered from being hybrid, i.e., a combination of democratic and authoritarian elements. Since 2016, after the attempted coup d'état, Turkish parliamentarianism has been transformed into a one-man regime. This contribution analyses the new type of Turkish authoritarianism from its foundation, since the rise of Justice and Development Party (AKP), using the Gramscian concept of hegemony and the role of the intellectual. Then, the article presents an interview with a scholar still working in a Turkish university to better understand the state of academic freedom in Turkey. ; The article examines the concepts of authoritarianism and democracy in Turkey through an analysis of academic freedom. From its foundation, Turkish democracy has suffered from being hybrid, i.e., a combination of democratic and authoritarian elements. Since 2016, after the attempted coup d'état, Turkish parliamentarianism has been transformed into a one-man regime. This contribution analyses the new type of Turkish authoritarianism from its foundation, since the rise of Justice and Development Party (AKP), using the Gramscian concept of hegemony and the role of the intellectual. Then, the article presents an interview with a scholar still working in a Turkish university to better understand the state of academic freedom in Turkey.

This paper analyze the effect of green energy, carbon dioxide emission, and militarization on green economic development. This study uses Turkey as a research country. Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) model has been used to examine the time series data of Turkey over the years between 1980 and 2015.

This thesis is an attempt to describe what Alevism represents and what it means to be an Alevi in contemporary Turkey. From the 16th century, under the Ottoman Empire, the Alevis were marginalized and persecuted. Nowadays, they are still struggling for their recognition. Political and social events influenced the Alevi identity; therefore, it is still not clear whether it is a sectarian, an ethnic, a religious or a political group. The contemporary fragmentation of the Alevi communities and the lack of recognition of their religious affiliation by the Sunni based Republic of Turkey do not help in solving the Alevi issue. In order to reach my research objective, I conducted fieldwork and participant observation in Turkey, mainly in the city of Aydin and in close-by the village of Yenikoy. In addition, I conducted six semi-structured interviews and distributed nine questionnaires. Given the extremely sensitive topic of my research, informants have asked to remain anonymous. My sample shows that according to the Alevis I interviewed, Alevism represents both culture and lifestyle. Being an Alevi means being humane, tolerant, as well as open minded, secularized, respectful, available and caring. Alevis do not feel they are recognized by the state, which on the contrary is perceived as favouring Sunni groups through its policies and ongoing political rhetoric. Indeed, my results show that major tensions are precisely generated by the State, or by State policies. Moreover, as supported by contemporary studies, such an asymmetric relationship has a sort of a knock-on effect on the social interaction between Alevi and Sunni groups. Last but not least, my personal involvement and academic expectations have played a vital role throughout the fieldwork and in my research. Indeed, what in my case made the difference were the difficulties I experienced to get in contact with Alevi. Aydin is considered a progressive and open city and it has been described by my informants as 'comfortable' and 'relaxed'. Nevertheless, it does not mean that all Alevis were willing to disclose their own identity and speak about Alevism. Indeed, even if discrimination in Aydin was not visible, some Alevi people were afraid to reveal their own identity. Given the importance those events have played in my research, I am going to include an additional section at the end of the second part of the Introduction, where I will articulate the methodological caveats and challenges with data collection I encountered.

While dealing with the current migration challenges, the European Union is revealing the overall weakness of its institutional and political architecture, consequently failing to give practical implementation to all those fundamental rights, contained in several widely shared international and regional legal instruments, on which its own legitimacy and credibility as human rights protector are based. Instead of putting its common values and policies in practice through the elaboration of a coherent supranational strategy, the Union is diverting its action to a deal-making approach grounded on the collaboration with third countries or origin or transit, apparently directed to the externalization of its responsibilities in migration and asylum field. This approach risks however to undermine the protection of asylum seekers' rights and interests. The most indicative example of this tendency is given by the Statement that on 18 March 2016 the EU Heads of State or Government negotiated with the Turkish counterpart in order to manage the increasing influx of asylum seekers and irregular migrants coming mainly from the Middle East's States and reaching the Greek islands via Turkey, that masks, with the pretext of preventing the smuggling routes, a greater desire to halt the entries in the EU territory through a stronger control of borders and a semi-automatic return mechanism. This research is aimed in the first place at clarifying the legal nature of the Statement and more specifically whether it has to be considered or not as a binding deal and if yes who is/are the subject/s responsible for its enactment on the EU side. In the second place, the objective is that of putting in evidence the possible violations of human rights and European Migration Law that the execution of the commitments agreed would entail, the inherent deficiencies of the Greek asylum system and the necessity for the EU to develop a common strategy for migration management which is effectively compliant with its own rules and values. Moreover, the Statement is analysed in the light of the new proposed reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and in particular of the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD), that risks further jeopardise asylum seekers' guarantees through a massive application of the 'safe third country' and 'first country of asylum' concepts. This unavoidably leads to question whether Turkey, beyond the efforts made in the alignment of its domestic legislation to the EU acquis, can be considered in practice as a 'safe country' in accordance with the EU standards, to where Syrians and migrants of other nationalities can be returned without incurring in the violation of their fundamental rights, such as the non-refoulement principle and the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In view of this current challenge, the EU should reflect on its role as a key unitary player on the international stage and build an alternative model of solidarity among Member States, which is fairer, more efficient and does not weaken asylum seekers' safeguard. Furthermore, also when acting on the external dimension the Union should endorse a strategy that is consistent with the principles and objectives affirmed by its primary Law, which should inspire not only Member States' policies at the internal level, but also the cooperation with third parties, ensuring a full respect of migrants' human rights.

Based on the original unpublished documents of the Italian ambassador in Ankara, the article refers to the difficult situation in which Turkey found itself as a consequence of the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. Since its entry into NATO in 1952, the Turkish government had been active in completing the Western defensive system in the Middle East. After the disappointing Middle East Command & the Medo, which had to see Egypt as a main pillar, the US Secretary of State saw in the Northern Tier line as the real base for building the Baghdad Pact. GB, of course, had to be the "glue" of the structure. Pakistan would be a new element; an Arab country; Iraq, was most welcome; & Iran joined too. Turkey tried from the beginning to get Washington into the Pact. It had to measure itself against the irresistible rise of Nasserism & the strong dissuasive action it exerted on Hussein of Jordan & Nuri Said of Iraq. When Nasser's ascendancy gained ground in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, & Iraq, Turkey tried in vain to connect the Baghdad Pact to NATO; Cairo & Damascus, the two main centers of Arab nationalism, succeeding in isolating Iraq, would strengthen those links with the USSR that would suddenly threaten Turkey both from communism in the North & Arabism from South. The bilateral treaty of 11 March 1959 with Washington, together with strong economic aid, would in the end guarantee Turkey would open its territory to the intermediate range ballistic missile base. Adapted from the source document.