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Authors who have studied the political authority wielded by a single party in different countries with non-totalitarian regimes have identified a 'cycle of domination' (Pempel, ed., 1990). Along the same lines, this analysis concentrates on the political institutions, resources and social divisions to identify the origins, challenges and continuance (or extinction) of the dominance of a single party in Mexico, India and Japan. Despite the significant differences between these nations, the origins of their cycles of one-party dominance share a linkage of party elites, State bureaucrats and private capital that guaranteed positions and resources in the form of patronage and cronyism. In addition to material resources, the use of ideology (for example, the dominant party portrayed itself as the embodiment of the nation's central aspirations and values) was also crucial in creating and subsequently maintaining the dominance of a single party in these countries. In all three cases, dominance also faced similar challenges in the form of a significant split in the party in power or in the emergence of an opposition capable of obtaining sufficient credibility regarding its capacity to govern. Finally, the framework of institutions, resources and social divisions also throws light on the extinction of the dominance of a single party in India and Mexico, as well as on its continuance in Japan. Adapted from the source document.

People and institutions that are part of the basically humanist "world of culture" are in charge of the preservation of our societies' goods. In determining if an object or building has to be part of the cultural heritage, the emphasis is put on what is considered a "master piece" and a "historical good", rather than in determining its real significance. What the society understands as "heritage" takes the heavy weight of a conception centered in these two values. I have neither been against the art nor what was made for many years. But I consider that the production of the last two hundred years, including the last decades, should not be excluded automatically from possible heritage consideration, although it does not have an artistic value or an excessive historical importance. The industrial heritage, in opposition to the artistic one, does not have too many singular elements. Industrialization is homogenization of life and work forms which have been translated into an homogenization of the tools, utensils and the construction. The industrial heritage's preservation has the purpose of reinforcing the collective memory of history and being an element to get to know better the daily life and the world of work in a different way that the one of the written testimonies. (Cuad CLAEH/GIGA)

Machiavelli is considered to be the founder of modern political science. Indeed, he proposes a new political rationale. Machiavelli places the idea & exercise of political power at the center of modernity. Like a sculptor, he molds & gives to the state at least its most basic form, so that it becomes almost inseparable from the Prince's role. The latter must not only conquer the former but also preserve it. In order to do this, it is necessary to make use of violence & to take advantage of the circumstances as they arise. This is what Machiavelli calls fortuna, which the Prince, the modern political actor, faces up to while using his good sense, the Machiavellian prudencia. Therein lies the Prince's virtue -- virtu. The rationale behind this has to do with the capacity of instinctively employing cruelty or compassion, devotion or incredulity, according to the circumstances & as prudence dictates. Machiavelli is not concerned about the Prince's being good or ruthless, a believer or not. What matters above all is to appear to have these qualities. As Machiavelli puts it, "the end justifies the means." After all, when the end is the protection of the state, the politician will be judged for the outcome, but not for the intentions or his inner human values. Adapted from the source document.

Two research projects by the Equipo de Elites Parlamentarias del Instituto de Estudios de Iberoamerica y Portugal de la Universidad de Salamanca (Research Group of the Institute of Iberoamerican and Portuguese Studies of the U of Salamanca) are reported: (1) Reforma politica y valores en los parlamentarios de cuatro casos nacionales de America Latina (Political Reform and Values in the Parliaments of Four Latin American Countries), carried out in 1994 & (2) Elites parlamentarias en America Latina (Parliamentary Elites in Latin America), launched in 1995 & finalized in 1998. The focus of attention is devoted here to the latter, which is discussed in more detail, including the number of informants during the first & second phase of the investigation & data collection (ie, questionnaire) & analysis (ie, cross-country comparison) methodology applied in obtaining information on parliamentarians' perception, assessment, & attitude to democratic practices in 15 Latin American countries. Results are summarized for the following topics: (1) the type of democratic regime, parliamentary election system, & government structure, (2) the role of political parties, (3) the trust in each of the three branches of government & armed forces, (4) the state's role in political, social, & economic spheres, (5) the principal problems faced by each of the countries, (6) regional integration of Latin American countries & foreign policy, (7) political careers & reasons for being elected to the parliament, & (8) ideological affiliation & polarization. Plans of future studies by this research group are shared. Tables, References. Z. Dubiel

Purcell looks at the most common approaches to the US embargo on Cuba, in particular the Helms-Burton Law. There are, first, those who argue that the embargo has failed in its goal of overthrowing Fidel Castro thus favoring a constructive engagement policy. If the embargo was to be lifted, the Cuban society would get to know US values & would stop believing in its government. A further diversification of the Cuban economy would also follow. On the other hand, those in favor of sanctions believe that a constructive engagement would in fact strengthen the Cuban dictatorship, as it would provide Castro the resources to survive & prevent the Cuban people from rising up against his government. Purcell claims that each crisis in Cuban economy has been followed by a limited opening, whereas in times of good economic performance Castro's government has embarked on foreign ventures against US interests. According to Purcell, it is ultimately problematic to evaluate these two approaches due to the fact that there is a lack of reliable data &, even if they were available, the debate is so deeply permeated by ideological concerns that the same set of data would lead to different conclusions. She considers, however, that the Helms-Burton Law will be maintained in the foreseeable future, & that President Bush is very unlikely to loosen his policy toward Cuba after September the 11th, 2001, given Castro's links with both the FARC & the president of Venezuela. Both the embargo & the Helms-Burton Law have failed to overthrow Castro or produce an economic breakdown in the island, but they have served as permanent constraints against the Cuban regime. Adapted from the source document.

"Cities, like dreams, are built of desires and fears," wrote Ítalo Calvino. The metamorphoses of a city have always been at the center of cultural, political and ideological debates and discussions. Buenos Aires was not the exception. At the beginning of the 20th century, its changes could be read in terms of evolution and progress or as destabilizing elements of the current systems and values. Towards the Centennial, its urban landscape was the theme chosen by various artists. So, nationalism and cosmopolitanism were the terms that marked the artistic tensions of the time. The position of the nationalists yearned to preserve certain traditions by reversing the passage of time and adopting the "types and customs" of the countryside, and this was represented by names such as Fernando Fader, Cesáreo B. de Quirós and writers such as Manuel Gálvez and Leopoldo Lugones. Another was the intention of figures such as Emilio Pettorutti, Alfredo Guttero, Horacio Butler, Alberto Prebisch or Jorge Luis Borges, who considered that to modernize art the fundamental condition was the existence of an avant-garde in accordance with the image of a modern and cosmopolitan Buenos Aires. While some celebrated the transformations and progress of the incipient industrialization, others denounced the social problems caused by the rapid growth of the metropolis. The problem was the construction of a tradition and the revision of a historical past that legitimized the two terms of this duality. These convictions took their toll on a wide spectrum of intellectuals, from Martin Malharro's utopian anarchism to Ricardo Rojas' Hispano-indigenousism, because the challenge lay in finding in the speed of change the stable characters of a nation that was just beginning to consolidate itself. The researcher Catalina Fara, Doctor in History and Theory of the Arts, faces this fascinating tale of mutations and disputes to weave in A vertical horizon that plot of fears and desires that somehow built the landscape of the Buenos Aires we know

Typical responses to the perceived escalation of violent crime throughout most of Latin America are to increase the size and powers of the regular police and -- in most cases -- to expand the involvement by the armed forces to confront both common and organized crime. Participation by the armed forces in domestic policing, in turn, has sparked debates in several countries about the serious risks incurred, especially with respect to human rights violations. In Mexico the debate is sharpened by the extensive violence linked to conflicts among drug -- trafficking organizations and between these and the government's security forces, in which the Army and Navy have played leading roles. Using World Values Survey and Americas Barometer data, we examine trends in public confidence in the police, justice system, and armed forces in Mexico over 1990 -- 2010. Using Vanderbilt University's 2010 LAPOP survey we compare levels of trust in various social, political, and government actors, locating Mexico in the broader Latin America context. That survey also poses questions about the appropriateness of the military acting as domestic police in fighting crime. Here we ask: Is public support for using the military as police widespread and generalized across the sample? Or are there patterns of support and opposition with respect to public opinion? Our main findings are that: (1) the armed forces rank at the top regarding trust, and -- while trust in other Mexican institutions tended to decline in 2008 -- 2010 -- trust in the military increased slightly; (2) respondents indicate that the military respects human rights more than the average and substantially more than the police or government generally; (3) public support for the military in fighting crime is strong and distributed evenly across the ideological spectrum and across socio -- demographic groups, and (4) patterns of support emerge more clearly with respect to perceptions, attitudes, and performance judgments. By way of conclusion we consider some of the political and policy implications of our findings. Adapted from the source document.