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Why Noncompliance traces the history of noncompliance within the European Union (EU), focusing on which states continuously do or do not follow EU Law, why, and how that affects the governance in the EU and beyond. In exploring the EU's long and varied history of noncompliance, Tanja A. Börzel takes a close look at the diverse groups of noncompliant states throughout the EU's existence. Why do states that are vocally critical of the EU have a better record of compliance than those that support the EU? Why has noncompliance been declining since the 1990s, even though the EU was adding member-states and numerous laws? Börzel debunks conventional wisdoms in EU compliance research, showing that noncompliance in the EU is not caused by the new Central and Eastern European member states, nor by the Eurosceptic member states. So why do these states take the brunt of Europe's misplaced ire? Why Noncompliance introduces politicization as an explanatory factor that has been long overlooked in the literature and scholarship surrounding the European Union. Börzel argues that political controversy combined with voting power and administrative capacity, explains why noncompliance with EU law has been declining since the completion of the Single Market, cannot be blamed on the EU's Central and Easter European member states, and is concentrated in areas where EU seeks to protect citizen rights. Thanks to generous funding from Freie Universitat Berlin, the ebook editions of this book are available as Open Access volumes from Cornell Open (cornellpress.cornell.edu/cornell-open) and other repositories.

"This book argues that the combination of the voting power of member states, their administrative capacity, and political controversy around the European Union (EU) explains why noncompliance with EU Law has declined since 1994 but still varies across countries and policy sectors"--

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction: The Politics of Noncompliance -- 1. Infringement Data and Noncompliance -- 2. Power, Capacity, and Politicization -- 3. Why Some States Comply Less Than Others -- 4. Why There Is No Growing Noncompliance -- 5. Why Noncompliance Is Sector Specific -- Conclusion: The Limits of Regulatory Governance -- Appendix 1. Summary Statistics -- Appendix 2. Correlation of Independent Variables -- Appendix 3. Dependent and Independent Variables and Their Operationalization -- Appendix 4. Robustness Tests -- Appendix 5. Interaction Effects -- Notes -- References -- Index

"This volume explores the conditions under which regional organizations engage in governance transfer in and to areas of limited statehood. The comparison of 12 regional organizations in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East shows that regional organizations have not only institutionalized commitments to human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption. They have also developed more detailed prescriptions of these 'good' governance standards and established similar instruments to promote and protect them in their member states. The authors argue that a global script of governance transfer by regional organizations is emerging. Rather than developing from a central model, however, this is patched together by regional and national actors who are translating governance standards and instruments into their local context"--

This paper asks under which conditions the state-building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International norms need to resonate with the dominant domestic discourse on political reforms. To substantiate our argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anti-corruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anti-corruption programs as an instrument against political opponents using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, the fight against corruption was facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anti-corruption policies that added pressure on political elites 'from below.'

Multinationale Unternehmen werden zunehmend von transnationalen Institutionen auf freiwilliger Basis zu Menschenrechten und Sozialstandards verpflichtet. Die Studie untersucht in diesem Beitrag die Sicherheitspraktiken von Unternehmen und fragt, inwiefern sich diese an die Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights halten. Anhand von zwei multinationalen Bergbaufirmen in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo untersuchen sie die Wirkung dieser Standards auf die Sicherheitspraktiken der Firmen, nehmen darüber hinaus aber auch die Auswirkung der Firmenpraktiken auf die lokale Sicherheitslage in den Blick. Die Autorinnen argumentieren dass man über die Compliance-Forschung, die auf die Implementierung formaler Programme und regelkonformes Verhalten fokussiert, hinaus gehen muss um freiwillige Standards sowie die Wirkung von Unternehmen auf Sicherheit in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit zu evaluieren. Dazu entwickeln sie einen "bottom-up" Ansatz der die gesamte Spanne lokaler Sicherheitspraktiken von Unternehmen sowie ihre – oft negativen – Effekte in den Blick nimmt. Dieser Ansatz erlaubt eine differenziertere Bewertung der Wirkung freiwilliger Standards als auch der Beiträge von Unternehmen zu lokaler (Un)Sicherheit