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Julia Gillard replaced Kevin Rudd as prime minister and Labor leader in June 2010. She describes her government as being firmly in the "tradition of Labor". To locate it in the broad ideological continuum of Labor governments, and to test the suggestion that she is travelling a reform path set largely by the Hawke and Keating governments, I analyse the positions taken by Rudd and Gillard on a range of issues, beginning with economic policy. On social issues Gillard has been even more cautious than Rudd and this reflects her analysis of the electoral impact of Howard's Culture Wars. Her focus on educational opportunity suggests she is the logical successor to Gough Whitlam, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. As Labor leaders, Rudd and Gillard each embraced market‐reliant policy positions. Rudd even claimed to be an "fiscal conservative". However, with Rudd venturing a critique of neo‐liberalism, it is Gillard whose stance is closer to Hawke and Keating's "economic rationalism". Indeed Gillard's insistence upon the centrality of markets leaves Labor with a dilemma: if there are no significant problems with relying on markets then why does Australia need a social democratic party?

Abstract
This article interweaves the personal and archival by exploring the intersection of official Australian records on the fall of Saigon and government handling of Vietnamese refugees in 1975 with my family history. As transitional justice addresses the legacies of human rights violations including the displacement and resettlement of refugees in post-conflict contexts, Australian responses to the Vietnamese refugee crisis of 1975 provide a relevant case study. Drawing on a wide range of archival documentation at the National Archives of Australia and the National Library of Australia, including policy papers, Senate findings, confidential cables, ministerial submissions, private correspondence and photographs, I trace the effect of government decisions on Vietnamese refugees seeking asylum. In the process I reveal actions by senior bureaucrats and in particular by then Prime Minister Gough Whitlam that are largely unknown. Combining archival research with personal history enables me to not only shed light on past actions of governance and uncover past injustice but also explore the enduring impact of government decision-making on individual lives.

Abstract: Australia's first women's refuge was established in 1974, marking a crucial outgrowth of women's liberation activism that placed domestic violence on the public agenda. To maintain refuges, feminists seized opportunities presented by the progressive Gough Whitlam Labor government. This convergence between a reforming government and the women's movement meant that Australian feminist refuges were among the first in the world to receive state support, in 1975. Maintaining this support required feminist activists to engage with the Australian state. They framed their claims in two ways: they foregrounded women's traumatic narratives of experiences of domestic violence, and they asserted that refuges were a distinctive feminist service. Adapting to a constantly changing political context, however, advocates found it difficult to distinguish their activities from charitable refuges. Their emphasis on women's trauma foregrounded a victimized political subject while the movement's emphasis on fostering "self-help" was co-opted by advocates of neoliberal governance.

The history of Indigenous struggles is a conflicted one that has carried on into the 21st century. Governments have implemented and adapted plan after plan in accordance with their beliefs on how Indigenous affairs should be managed. The goal for Indigenous Australians in 1938 was to obtain equal rights and opportunities. The journey has been a long one and still this milestone has not been achieved. However, these goals have been evolving to include being recognized as the First Australians and the entitlements that entails. Having land given back to Indigenous people was one of the original goals that remains to be a critical issue even in debates today. A Northern Territory strike at Wave Hill Station in 1966 shows the first actions toward regaining land rights, "The strike soon becomes a demand for land rights, when the strikers set up camp on their traditional land and seek the transfer of part of the pastoral lease."1 In the early 1900s, what is now referred to as the 'lost generation,' was caused by the government assimilating Indigenous Australians into mainstream Australian culture. It was a 'government manage all ' approach. To help facilitate this movement, children from mixed decent were taken from their families, and placed in non Indigenous homes to be raised. This practice continued until the late 1960s. When the Whitlarn Labor government carne into power, the phrase self-determination was used to describe the goals of and for Indigenous peoples. This was a vague term used to signify Indigenous people having some sense of independence while existing in Australian society. It was an opportunity to provide input into their own affairs. A separate government department was established to govern Indigenous affairs; this was called the Department of Aboriginal Affairs. An elected advising committee was formed to assist the department in speaking to Indigenous communities. The 1976 Fraser Coalition government moved toward the idea of self-management for Indigenous people. This to an extent reduced the ideals set out by the Whitlam government. The government did not intend to broaden its governance over Indigenous issues, but rather continued to view its responsibility as limited to certain aspects of Indigenous affairs. Under this government discussions of land rights as well as basic rights continued. In 1987, with Prime Minister Bob Hawke, the topic of forming a treaty with Indigenous Australians was raised, something then Opposition Leader John Howard was strongly against. A combination approach to addressing Indigenous affairs was initiated. As a result, in 1989 self-determination resurfaced as a policy approach with the creation of ATSIC. For the government the goal was to increase funding for Indigenous programs as well as give communities greater control over their future. ATSIC was established in 1990 in an effort to satisfy a change in goals. Never before had the government given indigenous people to power to decide where to allocate funds for their own programs. It was seen as a movement from the government making decisions for aboriginal people to helping them in making decisions for themselves. Also established was a council to promote Reconciliation and improve the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. However, the goals set by Government proved to be a stepping stone for what Indigenous leaders were after. The Government was displeased with some of the ways ATSIC was using its power. As a result the government decided it needed to critically monitor the functioning and decision making of the ATSIC board and ordered an intensive review to take place, where ATSIC was forced to account for its every move. This review board reported directly to the minister. In 1993, Indigenous people began the fight for more than just recognition of land claims, but for social reform aimed at improving their conditions and giving them opportunities for a better future. The topic of Reconciliation resurfaces. Indigenous people force the government to address the issue of Aboriginal children having been removed from their homes. The Keating government decided to focus on Indigenous rights and Reconciliation. This provided the opportunity for Indigenous Australians to voice what they had been continuously pushing for,' True Reconciliation.' Among other goals this movement sought an official apology from the government for the 'stolen generations.' In 1996, the Howard government took a step back from the idea of 'True Reconciliation,' and proposed 'Practical Reconciliation' instead. This plan did not satisfy the Indigenous demand for an apology. Through this period ATSIC underwent many struggles and conflict ultimately resulting in its abolishment.

How do Australian governments budget? How well do they spend and manage our money? Governments seem to be locked in a constant struggle with the problems of budgeting. Cabinet never has enough resources to go around, and while some agencies 'guard' public expenditure, others find endless ways to make new claims on budgets.Managing Public Expenditure in Australia provides the first systematic analysis of government budgeting and the politics of the budgetary process. Drawing on extensive original sources, the authors examine debates and reforms in public finance from Whitlam and Fraser to Hawke, Keating and Howard, and assess their impacts on policy development. In tracking the way governments actually spend money, Managing Public Expenditure in Australia provides an alternate and complementary political history of federal government over the past forty years.This book also includes accessible discussions on topics such as budget theory, financial management in government, and debt and deficit reduction. An explanation of new resource management techniques and initiatives help to illuminate the ongoing changes to budget and expenditure management practices. This is an essential purchase for students, teachers and practitioners of public finance, and for anyone involved in the continuing debate over the nature and role of the public sector.

There is an assumption in international relations literature that junior allies must choose between supporting a dominant global alliance partner and engaging with a rising power. Yet, Australian policy-makers have paradoxically managed to deepen Sino-Australian relations despite their bilateral alliance with the United States. They have developed a discrete China policy on the assumption that they could persuade Washington to accept it over time. They reasoned that this outcome was more likely if Australia used diplomacy to facilitate Sino-American cooperation and to develop an Australian China policy non-prejudicial to ANZUS. This article explores how this 'diplomatic formula' supported expansion of Sino-Australian relations under the Whitlam, Hawke, and Howard Governments. It explains Australia's intra-alliance influence and paradoxical foreign policy behavior and contributes to understanding the dynamics of asymmetric alliances during power transition.

There is an assumption in international relations literature that junior allies must choose between supporting a dominant global alliance partner and engaging with a rising power. Yet, Australian policy-makers have paradoxically managed to deepen Sino-Australian relations despite their bilateral alliance with the United States. They have developed a discrete China policy on the assumption that they could persuade Washington to accept it over time. They reasoned that this outcome was more likely if Australia used diplomacy to facilitate Sino-American cooperation and to develop an Australian China policy non-prejudicial to ANZUS. This article explores how this 'diplomatic formula' supported expansion of Sino-Australian relations under the Whitlam, Hawke, and Howard Governments. It explains Australia's intra-alliance influence and paradoxical foreign policy behavior and contributes to understanding the dynamics of asymmetric alliances during power transition.

The rise of the Australian welfare state -- The wage earners welfare state and the rediscovery of poverty -- The social democratic Whitlam labor government 1972-75 -- The anti-welfare backlash locally and internationally -- The decline of Keynesianism, the revival of classical liberalism and the alleged welfare state crisis -- The conservative liberal-national party coalition attempts to roll back the welfare state 1975-1983 -- Labor retreats from social democracy and adopts targeted welfare, the Hawke and Keating governments 1983-1996 -- The Australian neoliberal campaign to cut welfare : the role of think tanks, the media and corporate lobby groups -- The new convergence around conditional welfare -- Restoring self-reliance and the work ethic and saving taxpayers funds : the liberal-national party coalition's approach to social welfare 1983-2018 -- Labor accepts welfare conditionality 1996-2018 -- Rejecting the neoliberal consensus : welfare policy dissent and alternatives -- Case studies of the Australian council of social service (ACOSS) and the Australian greens -- Towards a participatory welfare model -- Conclusion -- Index

AbstractThis is an edited transcript of a talk given to the colloquium at the Whitlam Institute held on the 21st February 2018 on the topic of the title of this address. Here Linda Burney indicates the state of play in the Labor Party's response to the 'Uluru Statement from the Heart' at that time including this Party's recommendation to the Government that it establish a Joint Select Committee to enable the Commonwealth Parliament's Response. Such a committee was established: 'On 19 March 2018, the Parliament agreed that a Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples be appointed to inquire into and report on matters relating to constitutional change' (Commonwealth of Australia 2018, 2). Linda Burney is a member of the Joint Select Committee that has produced an Interim Report (July 2018), and which is co‐chaired by Senator Patrick Dodson (First Nations Caucus within the Labor Party) and Julian Leeser, a Coalition Government MP.

The Fraser government's response to the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis and the presentation, for the first time, of asylum-seekers arriving in Australia by boat is almost universally acclaimed as having been proactive, generous and humanitarian in spirit-the antithesis of both the preceding Whitlam Labor government and subsequent governments, particularly since 2001. Adopting a policy of 'forward selection' of refugees from camps in South-East Asia, the Fraser government was able to stem the flow of boats and oversaw the relatively uncontroversial resettlement of nearly 70,000 Indo-Chinese. However, the author argues that this was not the brave and principled course of action for which Fraser and his immigration ministers are regularly feted, but rather a delayed response that was motivated by fear and desperation rather than pure humanitarian intent. The celebrated outcomes of Fraser's policies belie the self-interested way in which they were constructed and neglect the fact that the government did not act until it was forced. Fraser's policies were neither a departure from the past nor the antithesis of current polices; to the contrary, they were the seeds of the contemporary Australian model of asylum. Adapted from the source document.

This article traces the history of Australian peacekeeping since its beginnings in September 1947. It shows that, while there have always been Australian peacekeepers in the field since 1947, the level of commitment in different periods has varied greatly. The article sets out to explain this phenomenon, chiefly in political terms. It argues that Australia's early involvement in the invention of peacekeeping owed much to External Affairs Minister H.V. Evatt's interest in multilateralism, but that under the subsequent conservative Menzies government a new focus on alliance politics produced mixed results in terms of peacekeeping commitments. By contrast, in the 1970s and early 1980s, for different reasons Prime Ministers Whitlam and Fraser pursued policies which raised Australia's peacekeeping profile. After a lull in the early years of the Hawke Labor government, the arrival of internationalist Gareth Evans as Foreign Minister signalled a period of intense peacekeeping activity by Australia. For different, regionally-focused reasons, Australia was again active in peacekeeping in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In recent years, however, Australia's heavy commitment to Middle East wars has reduced its peacekeeping contribution once again to a low level.