Suchergebnisse

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the results of our most recent report, which we are releasing today, on American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) contract and grant recipients that owe federal taxes. Collectively, individuals, businesses, and other entities owed the U.S. government about $330 billion in known unpaid taxes, including interest and penalties, as of September 30, 2010, according to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). IRS enforcement of the nation's tax laws continues to be on our High-Risk List. The Recovery Act appropriated $275 billion to be distributed for federal contracts, grants, and loans. According to www.Recovery.gov (Recovery.gov) data on federal spending, as of March 25, 2011, about $191 billion of that amount had been paid out. As far back as 1992, we have said that Congress should consider whether tax compliance should be a prerequisite for receiving a federal contract. Federal law does not prohibit the awarding of contracts or grants to entities because they owe federal taxes and does not permit IRS to disclose taxpayer information, including unpaid federal taxes, to federal agencies unless the taxpayer consents. Because of the potential that some Recovery Act recipients also have unpaid federal taxes you asked us to investigate this issue. This statement is based on our most recent report regarding tax delinquent federal contractors and grantees. Our report and my statement address two issues: (1) the magnitude of known tax debt owed by Recovery Act contract and grant recipients; and (2) examples of Recovery Act contract and grant recipients who have known unpaid federal taxes. To determine, to the extent possible, the magnitude of known tax debt owed by Recovery Act contract and grant recipients, we identified contract and grant recipients from Recovery.gov and compared them to known tax debts as of September 30, 2009, from IRS."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in institutionalizing operational contract support throughout the department. The institutionalization of operational contract support includes planning for the use of contractors, training of military personnel on the use of contractor support, accurately tracking contractor use, and establishing measures to ensure that contractors are accountable. For decades, DOD has relied on contractors to support contingency operations and has long considered them a part of the total force. For example, in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review the department reiterated that contractors were part of a total force that includes active and reserve military components, civilians and contractors. Additionally, in 2008 the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness testified that the structure of the U.S. military had been adapted to an environment in which contractors were an important part of the force. Further, an Army commission chaired by Dr. Jacques Gansler acknowledged that contractors were a significant part of the military's total force. While DOD joint guidance recognizes contractors as part of its total workforce, we have previously reported that DOD has not yet developed a strategy for determining the appropriate mix of contractor and government personnel. In addition, we recently testified that several long-standing challenges have hindered DOD's ability to manage and oversee contractors at deployed locations. For example, DOD has not followed long-standing planning guidance, ensured that there is an adequate number of contract oversight and management personnel, and comprehensively trained non-acquisition personnel, such as military commanders. Since 1992, we have designated DOD contract management as a high-risk area, in part due to concerns over the adequacy of the department's acquisition and contract oversight workforce. As we have previously testified, many of the long-standing problems we have identified regarding managing and overseeing contractor support to deployed forces stem from DOD's reluctance to plan for contractors as an integral part of the total force. We have also testified that DOD's long-standing problems in managing and overseeing contractors at deployed locations make it difficult for the department to ensure that it is getting the services it needs on time and at a fair and reasonable price. We have found numerous instances where poor oversight and management of contractors have led to negative monetary and operational outcomes. As a result, since the advent of our work on contractor support to deployed forces in 1997, we have made numerous recommendations to improve DOD's management of contractors in deployed locations. While DOD has taken some actions to address these challenges, it has not addressed all of them, as I will discuss in further detail. statement today will focus on the extent to which DOD has institutionalized operational contract support. This statement is based on recently published reports and testimonies that examined planning for operational contract support and the department's efforts to manage and oversee contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as our ongoing work involving operational contract support related issues in Iraq and Afghanistan."

Other written product issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This publication is superceded by GAO-11-646SP, Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships, May 2011. Both the executive branch and congressional committees need evaluative information to help them make decisions about the programs they oversee--information that tells them whether, and in what important ways, a program is working well or poorly, and why. In enacting the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), Congress expressed frustration that executive branch and congressional decisionmaking was often hampered by the lack of good information on the results of federal program efforts. Seeking to promote improved federal management and the increased efficiency and effectiveness of federal programs, GPRA instituted a governmentwide requirement for agencies to set goals and report annually on program performance. Many analytic approaches have been employed over the years by the agencies and others to assess the operations and results of federal programs, policies, activities, and organizations. Periodically, individual evaluation studies are designed to answer specific questions about how well a program is working, and thus such studies may take several forms. GPRA explicitly recognizes and encourages a complementary role for these types of program assessment: annual performance reports are to include both performance measurement results and program evaluation findings. Both performance measures and program evaluation play key roles in the Program Assessment Rating Tool that the Office of Management and Budget introduced in 2002 to examine federal programs in the budget formulation process. This glossary describes and explains the relationship between two common types of systematic program assessments: performance measures and program evaluations. It is based on GAO publications and program evaluation literature and was first prepared in 1998."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Veterinarians play an essential role in the defense against animal diseases, some of which can have serious repercussions for the health of animals, humans, and the economy. More than half of the federal veterinarians work in the Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Health and Human Services (HHS). However, there is a growing national shortage of veterinarians. This testimony focuses primarily on two key points as addressed in GAO's recently released report, Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health (GAO-09-178, February 4, 2009). First, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has not conducted a governmentwide effort to address current and future shortages of federal veterinarians; and, second, USDA and HHS have not assessed the sufficiency of their veterinarian workforces departmentwide. For the report, GAO, among other things, surveyed 24 federal component agencies about their veterinarian workforces. GAO also determined the extent to which the departments that employ about 96 percent of federal veterinarians, including USDA and HHS, have assessed the sufficiency of their veterinarian workforce. In addition, GAO interviewed officials of OPM to identify any initiatives it has conducted to address the sufficiency of the federal veterinarian workforce."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The South Florida ecosystem covers about 18,000 square miles, and is home to the Everglades, one of the world's unique environmental resources. Historic efforts to redirect the flow of water through the ecosystem have jeopardized its health and reduced the Everglades to about half of its original size. In 1993, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's World Heritage Committee (WHC) added Everglades National Park (Park) to its List of World Heritage in Danger sites. In 2000, a strategy to restore the ecosystem was set; the effort was expected to take at least 40 years and cost $15.4 billion. It comprises 222 projects, including 60 key projects known as the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), to be undertaken by a multiagency partnership. This testimony is based on GAO's May 2007 report, South Florida Ecosystem: Restoration Is Moving Forward, but Is Facing Significant Delays, Implementation Challenges, and Rising Costs, and a review of WHC decision documents relating to the Park's listing. This statement addresses the (1) status of projects implemented (2) status of projects key to improving the health of the Park, (3) project sequencing factors, and (4) funding provided for the effort and extent to which costs have increased."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since the 1980s, the V-22, developed to transport combat troops, supplies, and equipment for the U.S. Marine Corps and to support other services' operations, has experienced several fatal crashes, demonstrated various deficiencies, and faced virtual cancellation--much of which it has overcome. Although recently deployed in Iraq and regarded favorably, it has not performed the full range of missions anticipated, and how well it can do so is in question. Given concerns about the V-22 program, GAO recently reviewed and on May 11, 2009, reported on MV-22 operations in Iraq; strengths and deficiencies in terms of the capabilities expected of the V-22; and past, current, and future costs. In that report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense require (1) a new alternatives analysis of the V-22 and (2) that the Marine Corps develop a prioritized strategy to improve system suitability, reduce operational costs, and align future budget requests. The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the second recommendation, but not the first. GAO believes both recommendations remain valid. This testimony highlights GAO's findings from that report. In speaking of the V-22, we are actually speaking of two variants of the same aircraft. The MV-22 is used by the Marine Corps; and the CV-22 by the Air Force to support special operations. This statement largely focuses on the MV-22, but also refers to the V-22 and CV-22."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in our national defenses against such threats. DHS has sponsored R&D and testing activities to develop a "next generation" portal monitor, known as the advanced spectroscopic portal monitor. However, each one costs 6 times more than a current portal monitor. In March 2006, we recommended that DHS conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the new portal monitors are worth the additional cost. In June 2006, DHS issued its analysis. In October 2006, we issued our report that assessed the DHS study. GAO's statement, based on our October 2006 report, addresses whether DHS's cost-benefit analysis provides an adequate basis for its decision to purchase and deploy the next generation portal monitors."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Advances in technology have led to rapidly increasing sales of new electronic devices, particularly televisions, computers, and computer monitors. With this increase comes the dilemma of how to manage these products when they come to the end of their useful lives. Concerns have been increasingly expressed that while millions of existing computers become obsolete each year, only a fraction of them are being recycled. Some have alleged that the disposal of used electronics causes a number of environmental problems. They note, for example, that toxic substances such as lead can leach from used electronics. They have also noted that computers and other electronic equipment contain precious metals that require substantial amounts of energy and land to extract. These metals, they say, can often be extracted with less environmental impact from used electronics than from the environment. In this testimony, GAO summarizes existing information on the amounts of, and problems associated with, used electronics. GAO also examines the factors affecting the nation's ability to recycle and reuse electronics when such products have reached the end of their useful lives. This testimony discusses preliminary results of GAO's work. GAO will report in full at a later date."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In 1936, the Social Security Administration established the Social Security number (SSN) to track worker's earnings for Social Security benefit purposes. Despite its narrowly intended purpose, the SSN is now used for a myriad of non-Social Security purposes. Today, SSNs are used, in part, as identity verification tools for services such as child support collections, law enforcement enhancements, and issuing credit to individuals. Although these uses can be beneficial to the public, the SSN is now a key piece of information in creating false identities. The aggregation of personal information, such as SSNs, in large corporate databases and the increased availability of information via the Internet may provide criminals the opportunities to commit identity theft. Although Congress and the states have enacted a number of laws to protect consumers' privacy, the public and private sectors' continued use of and reliance on SSNs, and the potential for misuse, underscore the importance of strengthening protections where possible. Accordingly, this testimony focuses on describing (1) the public use of SSNs, (2) the use of SSNs by certain private sector entities, and (3) certain federal and state laws regulating the use of SSNs and identity theft."

Other written product issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This document is a companion product to GAO-04-916. This document presents the results of GAO's surveys of local food stamp office supervisors. The purpose of the surveys was to determine the views of local food stamp supervisors on whether implementation of the options had achieved expected results. We developed eight surveys, one for each of the Farm Bill options, to obtain this information. We mailed out a total of 1,328 surveys to eight random samples of local food stamp office supervisors. Each of the eight samples comprised local food stamp offices in states that had implemented that option. The response rates varied between 74.0 percent and 86.1 percent. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology and a discussion of the summary of selected survey results are contained in our report entitled Food Stamp Program: Farm Bill Options Ease Administrative Burden, but Opportunities Exist to Streamline Participant Reporting Rules among Programs (GAO-04-916, Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2004). While this e-supplement contains information on the results from local food stamp offices, another e-supplement (GAO-04-1058SP) contains information on the results from our survey of food stamp administrators. We conducted our survey work between December 2003 and April 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards."

Award date: 18 November 2020 ; Supervisor : Professor Deirdre Curtin (European University Insitute) ; This thesis explores the way the development of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has been funded and assess whether the funding strategy adopted complies with established principles of financial accountability. Starting from a notion of financial accountability as a duty to report expenditure in a measurable, transparent and coherent way, relevant budget lines contributing to the development of the system will be singled out in order to assess whether they have been implemented in accordance with those criteria. While the funding strategy initially relied on a multi-level system of financial governance involving the EU, the Member States and the executive agency Frontex, EUROSUR funds were then channelled into three main funding streams belonging to different policy areas of the EU: research and development, border management and humanitarian aid to developing countries. An integrated analysis of these financial instruments shows that the overall EUROSUR funding policy infringes principles to be respected to give account of expenditure, because of original accountability gaps affecting the launch of the EUROSUR project. Nevertheless, this deficit has been reduced over time. Chances are that in the next multiannual financial framework, running for the period 2021-2027 compliance will be improved in the field of external border management, with a more efficient use of available resources.

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's (FinCEN) primary function is to support and strengthen domestic and international anti-money laundering efforts through coordination and partnerships. Since its creation in 1990, FinCEN has been responsible for overseeing the management, processing, storage and dissemination of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) data. In 2004, FinCEN embarked on a major initiative intended to improve the sharing of information reported under the Bank Secrecy Act. BSA Direct is an umbrella project intended to provide secure, user-friendly, web-based tools for accessing, analyzing, and filing BSA data. It is part of a broad effort to reengineer data management responsibilities and transition them from the IRS. During the early spring of 2006, it became clear to FinCEN that the Retrieval and Sharing component of the BSA Direct project (BSA Direct R&S) was not going to meet the critical implementation deadline of June 30, 2006. Because FinCEN has experienced problems with development and implementation of the BSA Direct R&S, Congress asked us about the project's current status and to provide observations on FinCEN's IT investment management practices. Our objectives were to (1) describe BSA Direct R&S and the project's current status; (2) examine FinCEN's application of information technology (IT) investment management processes to the BSA Direct R&S project; and (3) describe, at a high level, the range of options FinCEN may consider as it reexamines the BSA Direct R&S project."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses our work on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which Congress established on October 3, 2008, in response to the financial crisis that threatened the stability of the U.S. financial system and the solvency of many financial institutions. Under the original TARP legislation, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) had the authority to purchase or insure $700 billion in troubled assets held by financial institutions. The Secretary of the Treasury extended the authority originally provided under EESA through October 3, 2010. However, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)--signed into law on July 21, 2010--set a new spending ceiling for TARP, in effect prohibiting Treasury from incurring any additional obligations for programs that had not been initiated prior to June 25, 2010. A broad range of activities have been initiated under TARP. Specific initiatives have injected capital into key financial institutions; implemented programs to address problems in the securitization markets; provided assistance to the automobile industry and American International Group, Inc. (AIG); and offered incentives for modifying residential mortgages, among other things. As TARP passes the 30-month mark, U.S. financial markets appear to be less volatile than they were in 2008. But questions about a sustained economic recovery continue, and certain areas of the economy still face significant challenges. For example, foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies continue to linger and small businesses still face tight credit conditions. As a result, TARP has been transformed into a program that focuses primarily on preserving homeownership and improving financial conditions for small financial institutions and businesses. While many other programs have ended and begun winding down operations and some participating institutions have repaid part or all of their TARP funds, the prospect of repayment from some other institutions, both large and small, remains uncertain. This statement is primarily based on our January 12, 2011, report and focuses on (1) the status of TARP programs; (2) Treasury's progress in implementing an effective management structure for TARP, including staffing the Office of Financial Stability (OFS), overseeing contractors, and establishing a comprehensive system of internal controls; and (3) trends in key relevant economic indicators."