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This study explores the varieties of civilian praetorianism or the different ways in which civilians enable and support military coups. It specifically argues that by shaping their access to different sets of resources, civilians' proximity to the political establishment and their level of social capital influence their method of support. Civilians linked to the political establishment wield resources better suited for enabling praetorianism through tactics like initiating or plotting coup conspiracies with military officers. Conversely, civilians with high levels of social capital hold resources valuable for consolidating praetorianism through tactics like providing post-coup support and neutralizing anti-coup opposition. Qualitative evidence from three coup episodes in Sudan demonstrates the argument's plausibility. By explaining the important variation in civilian capabilities and resources, this study advances research on civilian coup involvement, which—although understudied—is critical to understanding coup politics.

Abstract
The last two decades have seen an increased focus on reporting bias in large-N datasets. Research on coups d'etat has similarly increased given the availability of coup datasets. This essay argues that while the availability of such data has pushed scholarship forward, the data collection process behind these efforts remains plagued with limitations common to event datasets. Rather than building on what previous projects have accomplished, researchers have invariably developed "new" datasets that suffer from the same problems as earlier efforts. Specifically, we point to reliance on international news sources such as The New York Time and Keesing's Record of World Events - without the adequate consultation of regional sources and expertise - as a source of concern. We explore this issue by assessing the coverage of coup events from three country cases from the post-colonial Middle East: Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Our findings show that while existing data on successful and failed coups are largely adequate, scholars interested in coup plots and rumors will require a wider breadth of source material to identify such cases.

The last two decades have seen an increased focus on reporting bias in large-N datasets. Research on coups d'etat has similarly increased given the availability of coup datasets. This essay argues that while the availability of such data has pushed scholarship forward, the data collection process behind these efforts remains plagued with limitations common to event datasets. Rather than building on what previous projects have accomplished, researchers have invariably developed "new" datasets that suffer from the same problems as earlier efforts. Specifically, we point to reliance on international news sources such as The New York Time and Keesing's Record of World Events - without the adequate consultation of regional sources and expertise - as a source of concern. We explore this issue by assessing the coverage of coup events from three country cases from the post-colonial Middle East: Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Our findings show that while existing data on successful and failed coups are largely adequate, scholars interested in coup plots and rumors will require a wider breadth of source material to identify such cases.

Though oil wealth is associated with poor economic performance, repression, civil war, and other maladies, the resource is also associated with increased regime durability. We explore this paradox by investigating the influence of oil wealth on coups d'état. Prior findings on the relationship between oil and coups have been inconsistent, a trend we argue is attributable to the varied and sometimes invalid specification of the dependent variable. We theorize that the potential payoff of coups in oil-rich states incentivizes elites to be more risk acceptant when considering coup attempts. We consequently anticipate coup attempts are more likely in oil-rich states, but under conditions that are less likely to succeed. An assessment of a global sample offers strong evidence that oil-rich states are "cursed" with more attempted coups. However, oil rents are not associated with more successful coups. These results explain the curse/durability paradox and point to an understudied aspect of the oil curse and authoritarian survival.

AbstractThe term "coup" has been used to describe a diverse range of events. Although recent decades have seen the academic study of coups focus on an increasingly narrow type of military intervention in politics, the general public, governments, and international organizations frequently apply the coup label to a broader set of antidemocratic actions. This was dramatically illustrated after the overrunning of the US Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, when discussions of the event led to debates about whether or not it constituted a coup. More than a mere matter of semantics, describing an event as a coup can have analytical, normative, and practical implications. The scholars in this forum explore the challenges inherent in distinguishing coups from other types of antidemocratic actions, highlight gaps between academic and popular conceptions of the term, and identify ways in which scholars can productively contribute to public debates around contentious events.