Search results

Conflict between the judges and government is built into the very concept of the judicial protection of human rights. The Human Rights Act does presuppose a basic consensus on human rights between the judges, on the one hand, and the government, people and Parliament on the other. However, there is clearly no consensus when it comes to the rights of unpopular minorities, particularly concerning controversial issues such as asylum seekers suspected terrorists. The government argues the need for new measures to tackle these problems, whilst the judges argue against compromising our traditional principles of habeas corpus and the presumption of innocence. It is clear that there is a conflict between two constitutional principles; the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law. This conflict, if unresolved, could result in constitutional crisis.

THIS ARTICLE CONSIDERS THE FEATURES OF ISRAEL'S ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE ONGOING EFFORTS TO REFORM IT. THE SYSTEM IS CURRENTLY CHARACTERIZED BY AN EXTREMELY RIGID FORM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (PR) IN WHICH THE COUNTRY IS TREATED AS ONE LARGE CONSTITUENCY, AND A LOW (1.5 PERCENT) THRESHOLD OF THE NATIONAL VOTE REQUIRED TO GAIN REPRESENTATION IN THE LEGISLATURE. THE WEAKNESSES OF THIS SYSTEM, LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK AND UNDUE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF SMALL PARTIES, ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY OBVIOUS. MOST REFORMERS AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL MUST RETAIN THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF PR. VIABLE REFORMS INCLUDE RAISING THE THRESHOLD TO 3 OR 3.5 PERCENT AND PROVIDING FOR A CONSTITUENCY ELEMENT SO AS TO SECURE A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGISLATORS AND VOTERS. A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD COMBINE PR AND INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUENCIES, PATTERNED AFTER A MULTIMEMBER CONSTITUENCY SYSTEM (THE "SWEDISH" MODEL) IS ISRAEL'S BEST HOPE FOR OPENING UP THE POLITICAL SYSTEM SO THAT THE VOTER ENJOYS A GREATER DEGREE OF INFLUENCE IN CHOOSING CANDIDATES AND SIGNALING COALITIONS.

SINCE 1984, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT HAS GAINED INCREASED POWER AND WEIGHT WITHIN THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THUS, DIRECT ELECTIONS COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE OF GREATER IMPORT IN 1989 THAN THEY WERE IN 1984 OR 1979. IN FACT, HOWEVER, DIRECT ELECTIONS ARE INCAPABLE OF YIELDING THE VERDICT OF THE ELECTORATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY. THIS IS NOT ONLY BECAUSE THEY ARE, ALTHOUGH IN FORM TRANSNATIONAL, IN REALITY A SUMMATION OF TWELVE SEPARATE NATIONAL CONTESTS; BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE VERY NATURE OF THE PARTY SYSTEMS IN THE MEMBER STATES AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WHICH SERVE TO OBSCURE RATHER THAN ARTICULATE THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

THE DEBATE ABOUT ACCOUNTABILITY AND LOSS OF SOVEREIGNTY HAS BECOME MORE PRONOUNCED SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND THE SINGLE MARKET PROGRAM. THIS ARTICLE, HOWEVER, INSTEAD OF ENGAGING IN A DEBATE POLARIZED AROUND ABSTRACT CONCEPTS SUCH AS SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERALISM, WILL FOCUS UPON THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACCELERATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. IT DESCRIBES THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT WITHIN THE EC, HOW THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY MIGHT BE DEVELOPED, AND ADVOCATES IMPROVED PROCEDURES FOR DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY.