The Amer New Left is seen as part of an internat'l pol'al tendency. Despite diff's in form, student movements of the 1960's in the US, West Europe, & Japan share common concerns: violent or nonviolent rejection of both capitalism & bur'tic communism, anti-imperialism & an activist orientation. The main intellectual emphases of the Amer New Left appear to be anti-scholasticism, utopianism, & activism, as is illustrated in representative works by 2 authors whose ideas have greatly influenced the New Left: C. Wright Mills & Howard Zinn. The single most characteristic element in the thought of the New Left is the existential commitment to action, in the knowledge that the consequence of action can never be fully predicted; this commitment has survived all changes in pol'al fashion within the New Left. The members of the New Left condemn existing Amer society as 'corporate liberalism' & seek to replace it with 'participatory democracy.' They feel that the work of transforming society requires such tools as insurrectionary violence & dogmatic Marxist & Bolshevik forms of org. This reflects a weakness in the New Left's central concept of corporate liberalism. The theorists of corporate liberalism believe that their main enemy is not the reactionary Right, but the liberal center. This attitude may be compared to that of the German Communist party in the early 1930's which was more hostile toward the Soc Democrats than toward the Nazis. Amer New Left theory assumes that capitalism in the US would not turn to overt authoritarianism. It assesses Amer reality too hopefully. The prospect is not bright, but the trend toward rigorous repression does not necessarily mean the end of the New Left. Its origins go back to the thought & action of resistance against the fascism of the 1930's & 1940's. The spirit of resistance, & even possibly of nonviolent resistance, may yet rise to the occasion. Modified HA.
Religion, especially in its institutionalized church form, has always prescribed universal love and brotherhood and proscribed against killing and violence. Yet the institu tionalized church has always rationalized and come around to the support of the war and institutionally organized killing by its national community. This disparity between religious norms and practice has historically disturbed idealists and intrigued students of religion. This paper is concerned with how a universalistic religion confronts and resolves the dilemma of war vis-a-vis a particularistic socio-political system. It discusses (1) the theoretical bases for the non-pacifist attitudes and behavior of the institutional churches within the framework of the sociological 'Church-Sect' concept, and (2) the available data to lend support to the major hypothesis, that the church as a social institution ( as opposed to the sect) is both reflective and supportive of society's values and practices and that the church, therefore, functions primarily as an agent of conservation rather than as an agent of social change. These postulates are strongly supported by four sets of data and empirical evidence. The first fully supports the implication that outright opposition to war - conscientious objection - would be more evident in the sects than the churches. The second study supports the thesis that the church, through the chaplaincy system, resolves the value conflict in favor of society in a manner to support the values and objectives of the socio- political system in war. The third study supports the postulate that the church is ac commodative in that its stand on social issues depends largely upon the mood and senti ment of its parishioners rather than standing upon its own religious values. The last set of evidence sheds light on the thesis that the church remains essentially a conservative force by compartmentalizing its radicalism within the campus ministry - i.e., the church is a conservative rather than change-inducing agent vis-a-vis society.
Religion, esp in its instit'ized church form, has always prescribed universal love & brotherhood & proscribed against killing & violence. Yet the instit'ized church has always rationalized & come around to the support of the war & instit'ly org'ed killing by its nat'l community. This disparity between religious norms & practice has historically disturbed idealists & intrigued students of religion. Focus is on how a universalistic religion confronts & resolves the dilemma of war vis-avis a particularistic SP system. Discussion revolves around: (1) the theoretical bases for the non-pacifist att's & behavior of the instit'al churches within the framework of the sociol'al 'Church-Sect' concept, & (2) the available data to lend support to the major hyp, that the church as a soc instit (as opposed to the sect) is both reflective & supportive of society's values & practices & that the church, therefore, functions primarily as an agent of conservatism rather than as an agent of soc change. These postulates are strongly supported by 4 sets of data & empirical evidence. The first fully supports the implication that outright opposition to war-conscientious objection-would be more evident in the sects than the churches. The 2nd study supports the thesis that the church, through the chaplaincy system, resolves the value conflict in favor of society in a manner to support the values & objectives of the SP system in war. The 3rd study supports the postulate that the church is accommodative in that its stand on soc issues depends largely upon the mood & sentiment of its parishioners rather than standing upon its own religious values. The last set of evidence sheds light on the thesis that the church remains essentially a conservative force by compartmentalizing its radicalism within the campus ministry-ie, the church is a conservative rather than change-inducing agent vis-a-vis society. IPSA.
Two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, there are signs that sub-Saharan Africa will experience a modest recovery in 2022. Yet at least in the first half of the year, the region will continue to suffer from inadequate provision and administration of vaccines. In addition, violent conflicts and structural weaknesses constitute considerable challenges. We present a selective list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2022. Politics: Last year saw a number of military coups, which may foreshadow future takeovers by armies in Africa. Pivotal elections lie ahead that could trigger the outbreak of violence, for instance in Kenya. Political heavyweight South Africa is in a severe socio-economic crisis that is engendering growing public anger, and the governing African National Congress is experiencing increasingly deepening internal rifts. Violent conflicts: The civil war in Ethiopia puts the state's integrity at risk and could further undermine stability in the whole Horn of Africa. Jihadism represents a major security threat on the continent that needs to be tackled by African and international actors. A focus should lie on addressing root causes and on preventing crises. Development: It will take years for African countries to rebound from the pandemic's socio-economic repercussions. Structural problems such as high poverty, inequality, and government debt hamper economic growth and the effects of climate change are strongly felt in many African countries already. The year 2022 will be crucial for devising the next steps for continental economic integration. International arena: Africa is a sought-after international partner. Several actors including China, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union and its member countries are vying for political and economic influence. This competition will further intensify. African countries getting their full share of COVID-19 vaccines will be important. African and international partners need to expand support for the COVAX initiative and boost public health systems. The approaching EU–African Union summit in February represents an opportunity to step up cooperation to strengthen regional economic integration, democratic development, and the fight against climate change. Based on its coalition agreement, the new German government should be a main driver of this partnership.
On 9 June 2014, fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) pushed deep into Iraq from Syria. Within a few days they had taken over the west of the country and advanced to just outside of Bagdad. On 29 June 2014 they declared the formation of the 'Islamic State' and a new caliphate. For the first time, jihadists are in control of a contiguous, transnational territory in the Middle East. However, with the designation of their leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as 'the Caliph' - the religious and political leader of all Muslims - they may have overreached, ideologically and politically. The rapid success of ISIS in Iraq has several causes: Iraq is politically and ethnically divided and in some places without centralized power. ISIS already had a territorial base in Syria and some Iraqi towns under its control; extensive resources in terms of weapons, money, and fighters; and Iraqi allies in the fight against the unpopular government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad. By adopting the early Islamic concept of the caliphate, ISIS is appealing to many Muslims' longing for cultural authenticity, religious purity, and political unity. It is not fulfilling this promise, however, because its brutal approach is dividing societies and even scaring off many Sunni Muslims – whom it claims to defend. Inherent to the caliphate is a claim to sole political and religious representation, which neither the existing Muslim states nor most Sunni religious authorities will be willing to accept - not to mention the numerous religious and ethnic minorities in the region. The advance of ISIS has intensified the fragmentation of Iraq and could accelerate the dissolution of the single state there. However, a breakdown into individual ethnic-confessional micro-states would not do away with ISIS. It would also not solve the country's problems, but rather multiply them.
This review summarizes main trends, issues, debates, actors and initiatives regarding recognition and extension of protection of the human rights of migrants. Its premise is that the rule of law and universal notions of human rights are essential foundations for democratic society and social peace. Evidence demonstrates that violations of migrants' human rights are so widespread and commonplace that they are a defining feature of international migration today.About 150 million persons live outside their countries; in many States, legal application of human rights norms to non‐citizens is inadequate or seriously deficient, especially regarding irregular migrants. Extensive hostility against, abuse of and violence towards migrants and other non‐nationals has become much more visible worldwide in recent years. Research, documentation and analysis of the character and extent of problems and of effective remedies remain minimal.Resistance to recognition of migrants' rights is bound up in exploitation of migrants in marginal, low status, inadequately regulated or illegal sectors of economic activity. Unauthorized migrants are often treated as a reserve of flexible labour, outside the protection of labour safety, health, minimum wage and other standards, and easily deportable.Evidence on globalization points to worsening migration pressures in many parts of the world. Processes integral to globalization have intensified disruptive effects of modernization and capitalist development, contributing to economic insecurity and displacement for many.Extension of principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights culminated in the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. With little attention, progress in ratifications was very slow until two years ago. A global campaign revived attention; entry into force is likely in 2001. Comparative analysis notes that ILO migrant worker Conventions have generally achieved objectives but States have resisted adoption of any standards on treatment of non‐nationals.A counter‐offensive against human rights as universal, indivisible and inalienable underlies resistance to extension of human rights protection to migrants. A parallel trend is deliberate association of migration and migrants with criminality.Trafficking has emerged as a global theme contextualizing migration in a framework of combatting organized crime and criminality, subordinating human rights protections to control and anti‐crime measures.Intergovernmental cooperation on migration "management" is expanding rapidly, with functioning regional intergovernmental consultative processes in all regions, generally focused on strengthening inter‐state cooperation in controlling and preventing irregular migration through improved border controls, information sharing, return agreements and other measures.Efforts to defend human rights of migrants and combat xenophobia remain fragmented, limited in impact and starved of resources. Nonetheless, NGOs in all regions provide orientation, services and assistance to migrants, public education and advocating respect for migrants rights and dignity. Several international initiatives now highlight migrant protection concerns, notably the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants, the Global Campaign promoting the 1990 UN Convention, UN General Assembly proclamation of International Migrants Day, the 2001 World Conference Against Racism and Xenophobia, anti‐discrimination activity by ILO, and training by IOM.Suggestions to governments emphasize the need to define comprehensive, coordinated migration policy and practice based on economic, social and development concerns rather than reactive control measures to ensure beneficial migration, social harmony, and dignified treatment of nationals and non‐nationals. NGOs, businesses, trade unions, and religious groups are urged to advocate respect for international standards, professionalize services and capacities, take leadership in opposing xenophobic behaviour, and join international initiatives. Need for increased attention to migrants rights initiatives and inter‐agency cooperation by international organizations is also noted.
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar las subjetividades emergentes en la relación sociedad-naturaleza, en las comunidades y espacios urbanos de la subcuenca del río La Sabana-Laguna de Tres Palos, la cual se caracteriza por el proceso de degradación del ecosistema ribereño, a causa de la disposición ilegal de residuos sólidos y la descarga de aguas negras, así como de la creciente violencia criminal en la zona. Parte del estudio de la gubernamentalidad, así como del análisis cualitativo de experiencias acerca del conflicto socioambiental, para proponer dos formas de construcción de sentido y de acción social: una biopolítica socioambiental (homo economicus), basada en la incidencia tecnificada sobre el problema, aunque carente de crítica hacia el modelo económico; y una necropolítica socioambiental (endriago), que responde al abandono estatal y genera acciones para la sobrevivencia, aunque fuera de la legalidad y contra la vida de otros.Palabras clave: Gubernamentalidad, Conflicto socioambiental, Subjetividades emergentes Beyond perceptions. Emergence of socio-environmental subjectivities in a sub-basin region of Acapulco, GuerreroSummaryThe objective of this work is to analyze the emerging subjectivities in the society-nature relationship, in the communities and urban spaces of the sub-basin of the La Sabana-Laguna de Tres Palos river, which is characterized by the degradation process of the riparian ecosystem, due to the illegal disposal of solid waste and the discharge of sewage, as well as the increasing criminal violence in the area. It is based on the study of governmentality, as well as the qualitative analysis of experiences about the socio-environmental conflict, to propose two forms of construction of meaning and social action: a socio-environmental bio-politics (homo economicus), based on the technological impact on the problem, although lacking criticism of the economic model; and a socio-environmental necro-politics (endriago), which responds to state abandonment and generates actions for survival, although outside of legality and against the lives of others.Keywords: Governmentality, Socio-environmental conflict, Emerging subjectivities Ailleurs des perceptions. Émergence de subjectivités socio environnementales dans une région sous bassin d'Acapulco, GuerreroRésuméL'objectif de ce travail est celui d'analyser les subjectivités émergeantes dans la relation société-nature, dans les communautés et espaces urbains du sous bassin de la rivière La Sabana-Laguna de Tres Palos, qui se caractérise par le processus de dégradation de l'écosystème riverain, à cause de la disposition illégale de résidus solides et la décharge des eaux d'égout, ainsi que de la croissante violence criminelle de la zone. On part de l'étude de la gouvernabilité, ainsi que de l'analyse qualitative d'expériences à propos le conflit socio environnementale, pour proposer deux formes de construction de sens et d'action sociale : une biopolitique socio environnementale (homo economicus), basée dans l'incidence technicisée sur le problème, même dépourvu de critique envers le modèle économique ; et une nécro politique socio environnementale (endriago), qui répond à l'abandon de l'état et génère des actions pour la survivance, même hors de la légalité et contre la vie des autres.Mots clés : Gouvernabilité, Conflit socio environnemental, Subjectivités émergentes
AbstractViolent organizations with extreme ideologies such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria are often characterized as lawless, irrational, and therefore difficult or even impossible to predict and understand. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, I argue that many armed extremist groups across history and around the world share a common element: law-like systems of rules that they use to justify violence, regulate the conduct of civilians as well as their own members, and to transform social, political, and economic institutions in ways that will advance their ideological and strategic objectives. In Part I, I lay out a new research agenda for the study of "insurgent legality," arguing that legal scholars and practitioners should take seriously the internal regulatory and governance systems of violent and criminal non-state actors in order to understand not only how these groups emerge and establish legitimacy in the eyes of their members and supporters, but also how their legitimacy can be undermined. In the case of rebel insurgent groups like the Islamic State, I argue that an insurgent group's establishment of a legal system that is perceived by the local population as relatively more effective and fairer than that of the state it seeks to overthrow or secede from can greatly facilitate its capture and governance of territory. But if, over time, the insurgent group's system of law and governance becomes increasingly flawed by procedural injustice, corruption, discrimination against marginalized groups, increasing taxes without corresponding improvements in rights and services, and arbitrary violence, it will lose local support and become more vulnerable to collapse under pressure from growing internal threats of public resistance and infighting as well as the external threat of military defeat.In Part II, I test and find support for this theory with qualitative and quantitative data collected over the course of more than two years of field research in Iraq and southern Turkey including: an original household survey of 1,458 residents of the Islamic State's former capital city, Mosul; in-depth interviews with more than two hundred Syrians and Iraqis who lived under the Islamic State's rule; and a dataset of more than 1,500 primary source documents that maps the expansion and eventual retreat of the Islamic State's governance and lawmaking activities across time and space in all twenty-two Syrian districts that the group controlled to some extent between 2013 and 2017. Consistent with my theory, this data demonstrates the importance of legal institutions both for the Islamic State's initial success and the ultimate failure of its state-building project. Part III discusses the lessons learned and broader implications of this research for post-conflict peace-building, transitional justice, and countering the potential resurgence of the Islamic State that are informed not only by my academic research but also by my practical experience working with United Nations agencies in Iraq on these issues. I conclude by suggesting that my theory of insurgent legality can be extended to study the internal regulatory and governance systems of other violent or criminal non-state actors in very different contexts including drug cartels, white supremacist movements, pirates, and ransomware hackers.
Several armed conflicts have marked the past two decades in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). As a result, the DRC is facing an unprecedented humanitarian disaster with the death of hundreds of thousands of people, the large-scale displacement of civilians and the rape of thousands of women, girls and men. These armed conflicts have led to the metamorphosis of the concept of 'crime' with the emergence of new forms of sexual violence, particularly the widespread sexual violence used by armed groups as a tactic of war. In response to this avalanche of sexual violence, the DRC has taken a series of legislative measures. It began with the ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) on 11 April 2002. This was followed by the promulgation of the Military Judicial Code and the Military Criminal Code on 18 November 2002 (MJC and MCC, respectively) criminalizing, inter alia, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In 2006, the Congolese legislator criminalized various forms of sexual crimes as defined by international law in the Military Penal Code. On 31 December 2015, the Congolese authorities promulgated Law No. 15/022, amending and supplementing the Military Penal Code, for the implementation of the Rome Statute. Through this Law, the legislator has included in the Congolese Ordinary Criminal Code rape and other sexual assaults constituting war crimes, and in some circumstances, crimes against humanity. In terms of prosecutions, around 40 cases of rape classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity have been tried by Congolese military courts, and a few other cases are being investigated. This article seeks to assess the progress made by the DRC in prosecuting rape as a war crime and the challenges to such prosecutions.
La République démocratique du Congo (RDC) a été marquée par plusieurs conflits armés au cours des deux dernières décennies. Il en résulte que ce pays est confronté à une catastrophe humanitaire sans précédent avec la mort de centaines de milliers de personnes, le déplacement à grande échelle de civils et le viol de milliers de femmes, de filles et d'hommes. Ces conflits armés ont entraîné une métamorphose du concept de 'crime' avec l'émergence de nouvelles formes de violence sexuelle, notamment la violence sexuelle généralisée utilisée par les groupes armés comme tactique de guerre. En réponse à cette avalanche de violences sexuelles, la RDC a adopté une série de mesures législatives. La première fut la ratification du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale (Statut de Rome) le 11 avril 2002. Cette ratification fut suivie par la promulgation du Code judiciaire militaire et du Code pénal militaire le 18 novembre 2002 (respectivement le CMJ et le CCM) qui criminalisent, entre autres, les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l'humanité et le génocide. En 2006, le législateur congolais a incriminé dans le Code pénal militaire diverses formes de crimes sexuels tels que définis par le droit international. Le 31 décembre 2015, les autorités congolaises ont promulgué la loi no 15/022, modifiant et complétant le Code pénal militaire, pour la mise en œuvre du Statut de Rome. A travers cette loi, le législateur a inclus dans le Code pénal ordinaire congolais les viols et autres agressions sexuelles constitutifs de crimes de guerre, et dans certaines circonstances, de crimes contre l'humanité. En termes de poursuites, une quarantaine de cas de viols qualifiés de crimes de guerre et de crimes contre l'humanité ont été jugés par les tribunaux militaires congolais, et quelques autres cas sont en cours d'instruction. Cet article vise à évaluer les progrès réalisés par la RDC en matière de poursuites pénales pour viol en tant que crime de guerre et les défis auxquels ces poursuites sont confrontées.
Verschillende gewapende conflicten hebben de afgelopen twee decennia hun stempel gedrukt op de Democratische Republiek Congo (DRC). Als gevolg daarvan wordt de DRC geconfronteerd met een ongekende humanitaire ramp die gepaard gaat met de dood van honderdduizenden mensen, de grootschalige ontheemding van burgers en de verkrachting van duizenden vrouwen, meisjes en mannen. Die gewapende conflicten hebben geleid tot een metamorfose van het begrip 'misdaad' met de opkomst van nieuwe vormen van seksueel geweld, in het bijzonder het wijdverspreide seksuele geweld dat door gewapende groepen als oorlogstactiek wordt gebruikt. Als reactie op die lawine van seksueel geweld heeft de DRC een reeks wetgevende maatregelen genomen. Het begon met de ratificatie van het Statuut van het Internationaal Strafhof (Statuut van Rome) op 11 april 2002, gevolgd door de afkondiging van het militair gerechtelijk wetboek en het militair strafwetboek op 18 november 2002. Daarin worden onder meer oorlogsmisdaden, misdaden tegen de mensheid en genocide strafbaar gesteld. In 2006 heeft de Congolese wetgever verschillende vormen van seksuele misdrijven, zoals omschreven in het internationaal recht, strafbaar gesteld in het militair strafwetboek. Op 31 december 2015 hebben de Congolese autoriteiten wet nr. 15/022 tot wijziging en aanvulling van het militair strafwetboek uitgevaardigd, met het oog op de uitvoering van het Statuut van Rome. Met die wet heeft de wetgever verkrachting en andere vormen van seksueel geweld die te beschouwen zijn als oorlogsmisdaden, en in sommige omstandigheden misdaden tegen de mensheid, in het gewone Congolese Wetboek van Strafrecht opgenomen. Wat vervolging betreft, zijn ongeveer 40 gevallen van verkrachting die als oorlogsmisdaden en misdaden tegen de mensheid werden aangemerkt, door de Congolese militaire rechtbanken berecht, en enkele andere gevallen worden momenteel onderzocht. Deze studie heeft tot doel na te gaan welke vooruitgang de DRC heeft geboekt bij de vervolging van verkrachting als oorlogsmisdaad en voor welke uitdagingen dergelijke vervolgingen staan.
Varios conflictos armados han dejado huella en las dos décadas pasadas en la República Democrática del Congo (RDC). A resultas de ello, la RDC se está enfrentando a un desastre humanitario sin precedentes con la muerte de cientos de miles de personas, desplazamiento de civiles a gran escala y la violación de miles de mujeres, niñas y hombres. Estos conflictos armados han llevado a la metamorfosis del concepto de 'crimen' con la aparición de nuevas formas de violencia sexual, en particular el uso generalizado de la violencia sexual por grupos armados como táctica de guerra. En respuesta a esta avalancha de violencia sexual, la RDC ha adoptado una serie de medidas legislativas. Todo comenzó con la ratificación del Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional (Estatuto de Roma) el 11 de abril de 2002. A esto siguió la promulgación del Código Judicial Militar y del Código Penal Militar el 18 de noviembre de 2002 (Código Judicial Militar y Código Penal Militar, respectivamente), penalizando, entre otros, los crímenes contra la humanidad y el genocidio. En 2006, el legislador congoleño introdujo en el Código Penal Militar varias modalidades de crimen sexual tal y como se definen en el Derecho Internacional. El 31 de diciembre de 2015, la autoridades congoleñas promulgaron la Ley Núm. 15/022, reformando y complementando el Código Penal Militar, con objeto de implementar el Estatuto de Roma. A través de esta ley, el legislador ha tipificado en el Código Penal Común la violación y otros ataques sexuales que constituyen crímenes de guerra y, en algunas circunstancias, crímenes contra la humanidad. En términos de procedimientos instruidos, cerca de 40 casos de violación tipificada como crímenes de guerra y crímenes contra la humanidad han sido tramitados por los tribunales militares congoleños, y varios casos más continúan siendo objeto de investigación. Este estudio busca valorar el progreso de la RDC en la persecución de la violación como crimen de guerra y los retos a los que se ha tenido que hacer frente en dicha tarea.
Gli ultimi due decenni della Repubblica Democratica del Congo (RDC) sono stati segnati da diversi conflitti armati. Di conseguenza, la RDC sta affrontando un disastro umanitario senza precedenti con la morte di centinaia di migliaia di persone, lo sfollamento di civili su larga scala e lo stupro di migliaia di donne, ragazze e uomini. Questi conflitti armati hanno portato alla metamorfosi del concetto di 'crimine' con l'emergere di nuove forme di violenza sessuale, in particolare la diffusa violenza sessuale usata dai gruppi armati come tattica di guerra. In risposta a questa valanga di violenza sessuale, la RDC ha adottato una serie di misure legislative. È iniziato tutto con la ratifica dello Statuto della Corte penale internazionale (Statuto di Roma) l'11 aprile 2002. A ciò è seguita la promulgazione del Military Judicial Code and the Military Criminal Code il 18 novembre 2002 (rispettivamente Codice giudiziario militare e Codice penale militare), che hanno criminalizzato, tra l'altro, crimini di guerra, crimini contro l'umanità e genocidio. Nel 2006, il legislatore congolese ha definito come crimini varie forme di reati sessuali così come definito dal diritto internazionale nel Codice Penale Militare. Il 31 dicembre 2015 le autorità congolesi hanno promulgato la Legge n. 15/022, che modifica e integra il Codice Penale Militare, per l'attuazione dello Statuto di Roma. Attraverso questa legge, il legislatore ha incluso nel Codice penale Ordinario congolese lo stupro e altre aggressioni sessuali definiti crimini di guerra e, in alcune circostanze, crimini contro l'umanità. In termini di procedimenti penali, circa 40 casi di stupro classificati come crimini di guerra e crimini contro l'umanità sono stati processati dai tribunali militari congolesi e alcuni altri casi sono oggetto di indagine. Questo studio cerca di valutare i progressi compiuti dalla RDC nel perseguire lo stupro come crimine di guerra e l'impegno in tali procedimenti penali.
Mehrere bewaffnete Konflikte haben die vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnte in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo (DRK) geprägt. Als Folge dessen steht die DRK vor einer beispiellosen humanitären Katastrophe mit dem Tod von Hunderttausenden von Menschen, der massiven Vertreibung von Zivilisten und der Vergewaltigung von Tausenden von Frauen, Mädchen und Männern. Diese bewaffneten Konflikte haben zu einer Metamorphose des Begriffs 'Verbrechen' mit dem Aufkommen neuer Formen sexueller Gewalt geführt, insbesondere der weit verbreiteten sexuellen Gewalt, die von bewaffneten Gruppen als Kriegstaktik eingesetzt wird. Als Reaktion auf diese Lawine sexueller Gewalt hat die DRK eine Reihe von gesetzlichen Maßnahmen ergriffen. Es begann mit der Ratifizierung des Statuts des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs (Römisches Statut) am 11 April 2002. Es folgte die Verkündung des Militärgerichtsgesetzbuchs und des Militärstrafgesetzbuchs am 18. November 2002, die unter anderem Kriegsverbrechen, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und Völkermord unter Strafe stellen. Im Jahr 2006 hat der kongolesische Gesetzgeber im Militärstrafgesetzbuch verschiedene Formen von Sexualverbrechen im Sinne des Völkerrechts unter Strafe gestellt. Am 31. Dezember 2015 haben die kongolesischen Behörden das Gesetz Nr. 15/022 zur Änderung und Ergänzung des Militärstrafgesetzbuchs im Hinblick auf die Umsetzung des Römischen Statuts verkündet. Mit diesem Gesetz hat der Gesetzgeber Vergewaltigung und andere sexuelle Übergriffe, die Kriegsverbrechen und unter gewissen Umständen auch Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit darstellen, in das kongolesische ordentliche Strafgesetzbuch aufgenommen. Was die Strafverfolgung anbelangt, so wurden etwa 40 Fälle von Vergewaltigung, die als Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit eingestuft werden, von kongolesischen Militärgerichten abgeurteilt, und einige weitere Fälle werden derzeit untersucht. Diese Studie versucht, die Fortschritte der DRK bei der strafrechtlichen Verfolgung von Vergewaltigung als Kriegsverbrechen und die Herausforderungen für solche Verfolgungen zu bewerten.
In: Vestnik Volgogradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta: naučno-teoretičeskij žurnal = Science journal of Volgograd State University. Serija 4, Istorija, regionovedenie, meždunarodnye otnošenija = History. Area studies. International relations, Issue 6, p. 284-302
Introduction. The present research is related to the problem of the image of Other in Byzantine sources, but the focus is on its single aspect, namely the problem of the Byzantine attitude towards "the Latins" and, in particular, Western mercenaries which will be considered on the example of Athanasios I, patriarch of Constantinople's (1289–1293, 1303–1309) relation to mercenaries of the Catalan Company staying for a long time (1303–1309) on the territory of the empire. It represents source analysis of the patriarch's correspondence that is, we believe, the most underrated historical sources in this respect. Our goals are to find out the position of the Byzantine church towards the Catalan company and to determine the value of the Athanasios' epistolary as a source for studying the Byzantine-Catalan conflict. The subject of research is 10 letters of Athanasios somehow reflecting his views on the Catalans' presence in the empire. Methods and materials. The principles of the hermeneutic method allow us to interpret holistically the letters of the patriarch. Analysis and results. It is concluded that Athanasios who saw the Catalans, representatives of the West, as a threat to the existence of the Byzantine state and church from the very beginning was against their involvement in the empire to defend its eastern boundaries. After the Catalans' arrival, three main themes can be distinguished in his criticism of them which the patriarch expressed in his letters sent mainly to the emperor: he opposed lawlessness and violence on their part towards the local population; warned the basileus about inadmissibility of the Catalans' interference in state affairs; feared that their long stay in Byzantium would be harmful to the church and the Orthodox population in the ways that it was at the time of the Fourth Crusade and Latin Domination. These letters contain not much factual information but they allow to confirm and even complement data of other sources, mainly narrative ones, as well as to deepen our knowledge on relations between state and church in Byzantium under conditions of internal crisis in the early 14th century.
