Search results

AbstractThe paper studies the effects of abolishing fees in the public childcare facilities on the maternal labor supply and provides evidence from a post‐Soviet developing country, Armenia, characterized with low female labor force participation and high unemployment. The reform unexpectedly introduced only in the capital city created a natural experiment which we investigate using difference‐in‐differences methodology. The statistically significant increase of the childcare service utilization is shown to be affecting only marginally the maternal labor supply as measured by intention‐to‐treat effects. The positive results are more robust when only women actually utilizing the services are considered, but all the effects obtained fade out already in the second year after the reform. The robustness of our findings is tested by a series of placebo regressions.

This report examines the social policy response of the Government of Armenia to the Covid-19 crisis. Official data on the implemented programs suggest that since March 2020, around USD 55 million has been transferred to individuals and households as wage support, unemployment and family benefits, utility payment subsidies and tuition fee support. Survey data suggest that despite being early and extensive, government assistance has not been effective in relieving the financial stress and anxiety caused by the pandemic, while public expectations about the future remain pessimistic. As individuals most and least in need have benefited equally from the implemented programs, government assistance has also not been well-targeted. ; 10

This paper examines the social policy response of the Government of Armenia to the COVID-19 crisis. Official data on the implemented programs suggest that since March 2020, around USD 55 million has been transferred to individuals and households as wage support, unemployment and family benefits, utility payment subsidies and tuition fee support. Survey data suggest that despite being early and extensive, government assistance has not been effective in relieving the financial stress and anxiety caused by the pandemic, while public expectations about the future remain pessimistic. As individuals most and least in need have equally benefited from the implemented programs, government assistance has also not been well-targeted.

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.