Search results

Norges relasjon til Kina har siden anerkjennelsen av Folkerepublikken i januar 1950 blitt utøvd i et spenn mellom småstatsrealisme og småstatsidealisme. Norges handlingsrom og politikk overfor stormakten Kina utformes i et samspill mellom nasjonale og internasjonale faktorer, men i tråd med teoriretningen ny-klassisk realisme har strukturene i det internasjonale systemet størst forklaringskraft. Som en liten stat må Norge manøvrere i forhold til stormaktenes maktbalanse og rivalisering for å sikre sin egen velferd og sikkerhet. Norge valgte i 1949 å inngå i en allianse med USA gjennom NATO, og dette har siden vært bærebjelken i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk. Norges handlingsrom vis-a-vis Kina er dermed til enhver tid påvirket av USAs forhold til Kina. Denne artikkelen trekker de lange linjer i norsk Kina-politikk over syv tiår, fra 1950 til 2020. Med en ambisjon om global orden som et ekstra sikkerhetsnett var Norge tidlig ute med å anerkjenne Kina og støttet landets inntreden i FN-systemet, men den kalde krigen begrenset relasjonene. USAs engasjement av Kina på begynnelsen av 1970-tallet var et vendepunkt i norsk Kina-politikk. Den tiltakende rivaliseringen mellom USA og Kina de siste år gjør at norsk Kina-politikk nå igjen står overfor et vendepunkt, i retning av redusert handlingsrom og engasjement.
Abstract in English: Norway's relationship with China over the Past 70 Years: A Small State's Idealism and Realism with Respect to a Great PowerFrom recognizing the People's Republic of China in 1950 until today, both realism and idealism as well as domestic and international level factors have informed Norway's relationship with China. Nonetheless, this article finds that in accordance with neo-classical realism, international system variables have the strongest explanatory value on Norway's China policy. Since joining NATO in 1949, Norway's alliance with the United States has been the pillar in Norway's defence and security policy. Norway's room for maneuver crafting and implementing its China policy is consequently strongly affected by the ups and downs in Sino-U.S. relations. Unlike the United States, Norway recognized the PRC in 1950 and supported China's entry into the UN system, but the Cold War restricted Norway from further developing its relations with China. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the early 1970s enabled Norway to engage China, and the end of the Cold War in 1989 enabled Norway to widen its engagement to include issues such as environment and climate change, human rights and welfare policies. Nevertheless, after five decades of engagement, Norway's approach to China is currently once again changing as the result of an intensified Sino-U.S. rivalry and a changing threat perception of China across Europe.

This book examines India's foreign and defence policy changes in response to China's growing economic and military power and increased footprint across the Indo-Pacific. It further explores India's role in the rivalry between China and the United States. The book looks at the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical landscape and how India is managing China's rise by combining economic cooperation with a wide set of balancing strategies. The authors in this book critically analyse the various tools of Indian foreign policy, including defence posture, security alignments, and soft power diplomacy, among others, and discuss the future trajectory of India's foreign policy and the factors which will determine the balance of power in the region and the potential risks involved.

This book examines how recent fundamental changes influence Sino-Russian relations and the wider long-term implications of the revolving Sino-Russian dynamic on international affairs.

Jinping is assumed to be China's strongest leader since Deng Xiaoping - even since Mao, some argue. It might therefore be expected that Xi Jinping, at the top of a one-party state, has the power and ability to reform China. This article analyses how structural constraints limit Xi Jinping's power and freedom of action using his ability to implement a new course for the country's economic policy as case. To avoid being caught in the middle-income trap, China must adjust its investment and export-driven model to a more innovation, consumer and welfare-based development model. We use the school of historical institutionalism as framework, and examine how (i) path dependency, (ii) informal structures, norms and values, (iii) institutional autonomy, and (iv) institutional capacity in different ways limit and constrain the power and ability of Xi Jinping to implement a successful restructuring of the country's economic model. Adapted from the source document.

Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Communist Party of China in 2013, taking his leadership role at a time of continuing economic expansion and military modernization that seem destined to make China a superpower. Xi has become China's most powerful and popular leader since Mao, and his vision of the "Chinese dream" of "great renewal" does not seem like an empty political slogan. But the image of China's meteoric rise masks some problems that are simmering both at home and abroad. This book will examine the prospects for China's continuing rise but also the emergent and unintended consequences posed by China's domestic transformation and international assertiveness. The three most urgent and interrelated domestic challenges facing China's leaders are sustaining economic growth, fighting corruption, and maintaining social stability. In foreign policy, its neighbors and the United States have questions about what China wants and whether it will be a revisionist state or be content with most aspects of the status quo. There is also concern that nationalist pressures within China may put domestic pressure on foreign policy

This edited volume explores and analyses strategic thinking, military reform and adaptation in an era of Asian growth, European austerity and US rebalancing. A significant shift in policy, strategy and military affairs is underway in both Asia and Europe, with the former gaining increasing prominence in the domain of global security. At the same time, the world's powers are now faced with an array of diverse challenges. The resurgence of great power politics in both Europe and Asia, along with the long term threats of terrorism, piracy and sustained geopolitical instability has placed great strain on militaries and security institutions operating with constrained budgets and wary public support. The volume covers a wide range of case studies, including the transformation of China's military in the 21st century, the internal and external challenges facing India, Russia's military modernization program and the USA's reassessment of its strategic interests. In doing so, the book provides the reader with the opportunity to conceptualize how strategic thinking, military reform, operational adaptation and technological integration have interacted with the challenges outlined above. With contributions by leading scholars and practitioners from Europe and Asia, this book provides a valuable contribution to the understanding of strategic and operational thinking and adjustment across the world. This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, security studies, defence studies, Asian politics, Russian politics, US foreign policy and IR in general.