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Die vorliegende Dissertation analysiert die politische Ökonomie und die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Klimapolitik. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass die Ausgestaltung marktbasierter Instrumente des Klimaschutzes durch das Verhalten von politischen Entscheidungsträgern begründet werden kann, die ihre politische Unterstützung maximieren. So kann die Berücksichtigung von Präferenzen sektoraler Interessengruppen in klimapolitischen Entscheidungen ökonomische Ineffizienzen verursachen, die sich etwa in einer sektoralen Differenzierung von Umweltsteuern oder einer asymmetrischen Ausstattung von Teilbereichen der Volkswirtschaft mit handelbaren Emissionsrechten äußern. Die Dissertation zeigt ferner, dass der ökonomische Nutzen einer internationalen Verknüpfung von Emissionshandelssystemen von deren sektoraler Abdeckung sowie der Stringenz der Zuteilung von Emissionsrechten abhängt. Die Ermöglichung regional flexibler Emissionsreduktionen, etwa durch den Zugang zu Vermeidungsoptionen in Entwicklungsländern, verbessert zudem die Aussichten für eine kosteneffiziente und ambitionierte zukünftige Klimapolitik substantiell.

This paper assesses the economic impacts of linking the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) to emerging schemes beyond Europe, in the presence of a post-Kyoto agreement in 2020. Simulations with a numerical multi-country model of the world carbon market show that linking the European ETS induces only marginal economic benefits: As trading is restricted to energy-intensive industries that are assigned generous initial emissions, the major compliance burden is carried by non-trading industries excluded from the linked ETS. In the presence of parallel government trading under a post-Kyoto Protocol, excluded sectors can however be substantially compensated by international trading at the country level, thus increasing the political attractiveness of the linking process. From an efficiency perspective, a desirable future climate policy regime represents a joint trading system that enables international emission trading between ETS companies and governments. While the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) cannot alleviate the inefficiencies of linked ETS, in a parallel or joint trading regime the access to abatement options of developing countries induces large additional cost savings. Restricting CDM access via a supplementarity criterion does not significantly decrease the economic benefits from project-based emission crediting.

Given the coexistent EU priorities concerning the competitiveness of European industries and international emissions regulation at the company level, this paper assesses the efficiency and competitiveness implications of linking the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to emerging trading schemes outside Europe. Currently, countries like Canada, Japan or Australia are contemplating the set up of domestic ETS with the intention of linking up to the European scheme. While a stylized partial-market analysis suggests that the integration of trading systems is always beneficial in efficiency terms, our applied general equilibrium approach shows that the aggregate welfare impacts of linking the EU ETS are rather limited. We further find that the trade-based competitiveness effects of linking the European ETS crucially depend on the linked trading system: Although EU economy-wide competitiveness varies only moderately across linking scenarios, the sectoral decomposition of these aggregate effects shows that European industries are much more sensitive to the linking constellation. Similarly, the incentives for non-EU regions to join the European system display considerable heterogeneity. A stricter allowance allocation within domestic ETS can, however, substantially improve the overall prospects for establishing supra-European emissions trading schemes.

AbstractReducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) has been proposed as an economic and extensive source of emission abatement to supplement other long-term climate policies. However, critics suggest an excess supply of REDD credits may disrupt emerging carbon markets and raise north–south equity concerns. In this context, we investigate the economic implications of REDD regulations and future emissions reduction commitments. Numerical model simulations show that unrestricted exchange of REDD units reduces the international carbon price by half and cuts compliance costs by roughly one-third. Developed nations' requirements for policy supplementarity, which restrict demand for REDD credits, reduce such price impacts but go at the expense of both economic efficiency and benefits to rainforest areas. Instead, unlimited REDD access facilitates climate policy targets to be tightened by almost a quarter at constant compliance cost, tripling the environmental ambition of the Kyoto Protocol and providing considerable wealth transfers to developing countries.

Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) has been proposed as a potentially inexpensive and plentiful source of emission abatement to supplement other longterm climate policies. However, critics doubt that REDD credits are environmentally equivalent to domestic emission reductions, and suggest an excess supply may disrupt carbon markets. In this context, we investigate the economic implications of emissions market regulations and future emissions reduction commitments, as well as uncertainties in REDD credit supply. Numerical simulations with a multi-country equilibrium model of the global emissions market show unrestricted exchange of REDD units reduces the international carbon price by half and cuts Annex I compliance costs by roughly one third. Restricting supply or demand of REDD credits reduces price impacts, but comes at the cost of economic efficiency. Alternatively, Annex I reduction commitments could be increased by almost two thirds at constant carbon prices. While REDD provides large economic benefits for tropical rainforest regions, any REDD policy scenario also reduces wealth transfers to traditional CDM host countries through increased competition on the supply-side of the carbon market.

This paper presents a political-economy analysis of allowance allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). A common-agency model suggests that a politicalsupport maximizing government considers the preferences of sectoral interest groups besides public interest when allocating emissions permits. In the stylized model, industries represented by more powerful lobby groups face a lower regulatory burden, which for sufficiently high lobbying power leads to an inefficient emissions regulation. An empirical analysis of the first trading phase of the EU ETS corroborates our theoretical prediction for a cross-section of German firms, but also shows that the political-economy determinants of permit allocation depend on firm characteristics. We find that large carbon emitters that were heavily exposed to emissions regulation and simultaneously represented by powerful interest groups received higher levels of emissions allowances. In contrast, industrial lobbying power stand-alone or threats of potential worker layoffs did not exert a significant influence on the EU ETS allocation process.

In this paper we study political-economy determinants of the differentiation of environmental taxes between sectors. Using a common-agency model, we provide predictions on tax differentiation which are then tested using data from the German Ecological Tax Reform. As the reform is revenue neutral and reduces labor costs, tax differentiation is not only determined by the activity of lobby groups favoring reduced tax rates, but also by the groups? interest in revenue rebates to labor. Empirical data underpin our theoretical findings: A regression analysis of Germany?s green tax reform explains environmental tax differentiation by the presence of sectoral interest groups. Besides market concentration and energy demand elasticities, the exposure of industries to international trade flows plays an important role in the environmental tax design.