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"Small states are dependent on the economic, political, and societal shelter provided by larger states and international organizations to survive and prosper. Iceland provides an ideal case study for shelter theory, due both to its smallness as compared with its larger neighbouring states, as well as its status as both an entity and then as a state. That Iceland has historically been so isolated, relative to other small European states, also makes it easier to trace the country's interactions with other actors, since the impact of each interaction can be measured more definitively thus broadening the theory's validity and offering new insights into its operations. The contributors to this volume focus on the extent of Iceland's external engagement with other states and the domestic consequences of this interaction. Societal shelter, in terms of transfer of norms and values, is as of much importance as economic and political shelter. By unpacking the structure of Iceland's external relations, this book demonstrates both the size-related disadvantages and the unique needs of small states to evaluate, explain, and predict small state behaviour. This book will be of interest to all scholars in international relations, especially those interested in small state behaviour"--

According to the international relations literature, small countries need to form an alliance with larger neighbours in order to defend themselves and be economically sustainable. This paper applies the assumption that small states need economic and political shelter in order to prosper, economically and politically, to the case of Iceland, in an historical context. It analyses whether or not Iceland, as a small entity/country in the Middle Ages (from the Settlement in the 9th and 10th centuries until the late 14th century) enjoyed political and economic shelter provided by its neighbouring states. Admitting that societies were generally much more self-sufficient in the Middle Ages than in our times, the paper argues that Iceland enjoyed essential economic shelter from Norwegian sea power, particularly as regards its role in securing external market access. On the other hand, the transfer of formal political authority from Iceland to the Norwegian crown was the political price paid for this shelter, though the Icelandic domestic elite, at the time, may have regarded it as a political cover. The country's peripheral location shielded it both from military attacks from outsiders and the king's day-to-day interference in domestic affairs. That said, the island was not at all unexposed to political and social developments in the British Isles and on the European continent, e.g. as regards the conversion to Christianity and the formation of dynastic and larger states. This paper claims that the analysis of the need for shelter needs to take into account the political and economical costs that may be involved in a shield. Also, it needs to address how external actors may solve the problem of internal order. Moreover, an analysis from the point of view of the advantages of political or military shelter needs to address the importance of the extent of engagement of a small community, particularly a remote one, with the outside world. The level of engagement and the identity of the entity with which reciprocal transactions take place may have an important bearing on the community. This was the case in Iceland, i.e. communication with the outside world was of immense importance during the Middle Ages. Hence, the paper suggests that an analysis of the means by which shelter was secured must address the importance of communication according to the centre-periphery relations model.

The aim of this article is to examine Iceland's international activity during the last decade. The case of Iceland will be placed in a 'new' conceptual framework intended to explain how the size of states may shape their international approaches. The conceptual framework includes six criteria that affect the notion of the size of states and influence their international behaviour; their internal and external 'action capacity' and 'vulnerability' in terms of these criteria define the size of states and may account for their international approaches. This case study tests Iceland's increased international involvement within the framework in order to explain why Iceland has changed its international approach and become a more active player in the international arena since the mid-1990s. The country's increased activity in the international system is explained by two interrelated features presented in the framework: a change of perception and preference by a large part of the Icelandic political elite and external pressure reflecting the view of international actors. This has led to a policy change at the domestic level. There has been a move away from an international approach built on historical bilateral relations, with a narrow focus on the concrete economic advantages to be gained from all overseas activity, to an approach based on more broadly defined interests and increased international activity within multilateral international organizations.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the features that have determined Iceland's international activity and to what extent Iceland has been an active participant in the international system. The paper focuses on the period from the time Iceland took full charge of the conduct of its foreign policy from Denmark in 1940 until 1994, fifty years after Iceland became a Republic and joined the European Economic Area (EEA). At the time of Iceland's entry to the United Nations (UN) in 1946, it had the lowest population of all UN member states. Iceland soon joined most of the international organizations created in Europe and internationally after the Second World War. Iceland's neighbouring states, the Nordic states, became pro-active within the UN and other international institutions, and the interesting question is to what extent Iceland, as a small newly-independent state, became involved in the international community.

The paper argues that there is not necessarily a correlation between political, economic and societal shelter. Iceland received considerable societal and political shelter from Denmark in the period under study, but Denmark failed to provide its remote island with economic cover. Firstly, and most importantly, it provided substantial and highly valuable societal shelter. Copenhagen was the main channel by which new knowledge and technology could enter Iceland. The islanders benefited from educational, health-care and social policies of the crown and it played an invaluable role in preserving Iceland's cultural heritage. Secondly, Denmark provided partial protection of Icelandic waters and land though Iceland's peripheral position continued to be its main protection from outside attacks. However, at the end of our period, the Danish kingdom was in decline and unable to provide political cover. Nevertheless, increased centralization, initiated from Denmark, provided internal order and political stability and citizens became more equal before the law. Thirdly, Icelanders paid a heavy price for the Danish trade monopoly though Icelanders continued to receive partial economic and societal shelter from foreign merchants and fishermen. The crown's policies towards Iceland can largely be explained by current ideological trends at any given time. By being in constant contact with the European continent through Denmark, Icelandic society was part of the societal, political and economic evolution in Europe and managed to avoid isolation despite its geographical remoteness.

The paper applies the assumption that small states/entities need economic and political shelter in order to prosper, to the case of Iceland in the period from 1400 to the Reformation in the mid-16th century. Also, it applies the findings from the first paper in this 'hexalogy' (a six-paper series) on Iceland's external relations in a historical context, i.e. that Iceland enjoyed societal shelter in the Middle Ages, to this period. The aim is both to analyse whether or not Icelanders enjoyed economic, political and societal cover from their engagements with the Danes, English and Germans and to evaluate the validity of the 'shelter theory'. The paper argues that Iceland enjoyed considerable economic and societal shelter from its encounters with English and German merchants and fishermen in a period in which Danish political cover was formally in place but was not effective in practice. Moreover, the paper claims that the shelter theory, and small-state studies in general, need to take notice of the importance of social communication with the outside world for a small entity/state. Also, the Danish political vacuum in our late Medieval Period provided the islanders with economic opportunities and social engagements with the wider world. This was at the cost of continued domestic clashes between the islanders themselves, on the one hand, and between them and 'outsiders' on the other. Our findings indicate that in the case of Iceland there might be a trade-off between the benefits of strict political cover by a single external actor, and the economic and societal opportunities accompanied by a lack of political affiliations.

This paper examines whether particular subjective features are better suited than objective feature, to study the ability of the Nordic EU member states to have a say within the environmental policy of the EU. The Nordic states will be placed within a conceptual framework intended to explain states' ability to exercise influence internationally. The paper will argue that raditional quantitative measures normally defining size of states, such as the population, territorial size, GDP and military strength, do not give a clear picture of their influence within the EU. The paper argues that subjective features, which are concerned with how various domestic and external actors regard the Nordic states in environmental matters, have enabled the Nordic states to punch above their weight in EU environmental policy-making. Also, it is maintained here that features such as Nordic politicians' ambitions and prioritizations and their ideas about EU decision-making processes may indicate their states' ability to influence within the Union. Furthermore, we claim that states' administrative competence and the degree of domestic cohesion, combined with the degree to which the state maintains an external united front are important indicators of their success in the EU.