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This monograph examines the relationship between science and democracy. The author argues that there is no clear-cut division between science and the rest of society. Rather, scientists and laypeople form a single community of inquiry, which aims at the truth. To defend his theory, the author shows that science and society are both heterogeneous and fragmented. They display variable and shifting alliances between components. He also explains how information flow between science and society is bi-directional through "transactional" processes. In other words, science and society mutually define themselves. The author also explains how science is both objective and laden with values. Coverage includes a wide range of topics, such as: the ideal of value-free science, the is/ought divide, "thick terms" and the language of science, inductive risk, the dichotomy between pure science and applied science, constructivism and the philosophy of risk. It also looks at the concepts of truth and objectivity, the autonomy of science, moral and social inquiry, perfectionism and democracy, and the role of experts in democratic societies. The style is philosophical, but the book features many examples and case-studies. It will appeal to philosophers of science, those in science and technology studies as well as interested general readers

Foreword : like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants / Giovanni Scarafile -- Introduction : the relationship between science and democracy : harmonic and confrontational conceptions / Pierluigi Barrotta -- The dam project : who are the experts? : a philosophical lesson from the Vajont disaster / Pierluigi Barrotta and Eleonora Montuschi -- Rational decisions in a disagreement with experts / Istvssn Danka -- Rethinking the notion of public : a pragmatist account / Roberto Gronda -- The expert you are (not) : citizens, experts and the limits of science communication / Selene Arfini and Tommaso Bertolotti -- Decisions without scientists? : two case studies about GM plants and invasive acacia in Hungary / Anna Petschner -- Save the planet, win the election : a paradox of science and democracy, an Israeli perpetuum mobile and Donald Trump / Aviram Sariel -- Science and the source of legitimacy in democratic regimes / Oded Balaban -- The ethics of communication and the Terra Terra Project / Giovanni Scarafile and Maria Elena Latino -- The political use of science : the historical case of Soviet cosmology / Mauro Stenico -- The dialectical legacy of epigenetics / Flavio D'abramo

The relationship between science and democracy has become a much-debated issue. In recent years, we have even seen an exponential growth in literature on the subject. No doubt, the interest has partly been justified by the concern of public opinion over the technological repercussions of scientific research. Moreover, there are scientific theories that, if they were accepted, would allegedly imply the adoption of policies that have wide social consequences, as well as a rethinking of deeply-rooted habits on the part of the citizens. These considerations alone allow us to understand the reasons for the interest in the, at times troublesome, relationships between science and public opinion which characterize democratic societies.

AbstractIn this article we develop a pragmatist-inspired notion of intelligence that should lead to a better understanding of the notion of scientific expertise. The notion of intelligence is drawn from Dewey and is therefore used here in its technical sense. Our thesis is that scientific knowledge is a necessary but not sufficient condition for scientific expertise; intelligence should also be added. Conceived of as the capacity to apply general knowledge to particulars, we reach the conclusion that intelligence is a necessary requirement for scientific experts in the wake of Dewey's logic of inquiry. In particular, we argue that an all-important task that scientific experts are asked to accomplish, and which puts their expertise to the test, is to transform indeterminate situations into problematic situations, and that such a goal can only be achieved if scientific experts succeed in paying attention to all the contingent and precarious aspects that make the situation they face unique.

In this paper, we argue that the formulation of typical expert judgements – here referred to as 'judgement calls' – entails figuring out how to apply 'general knowledge' to specific circumstances (what we call the 'relevance query'). This requires wisdom, in its original Aristotelian sense, on the part of the scientific expert, as knowledge of laws and initial conditions is not sufficient to make judgement calls. Experts need to take into consideration factors coming from 'outside' the remit of scientific theory, thereby crossing the divide between empirical evidence and socio-political input (what we call the 'expert query'). Arguing against some form of the fact-value distinction is far from an original move, but we will do so both by avoiding the conclusion that expert judgements are nothing but political (against the received view in the sociology of science), and by advocating a somewhat novel perspective. We will claim that expert scientific knowledge proves to be inadequate when it is not integrated with local knowledge, which we define as the knowledge of all factors, which are deemed relevant to the application of general knowl- edge to specific circumstances. The possession and role of this type of knowledge, though partly an empirical (or sociologically situated) question, can be justified by epistemological reasons.