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The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European Election Study data (2004 and 2009). As the results show, economic voting was only detected in Hungary (2004 and 2009) and Slovakia (2004). The analysis indicates that, in general, almost all Prime ministers' parties bear a greater degree of economic accountability; meanwhile, perceptions of EU economic responsibility had no influence on the popularity of government parties in 2009. ; The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European ...

This article presents a review of the currently debated options for regulations of activities of private military companies (PMCs). This topic is a matter of pondering in the foreign literature. It primarily reflects on the massive use of PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan, which, however, merely illustrates the broader shortcomings resulting from the prolonged absence of clearly defined and enforceable mechanisms for the monitoring and control of the accountability, transparency and effectiveness of PMCs' activities. The goal of this article is therefore not only to present the practical, legal, economic, and political pros and cons of the possible regulation frameworks, but also to illustrate why it is still so difficult to reach a consensus on a regulation framework that would be acceptable to all the relevant actors. Adapted from the source document.

The goal of this contribution is to evaluate the relevance of the institutional factors and the influence of the single variables on the corruption. The key task is to find not only suitable indicator of the amount of corruption but also suitable approximants of institutional characteristics, else economical characteristics. The important advantage of this article is its focus also on the corruption measured by alternative ways, compared to the often used CPI. From the institutional characteristic view for the corruption fight seems to be important stable legal background. Not less important is also the government stability and its accountability. In the contradiction with the expected hypotheses claiming the strong and resistant bureaucracy to be beneficial against the corruption fight, almost all executed analysis is based on the contra productivity of the bureaucracy independency on the corruption fight. It is also important to mention that the direct and indirect taxes vary with their influence on the corruption. Adapted from the source document.

The goal of this contribution is to evaluate the relevance of the institutional factors and the influence of the single variables on the corruption. The key task is to find not only suitable indicator of the amount of corruption but also suitable approximants of institutional characteristics, else economical characteristics. The important advantage of this article is its focus also on the corruption measured by alternative ways, compared to the often used CPI. From the institutional characteristic view for the corruption fight seems to be important stable legal background. Not less important is also the government stability and its accountability. In the contradiction with the expected hypotheses claiming the strong and resistant bureaucracy to be beneficial against the corruption fight, almost all executed analysis is based on the contra productivity of the bureaucracy independency on the corruption fight. It is also important to mention that the direct and indirect taxes vary with their influence on the corruption. ; Web of Science ; 60 ; 2 ; 186 ; 167

The article is concerned with analysis of independence of central banks of the EU Member States within the framework of the ESCB, as well as independence & responsibility of the ECB, & suggests an alternative institutional embodiment of its position, reflecting the specific framework of the EMU. The system of selection of members of the ECB's Executive Board blurs a real collective responsibility towards Member States, which opens possibilities for nontransparent lobbyism. Modified system is suggested so that national banks governors have a symbolic relationship to the political representation, i.e. that they reflect a national economic policy in some way, without being bound & restricted by its formation whatsoever. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

This article offers a comprehensive analysis of the perils & benefits of peacekeeping privatization by approaching two key questions. Firstly, can private military companies (PMCs) take on peacekeeping functions consistent with the UN Charter's primary objective "to save future generations from the scourge of war?" And secondly, is peacekeeping privatization really an option for bridging the UN's peacekeeping capabilities-expectations gap? PMCs' past performances here offer no clear-cut answers for the first question. Critics have doubted their cost-effectiveness, accountability & legitimacy, while proponents have argued their cost-effectiveness, feasibility & professionalism over their UN and/or regional counterparts. On the second question, PMCs posses many capabilities necessary for peacekeeping operations that the UN often lacks. Yet the question remains how far privatization should extend, with the danger of it going too far too fast, causing PMC peacekeeping to become a substitute for, rather than an enhancement of, UN action. Adapted from the source document.