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This article explores the role of the battleship in naval strategy, challenging the contention that they were obsolete before the end of World War II, using the D-Day landings of June 1944 as its focus. It argues that battleships played two indispensable roles. First, they countered the threat from enemy capital ships, both to achieve command of the sea and to protect the invasion fleet. Second, they provided fire support both for the initial assault and also thereafter in defending the bridgehead and assisting the Allied advance, thereby contributing to the collapse of the German strategy for defence.

This article examines the utility of naval aviation, specifically the contribution of the British naval air arm to Operation Overlord. It argues that while there were practical reasons for carriers not being present directly off the Normandy beaches, British naval aviation supported the invasion both directly (from ashore, and from carriers operating at a distance) and indirectly, over a long period. It was also performing a range of other roles in several theatres. Navies and naval aviation contribute to campaigns in a way that is different to land-based forces; understanding this requires a bigger map and a longer timeline.

During the Second World War, there were intense disputes between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over the provision of air support for the Battle of the Atlantic. This was not mere inter-service squabbling, but rather the product of deep and long-standing differences about the nature and conduct of war. The Admiralty, fully appreciating the central role of air power in attacking and defending sea communications, repeatedly asked for the under-resourced Coastal Command to be strengthened. The Air Staff, however, consistently and strenuously resisted these requests due to the overwhelming priority it placed on the strategic air offensive against Germany. This article examines these disputes between 1940 and 1943, assessing the arguments presented by the Air Staff and by the Admiralty. It argues that the Air Staff was dogmatically fixated on demonstrating that bombing could win the war on its own, despite ample evidence to the contrary, and failed to allocate aircraft appropriately. As a result, the war at sea did not receive the support that its strategic importance justified. It further argues that Churchill and his government failed to adjudicate effectively on this vital issue as a result of their sloppy and inconsistent approach to setting priorities.