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Although jihadist organizations continue to attract large numbers of people in their wake, particularly from Europe, their recruitment capacity should not mask the difficulties they are currently encountering. In the face of the military setbacks suffered by Caliph al-Baghdadi's organization, experts have noted not only a decline in departures to areas controlled by the Islamic State, but also difficulties in keeping members within the organization. Many of its supporters have decided to desert, abandoning the armed struggle. This phenomenon is confirmed by a King's College study led by Peter Neumann, which claims that between 20% and 30% of jihadists decide to return to their country of origin. This report is based on the testimony of 58 "deserters" from the Islamic State, including nine from Western Europe and Australia, who have publicly recounted their reasons for leaving. In France, according to a report by the Criminal Affairs Directorate, more than 200 individuals have returned from Syria and Iraq. This phenomenon of jihadist defection is not new. It was already observed in the 1970s-1990s among armed Islamic groups in Algeria (GIA, Armée islamique du Salut, Groupe salafiste de prédication et de combat) , Morocco (Shabiba islâmiyya) , or Egypt (Islamic jihad and Gamâ'a islâmiyya) , for example.

Abstract
In order to struggle against the growing influence in the Arab world of the secular nationalism promoted in Egypt by President Nasser, Saudi Arabia decided in the '60s to appear as a center of religious and ideological influence. The cornerstone of the hegemonic politics of Saudi Arabia for the world leadership of Islam was the creation, in 1962, of the Muslim World League. This organization was in charge of financing projects related to the development of Islam in the world. It is probably in Europe that the proselyte activities of the League are the most important. If the League holds a predominant position in the soft power politics of the Saudi kingdom, its mission is also to struggle against ideologies that are likely to threaten the stability of the regime. It funds projects of mosques construction, distributes Korans and brochures, organizes Islamic classes and conferences, hoping to create networks of clientele and of non-critical allegiances to the Saudi kingdom in the Muslim populations. The League advocates a heterogeneous salafism, which indeed resembles, at least on a dogmatic level, the salafism advocated by theologists of Saudi Arabia but dissociates itself from it on a social and a political level. Confronted to the multiplication of international risks (the Iraq War, al-Qaeda, Saudi jihadists . . .), the League takes part in a vast institutional ensemble "of protection of the Saudi throne," like the Dar al Ifta, Council of the Saudi ulamas, which pledges allegiance to the authority and fight against anti-establishment Islamism and Islamic terrorism with its different fatwas.

In order to struggle against the growing influence in the Arab world of the secular nationalism promoted in Egypt by President Nasser, Saudi Arabia decided in the '60s to appear as a center of religious and ideological influence. The cornerstone of the hegemonic politics of Saudi Arabia for the world leadership of Islam was the creation, in 1962, of the Muslim World League. This organization was in charge of financing projects related to the development of Islam in the world. It is probably in Europe that the proselyte activities of the League are the most important. If the League holds a predominant position in the soft power politics of the Saudi kingdom, its mission is also to struggle against ideologies that are likely to threaten the stability of the regime. It funds projects of mosques construction, distributes Korans and brochures, organizes Islamic classes and conferences, hoping to create networks of clientele and of non-critical allegiances to the Saudi kingdom in the Muslim populations. The League advocates a heterogeneous salafism, which indeed resembles, at least on a dogmatic level, the salafism advocated by theologists of Saudi Arabia but dissociates itself from it on a social and a political level. Confronted to the multiplication of international risks (the Iraq War, al-Qaeda, Saudi jihadists...), the League takes part in a vast institutional ensemble "of protection of the Saudi throne," like the Dar al Ifta, Council of the Saudi ulamas, which pledges allegiance to the authority and fight against anti-establishment Islamism and Islamic terrorism with its different fatwas. Adapted from the source document.

Resumé Le port du voile intégral peut être le signe d'une quête identitaire de la part de féministes musulmanes en France. Mais le salafisme qui le prône se situe dans une position purement religieuse.

Phénomène marginal, mais croissant le niqâb est pour certains une prescription religieuse. Les salafistes, groupe sectaire plus que communautaire, appellent à rejeter le modèle occidental, et prônent le port du niqâb. Mais, pour certaines femmes le voile est un moyen d'affirmer une identité, une fierté, le signe patent d'un intériorisation de leur religion.

Les Frères musulmans, groupe islamiste le plus important du monde arabe, sont largement présents en Europe. Leur mouvance comprend plusieurs types d'organisation, des plus autonomes aux plus orthodoxes. En choisissant de jouer, en particulier en France, la carte de l'insertion dans la société politique locale et nationale, les Frères connaissent désormais une certaine normalisation, qui se traduit par une crise de leurs énoncés idéologiques et de leur force militante. politique étrangère