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Iran is now subjected to the harshest economic sanctions ever imposed on any country in the world. This report discusses if and how these sanctions work, first by analysing their intended purposes and how the many phases and layers of sanctions imposed by the USA, the EU and the UN Security Council have created an almost impenetrable, escalating sanctions regime against Iran. Secondly, the report illustrates how the sanctions are experienced, debated and received in Iran, and what direct and indirect consequences the sanctions have on Iran's nuclear program, the country's financial crisis, social conditions and the upcoming presidential election in June 2013. The conclusion is that the sanctions do work, but not according to their intentions. The sanctions are contributing to changing Iran: The external pressure creates further tensions and fractions on the domestic political scene; the market moves from the West to the East, and people are subjected to a humanitarian crisis. But the sanctions have not limited Iran's nuclear program; it has only been further developed during the last seven years. Therefore, there is still a considerable risk that the increasing isolation of Iran in a worst case scenario can lead to a military confrontation.

Det er en pågående debatt i akademia om hvorvidt og hvordan man kan benytte avskrekkingsteori i cyberdomenet. Avskrekking var originalt en teori utviklet for å unngå konvensjonell eller nukleær krig. I diskusjonen om cybersikkerhet har det blitt påpekt en rekke tekniske problemer med å overføre en teori fra den fysiske verden til cyberdomenet. Vi anerkjenner disse tekniske utfordringene ved avskrekking i cyberdomenet, men i denne artikkelen ønsker vi å belyse et annet aspekt ved avskrekking, nemlig samspillet mellom sosiale og tekniske faktorer ved avskrekking i cyberdomenet. I denne artikkelen vil vi diskutere hvordan avskrekking som strategi i cyberdomenet vil påvirkes av den spesifikke strategiske kulturen i et land. For å belyse argumentet vil vi benytte Kina som en casestudie. Motsetninger mellom kinesisk og «vestlig» strategisk kultur resulterer i konkrete forskjeller i hvordan Kina og vestlige land agerer i cyberdomenet. Ved å benytte fire komponenter av avskrekkingsteori (nektelse, gjengjeldelse, gjensidig avhengighet og normer) ønsker vi å vise hvordan en dyptgående innsikt i en stats sikkerhetspolitikk og strategiske kultur kan anvendes til å skreddersy en mer effektiv avskrekkingsstrategi og styrke evnen til å forhindre uønsket aktivitet.
Abstract in English
There is an ongoing debate in academia about if and how deterrence theory may be used in cyberspace. Deterrence was originally a theory developed for avoiding conventional and nuclear war. In the current discussion on cyber security, there has been pointed out a range of technical problems of transferring a theory about the physical world to cyberspace. We recognize these challenges of deterrence in cyberspace, but in this article we want to shed light on a different aspect of deterrence. That is the interplay between social and technical factors of deterrence in cyberspace. In this article we will discuss how deterrence as a strategy in cyberspace is influenced by the specific strategic culture of a country. We will use China as a case study to showcase our argument. Contrasts between Chinese and "Western" strategic culture results in concrete differences in how Chinese and Western countries act in cyberspace. By utilizing four components of deterrence theory (denial, punishment, entanglement and norms), we will show how an in-depth knowledge of a state's security policy and strategic culture may be used to tailor a more effective deterrence and enforce the capacity of hindering unwanted activity.

Folkemordet i Srebrenica i juli 1995 opprørte en hel verden. Siden 1992, da krigen brøt ut, hadde Bosnia-Hercegovina vært under internasjonalt oppsyn. Artikkelen drøfter hvordan folkemord og grove krigsforbrytelser kunne foregå i årevis uten å bli stanset. Fokus er på den rolle de internasjonale faktorene spilte – FN, EU, Nato og stormaktene. Hvorfor var det så stor motstand mot bruk av makt? Delvis kan det ha vært på grunn av manglende forståelse av hva som skjedde, en oppfatning av at Balkan var preget av århundregammelt hat. Noen vestlige land hadde sine egne interesser i området. For vestlige politikere var det enkleste ikke å gjøre noe. FN sendte fredsbevarende styrker til et land i krig, noe som var katastrofalt for styrkene selv og for FNs prestisje. De tiltakene som ble satt i verk, som Sikkerhetsrådets resolusjoner, økonomiske sanksjoner, våpenembargo, FN-sikrede områder og flyforbud, førte ikke til at krigshandlingene avtok. Også mange norske politikere var sterkt imot militær inngripen. Den serbiske hæren var for sterk, en militær løsning var ikke mulig. Dette viste seg å være feil. Folkemordet i Srebrenica fikk FN og Nato til å gå inn for maktbruk i september 1995. En begrenset militær aksjon var nok til å få slutt på krigen, og reelle fredsforhandlinger kunne begynne.
Abstract in English: Srebrenica 25 Years After – How Could the Genocide Happen?
The genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995 shocked the world. Since 1992, when the war broke out, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been supervised by the international community. The article discusses why genocide and crimes against humanity could happen without being stopped. Focus is on the role of the relevant international participants, the UN, the EU, NATO and the great powers. Why was there a strong opposition against use of force? It was partly due to weak understanding of what was going on, a concept of the Balkans as a region of inherent centuries-old hatred. Some Western states had their own interests in the region. For Western politicians the easiest way was to do nothing. The UN sent peacekeepers to a country at war, which turned out to be a catastrophe for the peacekeepers and for the prestige of the UN. Measures like Security Council resolutions, economic sanctions, arms embargo, safe havens and no-fly zones did not work. Many Norwegian politicians were strongly opposed to military intervention. The Serbian army was too strong, a military solution was not possible. This turned out to be wrong. The genocide in Srebrenica triggered the use of force by the UN and NATO in September 1995. A limited military action was enough to end the war, after which real peace talks could start.