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THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE VERY LARGE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS AND ARE ENGAGED IN THE COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPON TECHNOLOGIES. THIS ESSAY CONSIDERS TWO QUESTIONS: (1) TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE FOREGOING FACTS A FACTOR INCREASING THE RISKS OF CONFLICT? (2) TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THEY AMENABLE TO POLICY CHANGE?

THIS PAPER DISCUSSES THE POSSIBLITY OF GENERALIZING THE DEMILITARIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RELATIONS AND EXTENDING IT TO THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN EUROPE. THE IDEA, SHARED BY THE LEADERS OF BOTH FORCES, THAT NEITHER NATO OR THE WARSAW PACT COULD USE FORCE, IS, THE AUTHOR ASSERTS, ONE OF THE GREAT UNEXAMINED CLICHES OF OUR TIME. THE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENNCES OF THE IDEA THAT MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND DEPLOYMENTS CAN BE USED FOR POLITICAL ENDS IS ALSO DISCUSSED.

ACCORDING TO THE 1972 ABM TREATY THERE CAN BE NO DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF ABM SYSTEMS OTHER THAN FIXED-BASED LAND SYSTEMS. THIS SECTION DESCRIBES THE DEBATE WHICH HAS ERUPTED OVER VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF ARTICLES IN THE TREATY, SOME DESIGNED TO JUSTIFY SDI. THE LEGALITY OF SDI IN CONNECTION WITH THE OUTER SPACE TREATY OF 1967 IS ALSO DETERMINED. THE AUTHOR BELIEVES THAT SDI COULD NOT BE TESTED WITHOUT INFRINGING UPON AT LEAST THREE TREATIES.

THIS SECTION DISCUSSES SOME OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A UNILATERAL DECISION BY THE US TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY ABM MISSILES. THE AUTHOR RECOMMENDS AN ARMS AGREEMENT BASED ON ACCEPTANCE OF ABM LIMITATIONS AS THE ONLY WAY TO AVERT THESE CONSEQUENCES. A COMBINATION OF MEASURES TO BAN ASAT SYSTEMS, MAKE SAFEGUARDS REGARDING ABM TREATY PULL OUT, AND A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN ARE RECOMMENDED AS A WAY TO OPEN A PATH FOR AN AGREEMENT TO HALVE THE NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WARHEADS.

THE NATO ALLIES HAVE REACTED TO SDI WITH A LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE IDEA IN GENERAL, A DESIRE TO RESTRICT THE PROGRAM ACCORDING TO A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY, A FEAR OF BEING LEFT BEHIND IN POSSIBLE CIVIL APPLICATIONS, AND A DESIRE TO SHARE IN SOME OF THE MONEY INVOLVED IN THE PROJECT. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN THE MOST CATEGORICAL IN ITS OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF SDI.

THE SDI WAS AN IDEA WHICH CAME TO THE PRESIDENT FROM A SMALL GROUP OF OUTSIDE ADVISERS, AND IT WAS LAUNCHED WITHOUT THE CONSULTATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE PENTAGON. THIS SECTION DESCRIBES HOW THE IDEA GERMINATED IN THE HIGH FRONTIER LOBBY, BASED ON THE IDEAS OF EDWARD TELLER. IT THEN DESCRIBES HOW THE IDEA WAS NOT ROUND THE BUREACRACY AND BROUGHT TO THE PRESIDENT. AS A RESULT OF THE PROCEDURES USED TO PROMOTE IT, THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT EXAMINATION OR DISCUSSION OF ITS IMPLICATIONS.

THIS SECTION ASKS TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET POSITION WITH REGARD TO SDI: WHAT RESEARCH IS THE USSR UNDERTAKING IN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE, AND WHAT ARE AND WILL BE PRESENT AND FUTURE SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SDI. THE USSR HAS THE WORLD'S ONLY OPERATIONAL ABM SYSTEM AROUND MOSCOW, WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY A CONSIDERABLE RADAR SYSTEM. THE SOVIET BELIEF THAT US BUILDUP OF BOTH OFFENSE AND DEFENSE MISSILES INTENDS TO ESTABLISH A FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY EXPLAINS WHY THEY HAVE BEEN BARGAINING FOR REDUCED OFFENSE IT DEFENSE IS MADE OPERATIONAL.

THIS SECTION OUTLINES THE OBJECTIVES OF SIPRI IN ITS CONTINUING PEACE RESEARCH PROJECT AND CONSIDERS WHETHER ANTI-ARMS RACE PROGRAMS HAVE EVER BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN HISTORY. THE AUTHOR NOTES THAT THE SITUATION IN THE ARMS RACE IS DIFFERENT NOW THAN IT EVER WAS BEFORE IN HISTORY, IN THE ENORMOUS RESOURCES DEVOTED TO MILITARY PURPOSES IN PEACETIME AND IN THE NATURE OF PRESENTDAY MILITARY COMPETITION. THE IMPACT OF A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS THAT IT INVESTIGATES EVERY SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT TO SEE IF IT IS APPLICABLE TO MILITARY PURPOSES. THIS CONCENTRATION ON ARMS COMPETITION ALSO SERIVES TO BEGET SUSPICION AND DISTRUST.

DIFFICULTIES WITH VERIFICATION ARE NOT THE REASON FOR THE US AND BRITISH REFUSAL TO RE-OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON CTB. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY IMPROVEMENTS IN THE TECHNIQUES OF NUCLEAR TEST DETECTION, AND NEW OFFERS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE ISSUE OF INSPECTION. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN FURTHER ADVANCES IN SEISMOLOGY. OTHER MEASURES ALSO WOULD IMPROVE CONSIDERABLY THE CAPABILITIES OF IDENTIFYING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

THE DOMINANCE OF MILITARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INCREASES THE RISK OF THE USE OF FORCE. THE AUTHOR ARUGUES THAT THIS PROCESS MUST BE REVERSED BY DIMINISHING THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR, AND THE DEMILITARIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES HOW THIS SITUATION MIGHT BE BROUGHT ABOUT. IN EUROPE IT IS CLEAR THAT SECURITY IS AN INVERSE FUNCTION OF MILITARY SPENDING.

THIS SECTION REVIEWS THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START) IN GENEVA FROM JUNE 1982 TO DECEMBER 1983 WITH REGARD TO INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES AND LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES. THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES IN THE TALKS ARE DETERMINED. THE AUTHOR EXPRESSES INTEREST IN THE NEW SOVIET OFFER TO ELIMINATE ALL INTERMEDIATE-RANGE WEAPONS WEST OF THE URALS: A PROPOSAL WHICH GOES A LONG WAY TOWARDS THE US PROPOSAL FOR A ZERO OPTION. BUT THE SOVIET SS-20S EAST OF THE URALS WILL BE ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

EUROPEAN NUCLEAR WEAPON POLICIES SUFFER FROM ONE FUNDAMENTAL FLAW AND MYTH CONCERNING THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATIONAL DEFENCE. THE MYTH IS THAT CRUISE MISSILES WILL LINK UP WITH US STRATEGIC INTERCONTINENTAL FORCES AND THE US WILL STRIKE AGAINST THE USSR IN DEFENCE OF EUROPE. THE AUTHOR CALLS FOR A RETURN TO A SANER PERSPECTIVE: TO RECOGNIZE THE COMPELLING LOGIC OF STRATEGIC PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS.

THE WEST GERMAN PUBLIC SEEMS RATHER MORE FAVORABLE TO ARMS CONTROL IDEAS THAN THE PUBLIC IN THE US. THEY ESPECIALLY SUPPORT AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, AND MOST FAVOR AN IMMEDIATE COMPLE TEST BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE MAIN QUESTION ABOUT SDI WAS, SHOULD WEST GERMANY PARTICIPATE IN THE PROGRAM? ON BALANCE, THE WEST GERMAN PUBLIC SEEMED OPPOSED TO SDI, BUT NOT BY A GREAT MARGIN.

THE FORCE OF PUBLIC OPINION EXPLAINS WHY ARMS CONTROL ISSUES ARE SO CENTRAL NOW. THE AUTHOR DOCUMENTS CHANGES IN PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE PAST THIRTY YERS. ARMS CONTROL ISSES ARE INCREASINGLY ARGUED BEFORE THE BAR OF PUBLIC OPINION. THE AUTHOR OFFERS ONE CAUTION ABOUT PUBLIC OPINION: WHEN OPINIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE, THEY TEND TO BE UNSTABLE.

IN 1982 AND 1983 THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE FEAR OF WAR AND FEAR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE THE INTERMEDIATERANGE NUCLEAR FORCE TALKS BROKE DOWN. SINCE 1983 FEAR OF NUCLEAR WAR HAS BEEN RECEDING; BUT FEAR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS NOT ABATED. THE AUTHOR REVIEWS OPINION STATISTICS OF SIX EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND FINDS A GREAT DEAL OF SKEPTICISM ABOUT SUPERPOWER SINCERITY. BY AND LARGE, WITH REGARD TO TALKS, THE PUBLIC SIDES WITH THE US IN CONCERN OVER VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES.