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Abstract: Following the election of the Whitlam government in December 1972 changes in the composition, work and style of ministers' offices were substantial. Evaluations of the emerging pattern conflicted, often quite sharply. This paper surveys the pattern of staffing introduced by Labor and examines in particular the roles of ministerial officers as political and policy advisers. The paper also discusses recent experiences with ministerial staff in the United Kingdom and Canada, and makes brief reference to the use of ministerial staff by the Fraser government. Assessing the effectiveness of ministerial advisers is not easy. No straight forward measures of effectiveness exist. It is argued that, despite the ambitions of some ministerial staff during the Whitlam government, the role of ministerial advisers was essentially limited and confined. Ministers found them useful but few found them overwhelmingly so. While the Fraser government has reduced the number and visibility of ministerial staff it has retained the institutional underpinning of Labor's system. In the search for ways of assisting political parties to govern and to respond to changing situations, it is likely that ministerial staff with ability to advise on policy will receive further attention in the future.

Abstract: The ministerial staff of the present Liberal‐National Country Party government are compared with those of the Labor government between 1972 and 1975. The most striking contrasts between the two groups is that the Coalition staffers are fewer in number (with fewer "political" types) and less "visible" than their Labor counterparts. They also intrude less into the workings of departments and report better relationships with public servants. There is thus a weakening of the representative and party political elements in the Federal government which were built up under the Labor party, and an opening of the way for a possible reassertion of the bureaucratic element. Although Coalition staffers differ from Labor staffers in other respects (for instance more come from private industry and private practice, fewer from journalism), on a number of criteria they have much in common. They are mostly male, in their twenties or thirties, mostly graduates, disproportionately from non‐government schools, with about half from inside and half from outside the public service.

An "urban" definition of public policy problems raises great difficulties for the policy maker. If we emphasize implementation as a primary factor in evaluating public policy, we have good grounds for questioning the wisdom of an urban perspective. But urban questions have been and still are major areas of concern in public policy formulation. The ALP federal platform contains a long section on urban policies, reiterating what the Department of Urban and Regional Development (DURD) was striving to achieve under the Whitlam Government. At state level, urban problems have been tackled with varying degrees of success and seriousness, although at this level overall urban perspectives tend to be ignored, for reasons we shall indicate. However urban planning authorities have been tried in most capital cities, and metropolitan plans have been drawn up for all of them. They have concentrated mainly on land use and urban form. By the 1970s a common criticism of such planning was that it left aside many social and economic aspects of urban growth. For example, one (admittedly partisan) government source—the N.S.W. Department of Decentralization and Development—noted "a massive and increasing trend towards socio‐economic segregation":…the remoteness of central city facilities …the cost of commuter transport and the inadequacy of community facilities in low‐income outer suburbs are operating to perpetuate economic under‐privilege.

Abstract: The Industries Assistance Commission has been a new ingredient to the policymaking process for Australian primary industry. The traditional process contained a number of features — close association with the Country Party, Federal/State bargaining, a powerful Department of Primary Industry and myriad non‐departmental authorities — which together led to policies which were ad hoc, complicated and often based on social rather than economic criteria. The Whitlam government, with the support of the Liberal Party, but against the opposition of the Country Party, included the examination of assistance to primary industry within the scope of the IAC. Advising on primary industry was a special challenge for the IAC. The Commission devoted considerable energies to expanding its own resources into this field and establishing working relations with other institutions working in this area. Since 1974 about a sixth of the IAC's resources have been devoted to inquiries into primary industries, though the workload has decreased in recent years. The consequence of the IAC's entry into the field has meant primarily that other actors in the process, such as State departments and industry organisations have had to supplement their own resources by the employment of professional agricultural economists to write their submissions. The style of debate has been indelibly altered. This, rather than the direct impact of the IAC's recommendations on assistance to primary industries, stands as the new institution's greatest achievement.

Disproportionate attention is often focused on government programs which are adopted as part of a political platform. Yet these are often marginal in terms of the expenditures involved. Such is the case with education. The disadvantaged schools program introduced by the Whitlam Labor government involved only a very small outlay compared with the annual expenditure on education in Victoria. This paper argues that it is important to find ways of evaluating the spatial and social impact of the main bulk of government programs. Evidence is adduced which casts some doubt on the equity with which state government funds for state secondary schools have been allocated spatially in metropolitan Melbourne.

The crisis which arose in Australia in October-November 1975 led to the dismissal of the Labour Prime Minister Gough Whitlam by the Governor-General Sir John Kerr, the formation of a caretaker Government by the opposition leader Malcolm Fraser and the simultaneous dissolution of the Houses of the Federal Parliament.The constitutional issues involved in that crisis are studied. The opinion is maintained that the rational coherence of the parliamentary system require an effective head of State with the responsibility of acting personally in unusual circumstances, rather than the strict law definitely lapsed and the issue even then ruled by the «constitutional conventions» of Cabinet government.