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How Social Security has shaped American politics—and why it faces insolvencySince its establishment, Social Security has become the financial linchpin of American retirement. Yet demographic trends—longer lifespans and declining birthrates—mean that this popular program now pays more in benefits than it collects in revenue. Without reforms, 83 million Americans will face an immediate benefit cut of 20 percent in 2034. How did we get here and what is the solution? In Fixing Social Security, R. Douglas Arnold explores the historical role that Social Security has played in American politics, why Congress has done nothing to fix its insolvency problem for three decades, and what legislators can do to save it.What options do legislators have as the program nears the precipice? They can raise taxes, as they did in 1977, cut benefits, as they did in 1983, or reinvent the program, as they attempted in 2005. Unfortunately, every option would impose costs, and legislators are reluctant to act, fearing electoral retribution. Arnold investigates why politicians designed the system as they did and how between 1935 and 1983 they allocated—and reallocated—costs and benefits among workers, employers, and beneficiaries. He also examines public support for the program, and why Democratic and Republican representatives, once political allies in expanding Social Security, have become so deeply polarized about fixing it.As Social Security edges closer to crisis, Fixing Social Security offers a comprehensive analysis of the political fault lines and a fresh look at what can be done—before it is too late

"Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability is the first large-scale examination of how local media outlets cover members of the United States Congress. Using three samples of local newspapers from across the country, Arnold analyzes all coverage over a two-year period - every news story, editorial, opinion column, letter, and list." "The results show enormous variation in coverage. Some newspapers cover legislators frequently, thoroughly, and accessibly. Others - some of them famous for their national coverage - largely ignore local representatives. The analysis also confirms that only those incumbents or challengers in the most competitive races, and those who command huge sums of money, receive extensive coverage."--Jacket

"Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability is the first large-scale examination of how local media outlets cover members of the United States Congress. Using three samples of local newspapers from across the country, Arnold analyzes all coverage over a two-year period - every news story, editorial, opinion column, letter, and list." "The results show enormous variation in coverage. Some newspapers cover legislators frequently, thoroughly, and accessibly. Others - some of them famous for their national coverage - largely ignore local representatives. The analysis also confirms that only those incumbents or challengers in the most competitive races, and those who command huge sums of money, receive extensive coverage."--Jacket

A theory of policy making. Explaining congressional action. Policy attributes and policy preferences. Policy preferences and congressional elections. Electoral calculations and legislators' decisions. strategies for coalition leaders. Policy decisions -- The theory applied. Economic policy. Tax policy. Energy policy -- Assessing congressional action. Citizens' control of government

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AbstractSocial Security will be insolvent in 2033. If nothing is done, retirees will face an immediate 23% cut in their monthly benefits. The solvency cliff and its approximate date have been known for more than two decades. This paper examines why Congress has avoided fixing Social Security when the solutions were relatively affordable and when the baby-boom generation could have helped pay its share of the costs. It also examines what solutions will become politically feasible once the solvency cliff arrives. The surprise is that raising the wage base – in short, taxing the affluent – becomes the most politically appealing fix when insolvency arrives, despite the fact that this solution has no political appeal absent a crisis. Politics at the precipice is very different from ordinary politics.

How do citizens evaluate the performance of their mayors? Previous studies have examined mayoral performance either with cross‐sectional surveys or by comparing pairs of consecutive elections. In this article, we use 150 surveys conducted in New York City between 1984 and 2009 to carry out the first time‐series analysis of mayoral approval. We show that fluctuations in crime and the economy affect mayors' ratings and that black and white citizens react similarly to changing local conditions (although their initial evaluations of mayors often diverge sharply). We also show that how New Yorkers rate mayors in the polls is closely related to how they vote for mayors at the polls.