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"How do aspiring and established rising global powers respond to conflict? Using China, the book studies its response to wars and rivalries in the Middle East from the Cold War to the present. Since the People's Republic was established in 1949, China has long been involved in the Middle East and its conflicts, from exploiting or avoiding them to their management, containment or resolution. Using a conflict and peace studies angle, Burton adopts a broad perspective on Chinese engagement by looking at its involvement in the region's conflicts including Israel/Palestine, Iraq before and after 2003, Sudan and the Darfur crisis, the Iranian nuclear deal, the Gulf crisis and the wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen. The book reveals how a rising global and non-Western power handles the challenges associated with both violent and non-violent conflict and the differences between limiting and reducing violence alongside other ways to eliminate the causes of conflict and grievance"--

"What has been the role of rising powers in the Arab–Israeli conflict? What does this tell us about rising powers and conflict management as well as rising powers' behavior in the world more generally? This book studies the way that five rising powers—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the BRICS countries—have approached the conflict since it first became internationalized in 1947. - Conflict management consists of different methods, from peacekeeping to mediation and the use of economic incentives and sanctions and (non)enforcement of international legal decisions. What distinguishes them is whether they are active or passive: active measures seek to transform a conflict and resolve it; passive measures seek to ameliorate its worst effects, but do not change their underlying causes. Since 1947 rising powers' active or passive use of these methods has coincided with their rise and fall and rise again in the international system. Those rises and falls are tied to global changes, including the Cold War, the emergence of the Third World, economic and ideological retrenchment of the 1980s and 1990s and the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity after 2000. - In summary, rising powers' management of the Arab–Israeli conflict has shifted from active to more passive methods since 1947. Their actions have occurred alongside two key changes within the conflict. One is the shift from a primarily state-based conflict between Israel and the Arabs to one that is more ethnic and territorial in scope, between Israel and the Palestinians. The other the emergence of the Oslo framework which has frozen power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians since 1993. By pursuing the Oslo process, rising powers have separated conflict management from developing 'normal' diplomatic and economic exchanges with Israel and the Palestinians. In adopting this more passive conflict management approach, rising powers are disregarding both emerging alternatives that may potentially transform the conflict's dynamics (including involvement with civil society actors like the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement) and undertaking more active efforts at conflict resolution—and presenting themselves as global powers." (Publisher's description)

AbstractHow do middle powers operate in uncertain multipolar international systems? Through the cases of Malaysia and Indonesia, the article examines their approach in the Middle East after the Arab uprisings. Particular reference is given to their actions in three main areas: the Gulf (especially relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran), the Syrian war (and its blowback in terms of domestic radicalization), and the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict. While the two middle powers' behavior demonstrated all three possible modes—whether to support, push back or stand apart—what distinguished them was their timing: under multipolarity these different forms of behavior occurred concurrently, in contrast to a more sequenced approach under (global) unipolarity and bipolarity. The findings point to Malaysian and Indonesian actions as examples of "hedging" whereby states seek good relations with all and minimize the risk of problematic entanglements.

How are rising powers like Russia, India and China responding to the pandemic among the Gulf monarchies and what are the implications for rising power behaviour more generally? Through an examination of these powers' established relations with the Gulf monarchies and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the regional energy and labour markets and the search for a vaccine, the article highlights the opportunities and constraints faced by each. The variety of approaches taken by rising powers in a volatile environment (like today's Middle East) challenges the assumption that they will adopt a singular strategy in relation to the international system, either as a supporter, spoiler or shirker in an international system. But this may change as the system becomes more settled.

La Chine peut-elle faire la différence dans le conflit israélo-palestinien ? Pour répondre à cela, l'article se réfère à deux formes principales de paix selon les travaux de Galtung : la paix négative (c'est-à-dire l'absence ou l'élimination de la violence) et la paix positive (c'est-à-dire la résolution des causes d'un conflit). Un certain nombre d'éléments nous permettent d'évaluer ce rôle : la présence croissante de la Chine dans la région, son souci de la stabilité et de l'ordre régionaux ; ses intérêts commerciaux croissants et approfondis avec les parties au conflit, son engagement dans le processus d'Oslo, ses contributions au dialogue entre les deux parties, et son manque d'engagement avec la dynamique locale en cours dans les sociétés politiques et civiles israéliennes et palestiniennes. Au final, ces facteurs, conjugués aux évolutions récentes, laissent penser que la Chine envisage un scénario de paix négative et qu'il est donc peu probable qu'elle joue un rôle important dans la résolution du conflit.

The article presents a framework by which the approaches taken in educational policies by the Left in Latin America may be understood. This framework takes the form of a continuum by which left-wing or progressive education, between deep and shallow poles, drawing at an abstract level the continuum on the equalitydifference features associated with Bobbio's (1996) Left-Right political spectrum. Presenting the Cuban (and to a lesser extent) the Sandinista Revolutions as the main source of progressive education in the region prior to the 1980s, the article examines the neo-liberal and neo-conservative features associated with the New Right and the Left's response. This took several forms in the 1990s and 2000s: traditional communists (Cuba), Third Way reformers (e.g. the PSDB in Brazil and the Concertacion in Chile) and between first generation (e.g. PT, Frente Amplio, Izquierda Unida, Causa R, Sandinistas since 2007) and second generation (e.g. the Chavez, Morales and Correa governments) radicals. The educational approaches of each are then placed tentatively along the progressive education spectrum.

As a 'rising power', China is expected to play a greater global role. But current Chinese involvement in the long-running and internationalised Arab-Israeli conflict is limited. How to explain this? What does it suggest about China's regional and global role? Studying Beijing's involvement since the 1950s, I note Chinese military assistance to the Palestinians during the 1960s-70s and strong criticism of Israel. But from the 1980s Beijing adopted a more diplomatic approach and endorsed the two-state solution. The change was due to China's broader regional and international relations. During the Cold War Beijing's 'active' pro-Palestinian stance was associated with being 'outside' the superpower-dominated international system. By the end of the Cold War Beijing was 'inside' the international system and increasingly integrated into the global economy. Commercial considerations trumped political ones, emphasising diplomacy. This suggests China's exercise of global power may be more nuanced and less overt than otherwise assumed.