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The purpose of this article is to build models that explain and forecast the outcome of the second-round vote in the French presidential elections (in the case of a classical duel between moderate left and moderate right) in each department and at the national level. We compare two types of models: the first one influenced by a quarterly change in the national unemployment rate, taken into account, along with the popularity variable; and the second one when the vote is directly influenced by an annual change in the national unemployment rate. We also try to take into account the influence of the periods of cohabitation on the responsibility of the incumbent president (if he is running for re-election) with respect to the economic situation. We also highlight the influence of a partisan variable and a local department advantage variable on the second-round vote for the left in the French presidential elections. Its forecasts for the elections of the past (1981–2007, excluding 2002 and 1981–2012, excluding 2002) are satisfactory. We make ex ante forecasts for the second-round vote of the 2012 French presidential election. ; Cet article a pour objet la construction et l'estimation de modèles permettant d'expliquer et de prévoir le résultat du second tour des élections présidentielles françaises (en cas de duel gauche modérée / droite modérée) par département et au niveau national. Notre travail met en évidence l'influence de la variation du taux de chômage national et permet de comparer deux types de modèles : l'un avec l'influence de la variation trimestrielle du taux de chômage national prise en compte avec la variable popularité et l'autre avec une influence directe de la variation annuelle du taux de chômage national sur le vote. On essaie aussi de prendre en compte l'influence des périodes de cohabitation sur la responsabilité du président sortant (s'il est candidat à sa réélection) par rapport à la situation économique. On montre également l'influence d'une variable partisane et d'une variable avantage local ...

The purpose of this article is to build models that explain and forecast the outcome of the second-round vote in the French presidential elections (in the case of a classical duel between moderate left and moderate right) in each department and at the national level. We compare two types of models: the first one influenced by a quarterly change in the national unemployment rate, taken into account, along with the popularity variable; and the second one when the vote is directly influenced by an annual change in the national unemployment rate. We also try to take into account the influence of the periods of cohabitation on the responsibility of the incumbent president (if he is running for re-election) with respect to the economic situation. We also highlight the influence of a partisan variable and a local department advantage variable on the second-round vote for the left in the French presidential elections. Its forecasts for the elections of the past (1981–2007, excluding 2002 and 1981–2012, excluding 2002) are satisfactory. We make ex ante forecasts for the second-round vote of the 2012 French presidential election. ; Cet article a pour objet la construction et l'estimation de modèles permettant d'expliquer et de prévoir le résultat du second tour des élections présidentielles françaises (en cas de duel gauche modérée / droite modérée) par département et au niveau national. Notre travail met en évidence l'influence de la variation du taux de chômage national et permet de comparer deux types de modèles : l'un avec l'influence de la variation trimestrielle du taux de chômage national prise en compte avec la variable popularité et l'autre avec une influence directe de la variation annuelle du taux de chômage national sur le vote. On essaie aussi de prendre en compte l'influence des périodes de cohabitation sur la responsabilité du président sortant (s'il est candidat à sa réélection) par rapport à la situation économique. On montre également l'influence d'une variable partisane et d'une variable avantage local ...

The purpose of this article is to build a model that explains and forecasts the result of the firstround vote of the French legislative elections and the results in seats after the second round per department and at the national level. This model highlights the influence of a popularity rating between the Left and the Right; and the economic conditions (the unemployment rate, the GDP growth rate, the inflation rate with more ambiguous results) to account for the first-round vote for the Left in the French legislative elections. Its forecasts for the elections of the past (1986-2007) are satisfactory and we make ex ante forecasts in vote and seats for the 2012 French legislative elections. We make some preliminary ex ante forecast in vote and in seats for the 2017 French legislative election. ; L'objectif de cet article est de construire un modèle qui explique et prévoit le résultat du premier tour du vote aux élections législatives françaises and les résultats du second tour en sièges par département et au niveau national.

In this article, we study a popularity function for the popularity of the French political parties (1981Q2-2017Q1). At first, we suppose that voters have a retrospective behaviour according to reward-punishment model in a closed economy. We show that the unemployment rate has a significant influence on the popularity of the French political parties. We find unfavourable results for the partisan hypothesis. We also show that the economic openness has an influence on popularity. We also find a partly expected result for the asymmetry hypothesis: punishment without reward. For the political variables, we show the significant influence of the honeymoon effect, the second order elections (regional or European), and the congresses of the Socialist party.

In this article, we study a popularity function for the popularity of the French political parties (1981Q2-2017Q1). At first, we suppose that voters have a retrospective behaviour according to reward-punishment model in a closed economy. We show that the unemployment rate has a significant influence on the popularity of the French political parties. We find unfavourable results for the partisan hypothesis. We also show that the economic openness has an influence on popularity. We also find a partly expected result for the asymmetry hypothesis: punishment without reward. For the political variables, we show the significant influence of the honeymoon effect, the second order elections (regional or European), and the congresses of the Socialist party.

In this article, we study a popularity function for the French popularity political parties (1981Q2-2014Q4). We suppose that voters have a retrospective behaviour according to the responsibility hypothesis and we study if voters are naive or sophisticated. We show that, the unemployment rate has a significant influence on the popularity of the French political parties (closed economy, opened economy). We do not clearly show the interest for taking into account the openess of the economy. We also found unfavourable results for the asymmetry hypothesis. Then, we found slightly favourable results for the sophisticated voters hypothesis (assuming that voters distinguish trends and cycles for each economic variables). For the political variables, we show the significant influence of the honeymoon effect, the second order elections (regional or European), and the congresses of the Socialist party.

The purpose of this note is to complete the estimates made in Auberger (2012) for French presidential elections. We study the influence of the local unemployment on the vote for French presidential elections. We build another variable taking into account the responsibility of the incumbent President for the economic situation after a cohabitation period. We also make estimates for the second-round vote of French presidential elections (without the 2002 French presidential election or with an estimated vote for this election). We show that over the 1988-2007 period (without 2002), it is not necessary to take into account the influence of cohabitation periods on the responsibility of the government in relation to the economic situation.

This article builds and estimates several econometric models that explain and forecast the outcomes of the French elections for the European Parliament. These models show the influence of the change in the local unemployment rate to explain the vote for the moderate Left and the moderate Right in the French elections for the European Parliament. These models appear to be accurate in forecasting the elections of the past, and their behavior for the 2009 French election for the European Parliament is satisfactory. Adapted from the source document.