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Seen from the perspective of the inconsistency of the Other, the post-truth era can be considered to be an era emerging from a crisis in belief in the existence of the Other, which is to be taken in a twofold sense: as a belief in the Other of the Other, that is, the Other of Law, and a belief in the Other considered as the subject supposed to know. Insofar as the contemporary subject does not want to know anything about this "condition of belief" without which no knowledge, and therefore no truth, are possible, the crisis of belief affect both, the Other and the subject. This can be seen in the fact that the failing belief in the Other and knowledge, considered as a distinctive feature of our profoundly unbelieving times, is accompanied by an unprecedented rise in anxiety at the social level, as contemporary subjects who do not believe in the (existence of the) Other are singularly defenceless before the irruption of the real. With truth losing its power to name the real, the subject itself as a singular response to the real is becoming ever more precarious. Which is why, when faced with the erratic irruption of the real, contemporary subjects are condemned to a desperate search for certainties.

What is the peculiar evocative force of the notion of the real? Rather than succumbing to the temptation of forcing appearance in order to accede to the real supposed to be lurking behind it, for Lacanian psychoanalysis the access to the real is that of the semblance. While one of our aims in this paper is to briefly outline the development of Lacan's rather peculiar "realism", we would also wish to emphasize the relation between the real and the semblance as being the crux of Lacan's later teaching. Indeed, for psychoanalysis, the question of the real is inseparable from the interrogation of the semblance, a term forged by Lacan in the last period of his teaching in order to rework the relation between the truth and the real. This is why although the semblance is relevant to numerous contemporary discourses, it is only in psychoanalysis that this problem is raised to the level of one of the central theoretical and practical issues. Omnipresent, unsettling, yet unresolved, this problem comes to the fore at the critical moments in the history of psychoanalysis, thereby marking turning points at which the orientation of psychoanalysis is at stake.

The paper attempts to give an account of two different ways of relating to mathematics: Lacan's and Badiou's. Its starting point is Badiou's and Lacan's interpretations of Russell's infamous definition of mathematics, according to which mathematics is a discourse in which no one knows what one is talking about, nor whether what one is saying is true. While for Badiou, the ignorance that is supposed to characterise mathematics according to Russell only concerns the role philosophy assigns to it, namely, it being identified with the science of being qua being, for Lacan the ignorance constitutive of mathematics should rather be seen as a symptom resulting from the reduction of truth to a mere truth value. In discussing the detected divergences in these two readings, the paper shows how the access to psychoanalysis as well as the access to philosophy coincides with a certain access to mathematics, although we are not dealing with the same type of access.

One of the lessons to be drawn from Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents is undoubtedly that jouissance – because it implies pain and suffering – is something harmful to the subject. However, this inherent cruelty of jouissance becomes a problem for modern moral and political philosophy with Sade, for whom the right to jouissance is a fundamental human rights and as such universal. While Sade's universal right to jouissance is inconceivable outside the horizon of human rights discourse, the only space in which universal rights can arise, it represents the ultimate limit of this discourse precisely to the extent that the despotism of the passions, which Sade advocates, promotes the rights, not of man, but of jouissance. But can there be something like an ethics of jouissance and, consequently, a politics of jouissance at all if ethics and politics are founded on a relationship with the Other, whereas jouissance, being solipsistic, autistic in nature, problematises the very status of the Other? And conversely, if Sade's project of emancipation aims at the realisation of the tyranny of jouissance precisely at the level of the socius, then one might ask: What is the social bond that is founded on something which appears to be incompatible with it? To answer these questions, this article examines the radical nature of Sade's despotism of passions as a reinvention of the social bond that consists in bringing together two incompatible instances: freedom and jouissance. ; Eden od naukov Freudovega Nelagodja v kulturi je, da je užitek, ker prinaša bolečino in trpljenje, nekaj škodljivega za subjekta. Toda ta inherentna krutost užitka postane problem za moderno moralno in politično filozofijo s Sadom, za katerega je pravica do užitka ena temeljnih človekovih pravic in kot taka univerzalna. Če je Sadova univerzalna pravica do užitka nepojmljiva zunaj okvira diskurza o človekovih pravicah, znotraj katerega je univerzalna pravica sploh mogoča, pa sadovska pravica do užitka pomeni mejo tega diskurza v tisti meri, v kateri Sadov despotizem strasti ne zagovarja pravic človeka, marveč pravice užitka. Toda ali sploh lahko obstaja nekaj takega kot etika in, posledično, politika užitka, če sta etika in politika utemeljeni na razmerju do Drugega, užitek, ki je po definiciji solipsističen, avtističen, pa status Drugega ravno problematizira? In narobe, če Sadov emancipatorni projekt meri na uresničenje tiranije užitka prav na ravni družbe, potem bi se lahko vprašali, kakšna je družbena vez, ki je utemeljena na užitku, ki se zdi nezdružljiv z njo? Zato da bi odgovoril na ti vprašanji, pričujoči članek analizira radikalno naravo Sadovega despotizma strasti kot reinvencijo družbene vezi, ki med seboj poveže dve nekompatibilni instanci: svobodo in užitek.

In critical border studies Europe is often compared to a border-zone, border-land, border-space or even-border-scape. This article sets out from Balibar's concepts of heterogeneity and ubiquity of borders today in order to explore Europe as a borderland, i.e. a zone of transition and mobility without territorial fixity. Lacan's concept of "lituraterre" helps us to consider the making and unmaking Europian borders through the erratic movements of migrants. ; Kritične mejne študije Evropo pogosto primerjajo z mejnim območjem, mejnim ozemljem, mejnim prostorom ali celo mejno pokrajno. Pripujoči članek izhaja iz Balibarjevih konceptov heterogenosti in vsepričujočnost mej danes, da bi raziskala Evropo kot mejno območje, to je, kot območje prehodov in mobilnosti, ki ne pozna ozemeljske fiksnosti. Lacanov koncept »lituraterre« omogoča misliti nastajanje in odpravljanje evropskih meja s pomočjo eratičnih gibanj migratov.

Confronted by the hegemonic nominalist discourse characterised by its privileging of the multiple over the One and difference and/or otherness over the same, the paper sets out from the assumption that the subversive gesture today consists in rehabilitating these two discredited philosophical notions: the One and the Same. This essay aims at contributing towards an understanding of this thorny issue, and in particular at looking at the political and theoretical impasses associated with the production of the universal in an infinite universe, a universe without a beyond. By teasing out the gist of the conceptualisations of the One and the Same, provided respectively by Lacan and Badiou, the paper argues that the contemporary politics of emancipation can fully deploy itself in the domain of the inconsistent, non-totalisable real of the social only by starting with an axiom that equates the One and the "for all". By developing what the author propose to call the aleph of emancipation, contemporary theorisation of emancipation can reply to the persistent misunderstanding of the status of the universal in the not-all universe by some of the most perspicacious theorist, such as J.-C. Milner, F. Regnault, and G. Agamben. ; Soočeni s hegemonističnim nominalističnim diskurzom, ki daje primat mnoštvu pred Enim in razliki oziroma drugosti pred Istim, pričujoči članek izhaja iz predpostavke, da je subverzivna gesta danes tista, ki si prizadeva rehabilitirati ta dva, danes diskreditirana filozofska pojma. Članek si prizadeva prispevati k razumevanju tega kompleksnega problema, predvsem pa analizirati politične in teoretske zagate, ki izvirajo iz poskusov proizvesti univerzalno v neskončenm univerzumu, ki ne pozna ne meje ne zunaja. Omejujoč se na jedro konceptualizacije Enega Istega, kot ga je mogoče razbrati pri Lacanu in Badiouju, članek zagovarja tezo, da je sodobna emancipatorna politika mogoča edino, če izhaja iz aksioma, ki enači Eno in »za vse«. Izpeljujoč implikacije tega, kar avtorica poimenuje »alef emancipacije«, članek pokaže, da lahko sodobno teoriziranje emancipacije preseže zagate in pasti, ki izhajajo iz nerazumevanja statusa univerzalnega v ne-vsem univerzumu, nerazumevanja, kot ga je mogoče zaslediti pri nekaterih najprodornejših sodobnih mislecih, kot so J.-C. Milner, F. Regnault in G. Agamben.

Der Beitrag befaßt sich mit der modernen und postmodernen Auffassung des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Recht bzw. dem Gesetz und der Gerechtigkeit. Dabei werden zuerst zwei Modelle analysiert: einerseits das von Habermas und Rawls, andererseits das von Lyotard. Im zweiten Schritt wird dann am Beispiel des westlichen Verhaltens im bosnischen Krieg die Unzulänglichkeit beider Modelle dargelegt. ; Prispevek obravnava modernistično in postmodernistično pojmovanje razmerja med zakonom (pravom) in pravičnostjo. Pri tem izpostavi predvsem dva modela: haberma-sovsko-rawlsovski na eni strani in lyotardovski na drugi. Na primeru zahodnjaškega obravnavanja vojne v Bosni pokaže nezadostnost obeh modelov.

In her paper »On the In-ex-sistence of the Critique of Political Reason«, the author focuses on various ways in which the absence of the »Fourth Critique« takes shape in Kant's later writings dealing with the constitution of the state. In this context, the author takes issue with H. Arendt in her attempts to reconstruct Kant's missing political philosophy. Contrary to H. Arendt's interpretation and Kant's own understanding of his later writings, the author shows limits of theoretical discourse (de)forms event of his time, the French Revolution. ; Avtorica raziskuje različne načine, na katere se odsotnost «četrte kritike« kaže v Kantovih poznih spisih, v katerih se ukvarja s konstitucijo države. V tem kontekstu avtorica izhaja iz poskusa H. Arendt, da bi rekonstruirala manjkajočo Kantovo politično filozofijo. V nasprotju z njeno interpretacijo in Kantovim lastnim razumevanjem njegovih poznih spisov avtorica pokaže, na kakšen način Kantovo dojemanje mej teoretičnega diskurza (de)formira njegovo oceno glavnega političnega dogodka njegovega časa - Francoske revolucije.

Comme le signale son titre, l'enjeu de cette étude, qui porte sur la pensée politique de Claude Lefort, est de mettre en valeur ce que nous discernons comme paradoxe inhérent de la démocratie : la mise en œuvre de ce qui ne se dit pas et qui, de ce fait même, ne se laisse pas compter. ; Kot napoveduje že naslov članka, si pričujoči prispevek, ki analizira politično misel Clauda Leforta, prizadeva izpostaviti tisto, kar smo izločili kot notranje protislovje demokracije: aktualizacijo nečesa, česar ni mogoče reči in česar prav zato tudi ni mogoče šteti.

In this essay the author takes issue with postmodernist and/or poststructuralist theory of resistance. In the course of discussing what the author calls "the impasses of the way out", she devides her analysis into two parts: one devoted to an exposition of the collapse of the emancipationist paradigm and to the impasses of the "way out" generally, and one devoted to the conception of the subject attuned to resistance. As a consequence of this discussion, the author argues that the pre-eminence of resistance, advocated by the postmodernists and/or poststructuralists, has serious implications for our understanding of the way out in the present constellation, but also for contemporary thought itself. In the course of tracing the experience of post-emancipationsit thought in its attempt to deal with the impasses of the "way out", the author shows how postmodernist thought, by declaring that "the intractable" has fallen silent in the present social and political struggles, has largely contributed to the depoliticisation that has come increasingly to characterise our daily lives. Second, it has been shown how postmodernist and/or poststructuralist thought, in its desire to yield hole of a "way out", turned out to be one of the most insidious ways of surrendering to the "growing impasses of capitalism". ; In this essay the author takes issue with postmodernist and/or poststructuralist theory of resistance. In the course of discussing what the author calls "the impasses of the way out", she devides her analysis into two parts: one devoted to an exposition of the collapse of the emancipationist paradigm and to the impasses of the "way out" generally, and one devoted to the conception of the subject attuned to resistance. As a consequence of this discussion, the author argues that the pre-eminence of resistance, advocated by the postmodernists and/or poststructuralists, has serious implications for our understanding of the way out in the present constellation, but also for contemporary thought itself. In the course of tracing the experience of post-emancipationsit thought in its attempt to deal with the impasses of the "way out", the author shows how postmodernist thought, by declaring that "the intractable" has fallen silent in the present social and political struggles, has largely contributed to the depoliticisation that has come increasingly to characterise our daily lives. Second, it has been shown how postmodernist and/or poststructuralist thought, in its desire to yield hole of a "way out", turned out to be one of the most insidious ways of surrendering to the "growing impasses of capitalism".

In this essay I propose to explore the status of the not all in politics and psychoanalysis by analyzing and bringing into question the seemingly self-evident relationship of the mutual exclusion between politics and psychoanalysis. I would argue that in order to expose an affinity in dealing with the 'not all' in politics and psychoanalysis, it is necessary to move beyond the traditionally hostile polarities of the singular and the universal and to reverse the usual perspective according to which there is no passage between the domain of the singular and the domain of the universal. I then move on to considering the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics from the point of view of the community 'for all' constituted through a complex practice of disidentification and the production of the 'whatever' singularities.

Traditionally, emancipatory politics is a question of knowing which parts of society are capable of counting for something, and which ones are not. Formulating the question of emancipatory politics in terms of existence, more specifically, in terms of "political subjects who are not social groups but rather forms of inscriptions of the count of the uncounted" (Rancière), means acknowledging that the proper place for emancipatory politics is the very terrain in which the system of domination operates, a system that radical political theorists characterize as a system of placement, identification, or counting. At present, however, this question of counting the uncountable, crucial for emancipatory politics, cannot be raised at all to the extent that globalization means that everybody is always already included, the exclusion of the uncounted is necessarily obscured, indeed, it has become invisible. Beginning with a discussion on an enigmatic remark: "the infinitization of the value of the subject", taken from Lacan's Seminar The Four Fundamental concepts of Psycho-analysis, this paper examines a conceptual shift in the articulation of the relation between the subject and the figures of the Other in an epoch of the Other which does not exist. Taking as her point of departure Lacan's theory of the cut, the author shows how, in an era of the "generalized metonymization", only an act constitutes a way out of a discourse that knows no closure.