Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of illustrations -- Notes on contributors -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1 Contesting constitutionalism: constitutional politics in Southeast Asia -- PART I Constitution-making and constitutional design -- 2 Ways of constitution-making in Southeast Asia: actors, interests, dynamics -- 3 Delaying constitutionalism to protect establishment hegemony in Thailand: designing the election system and the Senate in the Constitution of 2007 -- 4 Constitutionalism old and new in the "UN Kingdom of Timor-Leste
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Civil society scholarship has repeatedly warned of the dangers of uncivil society for young democracies. However, it remains unclear when and how uncivil society becomes an instrument of democratic backsliding. Using Thailand and Myanmar as its case studies, the article discusses the origins, ideology, and impact of several uncivil society groups, deepening our knowledge on the latter's role in democratic backsliding/breakdown. It argues that uncivil society can act as useful resource for conservative elites seeking to derail democratisation processes. Particularly in times of a perceived or manufactured national crisis, uncivil society successfully pursues illiberal agendas – often in tandem with established elites of the former regime. Also highlighted are the core mechanisms through which uncivil society leads to democratic backsliding/breakdown, as well as the long-term effects these movements have on the erosion of social trust and civility and the poisoning of inter-class or inter-religious relations. (JCSA/GIGA)
Is democracy in crisis in Southeast Asia? The article gives an overview over the status of democratization in Southeast Asia by looking at established democracy indices such as the Freedom House data and Bertelsmann Transformation Index. After mapping the regime types of Southeast Asian states, the article analyses the state of consolidation in Southeast Asia's young democracies with Linz/Stepan's model of democratic consolidation. The article shows that democracy has received serious setbacks only in Thailand (and to certain extent also in the Philippines), whereas Indonesia's democracy has gained maturity in recent years. These developments are reflected in constitutional consolidation, political party development and the reform of the militaries of the region. The prospects for democratization are quite gloomy, since most of the authoritarian regimes in the region lack the conditions considered conducive for democratization, such as economic development, vivid and active middle class or vigorous working class. External influences also favour the status quo and do not support democratization.
AbstractThe article sheds light on tutelary regimes, which have so far been left out in the discussion of contemporary authoritarian regimes. It uses a configurative approach to conceptualize tutelary regimes according to the three dimensions of tutelary interference, electoral competitiveness and civil liberties. Tutelary interference is conceived of as a spectrum of possible and not mutually exclusive roles which tutelary powers perform – depending on their position in the political system. Empirically, the article uses a case study of Myanmar's tutelary regime to illustrate how the armed forces' institutionalized powers and prerogatives have helped the country evade substantial democracy. The results show a high degree of regime heterogeneity, with a functioning electoral regime in place but substantial weaknesses in civil liberties. Both are (partly) rooted in the tutelary interference of the military, which is pervasive. The military's position straitjackets the government; the military vetoes certain policies and structural reforms and guards the political system and its prerogatives from a position of strength. Politicians have so far not come up with successful strategies to bring the military under civil control.
Although Myanmar's transition from military rule has been thoroughly studied, research into the evolving presidential system is lacking. This article maps Myanmar's unique hybrid form of presidentialism and characterises executive-legislative relations between 2012 and 2017. It not only examines institutions themselves but also explores how actors within them have acted and shifted strategically. It is argued that elite-behaviour determines how institutions work. Myanmar's 2008 constitution imposed by the military established a hybrid presidential system with a formally powerful president. The first phase under President Thein Sein saw competitive yet cooperative executive-legislative relations between President Thein Sein and the ambitious House Speaker Shwe Mann, both members of the former military regime. However, this power-sharing arrangement of former members of the military regime became increasingly fragile with the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi and her attempt to change the 2008 constitution. After the election victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the passage of the state counsellor law, a de facto semi-presidential system was established – Burmese style. Since then, the frontline has been between the civilian and military parts of the administration.
