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On the final day of her American Government class last spring, one of my wife's students approached her and said, "You're a really great teacher. It's too bad you're teaching this subject. I hate politics." The young man had begun the course getting D's and F's, but gradually raised his grades to B's. Clearly he was diving into the work, but the dislike of politics that he brought into the course remained.Professor Linda Bennett's experience at Wittenberg University typifies what many people tell me and my observations confirm. Today's young Americans on and off campus have a visceral dislike of politics, and it is expressed in many ways.Like many Americans over 30, young people do not trust politicians, believing many to be corrupt and self-serving. Large percentages think government is unresponsive to people like themselves, and that government is too much in thrall to well-organized special interest groups. The 1994 National Election Study found, for example, that 77% of Americans under 30 said they trusted the Federal government to do the right thing only "some of the time" or "none of the time"; 79% thought that Washington was run to benefit just "a few big interests looking out for themselves"; and 54% believed that "quite a few" of the people in government are crooked. (Among those over 30, 79% said they did not trust the government in Washington to do the right thing; 80% thought it benefitted just a few big interests; and 51% said that quite a few people in government were crooked.) Large portions of young Americans do not think that they have any political clout or that national politicians are solicitous of their opinions.

Examines disillusionment with the political system and disinterest in government and politics among university students; with recommendations for educators; US.

Before the 1976 presidential primaries had begun, the figure of George Wallace loomed large in the American political arena. Pollsters and journalists speculated widely on how many Democratic convention delegates Wallace would win, what influence he would have on the Democratic convention, and whether he would lead a third-party movement if denied the Democratic nomination. Events from the New Hampshire through the California primaries proved much of this speculation to be idle, for Wallace never did mount a serious challenge within the Democratic party. Using data from the 1968 through 1976 SRC/CPS Election Studies, this work traces the sources of Wallace support over time and advances several hypotheses as to why the "Wallace Factor" was relatively absent in the 1976 campaign.

With the 2004 European Parliament elections approaching, it is useful to consider what affects voting in these elections. This paper addresses the puzzle of declining turnout in European Parliament elections. After reviewing the influential "second order elections" explanation emphasizing domestic influences on turnout, especially Mark Franklin's recent study stressing the importance of electoral salience factors, we develop a revised model to incorporate EU as well as domestic variables. Our model indicates that EU influences, at least on the aggregate level, may have more influence on EP elections than previously reported. Tests of our model for the first five EP elections, 1979 through 1999, find that it provides an alternative explanation of turnout similar in power to Franklin's model. Because of changes in membership of the EU, our alternative model may be preferable for explaining future turnout variation in EU elections.

Data from Great Britain and the United States from the late 1950s to the early 1990s show
relatively little change in the frequency with which citizens engage in political discussions, with
whom they are likely to speak, and the variables that shape their propensity to engage in political
talk. In addition, analyses of the data show that discussing politics enhances citizens' knowledge
of public affairs, even net of other variables known to affect political knowledge. Students of
political behaviour and those interested in strengthening democracy need to treat political
discussions as an important form of political participation.

Data from Great Britain and the United States from the late 1950s to the early 1990s show relatively little change in the frequency with which citizens engage in political discussions, with whom they are likely to speak, and the variables that shape their propensity to engage in political talk. In addition, analyses of the data show that discussing politics enhances citizens' knowledge of public affairs, even net of other variables known to affect political knowledge. Students of political behaviour and those interested in strengthening democracy need to treat political discussions as an important form of political participation. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

The Bosnian civil war offers an opportunity to examine the American public's attitudes toward foreign policy problems in the post-cold war era. We use polls conducted for the Times Mirror/Pew Research Center for the People and the Press from 1992 to 1996 and indicators of media coverage of Bosnia to analyze trends in public attention to and knowledge of the conflict. As expected, events, media coverage, public attention to that coverage, and knowledge of the conflict are related. Knowledge rises over time, but the increase is greatest among the most educated. Greater knowledge also produced differing policy preferences. The more knowledgeable Americans were, the more they sympathized with the Bosnian Muslims. The relationship between knowledge and support for more aggressive U.S. options, however, was mixed. The data on Bosnia suggest that the public can become interested in foreign policy in the post-cold war era, but we cannot predict the duration of that interest.